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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court held the prohibition of lawyer advertising
unconstitutional in Bates v. State Bar of Arizonal American lawyers have
engaged in heated debate over the appropriateness of advertising for their
profession. Although the debate over lawyer advertising-especially as it
applies to mass media-raises relatively new issues for the profession, the
1. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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concerns at the heart of the debate are the oldest that lawyers as a
profession face. Lawyer advertising at its core is concerned with "profes-
sionalism": how lawyers, as an organized profession, ought to deliver legal
service to the public.
Immediately following Bates, most state bar associations proceeded to
regulate false and misleading advertisements. 2 Recently, however, concern
with the image of lawyers has prompted many states to commence a
"second wave" of attorney advertising regulation. Led by new bar rules in
Iowa and Florida,3 several states, through regulation, have attempted to
supress "undignified," "tasteless," and "sleazy" lawyer ads. 4 Some have
argued that lawyer advertisements have become the "graven image" of the
profession. Indeed, state bar associations-in the spirit of a modern day
Moses-often have acted through regulation to curtail or suppress the
harsh imagery of lawyers who advertise. Recent regulation has focused
particularly on mass media advertising, disclaimers, and maintaining pro-
fessional "dignity" in messages to the public.
Apart from raising several constitutional questions,5 this second wave
reveals a fundamental tension which underlies the legal profession: Can
lawyers make their services widely available to the public while sustaining a
high level of quality? Why is the advertising of legal services at odds with
sustaining minimal quality delivery of legal services? Further, does the legal
profession's perception of "dignity" necessarily equate to quality of legal
service?
A. Scope and Purpose
This Contemporary Studies Project6 (Project) is an empirical exami-
nation of lawyer advertising. The Project focuses on the nature and effects
of lawyer advertising and the regulation of lawyer advertising in Iowa. The
purpose of the Project is to evaluate the advertising behavior of lawyers, the
effect of lawyer advertising on the legal profession and on public access to
legal services, the public opinion of lawyer advertising, and the general
success of Iowa's regulatory approach to lawyer advertising. In conducting
this evaluation, the Project considers the history of lawyer advertising and
theories of professional regulation and advertising.
The Project is intended to provide bar associations with a basis for
understanding the arguments for and against regulation of lawyer adver-
tising and to evaluate the successes and failures of current regulatory
approaches. The Project also informs the debate among lawyers about the
appropriateness and effectiveness of lawyer advertising. The Project fo-
cuses on the Iowa Bar Association's generally "restrictive" approach in
2. See infra notes 73-93, 102-69 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 105, 107, 112, 134, 163-64, 170-226 and accompanying text.
4. Resnick, State Tries to Rein in Legal Ads, Nat'l L.J.,Jan. 21, 1991, at 1, 22 (noting that
at least 20 states are currently considering lawyer advertising regulations similar to Iowa and
Florida restrictions).
5. See infra notes 55-71, 94-101, 117-29, 149-60, 217-26 and accompanying text.
6. The data collected in connection with the Project are on file in the University of Iowa
College of Law Library.
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regulating lawyer advertising.7 The findings, conclusions, and recommen-
dations of the Project, however, will be useful for other bar associations,
especially those considering further restrictions on advertising by lawyers
modelled after the Iowa approach.8
Advertising by lawyers always has been a "hot" issue within the bar,9
and it is even more so in today's information age.' 0 Although we do not
expect our empirical findings to solve the current disagreement within the
bar about lawyer advertising," we do think that our findings illuminate and
help refine the arguments used by both proponents and opponents of
lawyer advertising. We also identify successes and failures in Iowa's current
approach in regulating lawyer advertising. Finally, we offer proposals
concerning the lawyer advertising debate.
B. Research Design and Methodology
We began the Project with a comprehensive survey of the voluminous
literature addressing lawyer advertising. During this initial research stage,
we sought to develop an historical perspective and identify the critical issues
of disagreement concerning lawyer advertising within the bar. Once we
identified these issues, we formulated several hypotheses and considered
alternative methods for their empirical examination.
Due to resource and time limitations, mail surveys served as our
primary research instrument. We supplemented this methodology with an
innovative form of focus group research called "electronic message-
testing."' 2 Overall, the Project involved three primary research activities.
First, a two-page survey' s was sent to a random sample of the general
7. See infra notes 170-226 and accompanying text.
8. Iowa has taken an especially restrictive regulatory approach of electronic media
advertising by lawyers. See infra notes 213-26 and accompanying text. The Iowa Supreme
Court has also ordered that advertising by lawyers must inform potential clients of incidental
costs of litigation and articulate a disclaimer. High Court Orders Warning Labels on Lawyer
Ads, Des Moines Reg., May 4, 1989, at A8, col. 2. This revision of the disciplinary rules went
into effect in June 1989. The Florida Supreme Court followed suit on December 20, 1990, by
instituting strict new regulations of lawyer advertising in electronic media. At least 20 states are
currently considering similar restrictions on electronic media advertising by lawyers. Resnick,
supra note 4, at 1, col. 4.
9. See infra notes 39-75 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Resnick, supra note 4 (noting Florida's concern with possible misrepresenta-
tion to the public through television and radio advertisements by lawyers); Lawyers Tap Ads
to Boost Clientele, Des Moines Reg., Dec. 17, 1989, at 1B (noting national trend to employ
marketing firms for advertisement of legal services).
11. To be candid, the authors disagree among themselves as to the arguments for and
against lawyer advertising. While one author has no resistance towards lawyers who advertise
truthfully, the other author views certain types of lawyer advertising-at least in public
media-as unprofessional and damaging to the legal profession. We note this implicit tension
and our personal biases not to undermine the results of the Project, but to delineate its
limitations.
12. We are thankful to Chris Wheeler of Rowan & Blewitt, Inc., a research organization in
Washington, D.C., for conducting this portion of our research.
13. For a reprint of the population survey, see infra Appendix A.
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populations of Iowa and Wisconsin.14 Iowa and Wisconsin were chosen as
comparative forums in order to develop a quasi-experimental research
design because the states are geographically and demographically similar' 5
and they have adopted different approaches in the regulation of lawyer
advertising.'6 The central purpose of the population survey was to assess
the effects of certain types of lawyer advertising on three areas: the public's
perception of lawyers who advertise; lawyers as a professional group; and
the court system.
The second primary research activity was a ten-page survey'7 sent to a
sample of Iowa and Wisconsin lawyers. 1' The survey was modelled after a
similar instrument used by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in
preparation for a report describing the economic effects of lawyer
advertising. 19 The questions asked by the survey concerned the nature of
lawyer's advertising behavior,20 the attitudes of lawyers towards the legal
profession and lawyer advertising,2' and the effects of lawyer advertising on
legal service delivery.22
The third primary research activity was an electronic message-testing
(EMT) session of sixty-three members of the public and twenty-seven law
14. The sample was obtained from TeleConnect, Inc. of Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Of the 2022
surveys sent, 387 (19.1%) were completed and returned. Of the 1022 surveys sent to Iowa
residents, 208 (20.4%) were completed and returned. Of the 1000 surveys sent to Wisconsin
residents, 179 (17.9%) were completed and returned.
15. Wisconsin and Iowa are neighboring states with generally similar demographic
characteristics. The national average per capita income is $12,772. The average per capita
income for Iowa is $12,123 and the average per capita income f6r Wisconsin is $12,387. U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book 8 (1988) (based on
1984 data). The national average percentage of adults with 12 years and above of education
is 71.5%. The Iowa average percentage of adults with 12 years and above of education is 71.5%
and the Wisconsin average is 69.6%. Id. at 5 (based on 1980 data). The average population per
lawyer in the United States is 360. The average population per lawyer in Iowa is 471 and the
average population per lawyer in Wisconsin is 462. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 182 (1990) (based on 1985 data).
Iowa and Wisconsin do differ, however, in the percentages of their respective populations
in urban and rural areas. The national average percentage of population in metropolitan areas
is 77.1%. The average percent of population in metropolitan areas in Iowa is 43.5%, while the
average in Wisconsin is 66.5%. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and
City Data Book (1988).
16. Compare infra notes 170-226 and accompanying text with notes 108, 131, 161.
17. For a reprint of the survey, see infra Appendix B.
18. The sample was obtained from TeleConnect, Inc. of Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Of the 978
surveys sent, 425 (43.5%) were completed and returned. For purposes of the Project,
"completed" surveys include only those with a "yes" response to question 1, indicating only
those lawyers who are in private practice. See infra Appendix B. A higher concentration of
surveys was sent to Polk County, Iowa (which contains the Des Moines metropolitan area) and
Dane County, Wisconsin (which contains the Madison metropolitan area) because of their high
degree of urban and general demographic similarity.
19. Federal Trade Commission, Improving Consumer Access to Legal Services: The Case
for Removing Restrictions on Truthful Advertising 83-99 (Cleveland Reg. Office and Bureau
of Econ. 1984) [hereinafter FTC Report].
20. See infra Section IV.B.1.
21. See infra Section IV.B.2.
22. See infra Section IV.B.3.
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students.23 The EMT, by continuously surveying each respondent through-
out exposure to the media, allows dynamic responses to media
phenomena. 24 This research approach allowed an examination of the
attitudes toward lawyer advertising generally and toward specific media
advertisements held by a sample of both the general public and law
students (future bar association members).
25
C. Organization of Discussion
Following this introduction, Section II of the Project traces the history
of lawyer advertising and discusses developments in the regulation of
lawyer advertising since Bates. Section III discusses theories of profession-
alism, theories of the economic effects of lawyer advertising, and past
empirical studies of the effects of lawyer advertising. Section IV presents an
empirical analysis of the data collected in connection with the Project and
discusses the results. In Section V, we make recommendations for the
regulation of lawyer advertising to the Iowa Bar Association and other bar
associations concerned with the regulation of lawyer advertising.
II. HISTORY OF LAWYER ADVERTISING REGULATION
The historical development of lawyer advertising parallels the devel-
opment of advertising in such fields as medicine and accounting.26 Yet the
regulation of lawyer advertising in the United States possesses a unique and
ambivalent history of its own. Lawyer advertising was common in the
early-nineteenth century and appeared regularly until the bar prompted
ethical and regulatory prohibitions throughout the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries.27 For most of the early through mid late-
twentieth century, state bars completely prohibited or severely restricted
lawyer advertising in most media.28
Thirteen years ago, however, the United States Supreme Court
extended constitutional protection to lawyer advertising in the landmark
23. See Rowan & Blewitt, Inc., Message Testing and Analysis: Conducted for the
University of Iowa College of Law by the Center for Communication Dynamics (Aug. 1989).
This report is on file in the University of Iowa College of Law Library and is available from
Rowan & Blewitt, Inc., Suite 1000, 1000 Vermont Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.
24. Id. at 3. Unlike traditional media testing-which exposes a respondent to a single
message and asks the respondent to assign a "grade" to the message at the end of a specified
time period-electronic message-testing allows each respondent to articulate her reactions by
turning a handheld dial continuously throughout the presentation. Id. The respondents were
given instructions concerning the scales for each message.
25. See infra notes 428-48 and accompanying text. The EMT allows for interesting
comparisons between the attitudes of these two groups.
26. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 776 (Practitioner's ed. 1986) ("Lawyer advertising does
not really have a history of its own; instead, most of the major moves and shifts in the area
clearly parallel those in other fields such as medicine, dentistry, and accounting.").
27. See D. Calhoun, Professional Lives in America 82-83 (1965) ("Advertising by lawyers
began to decline in Nashville during the 1840's and 1850's, revealing that the more respectable
part of the bar no longer operated as a public institution where members advertised for
practice from any farmer or planter who rode into town on Court day and picked up a
newspaper."); infra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
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case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.29 Six subsequent Supreme Court
decisions have defined and expanded this protection. 0 These decisions
have shifted the focus of the lawyer advertising debate from whether
advertising should be permitted at all to what types of advertising states
may regulate.
A. Historical Regulation of Lawyer Conduct
The American legal profession inherited much of its approach to
ethics from England.3 ' For many years, ethical norms and aspirations,
rather than enforceable rules, governed the conduct of lawyers.3 2 Manda-
tory codes of professional conduct have regulated lawyers for most of the
twentieth century.33 Most modern courts and legislatures adopt codes of
professional conduct primarily for the purposes of determining a lawyer's
responsibilities to the profession.34  Codes serve the additional
purposes of education, reinforcement of preexisting inclinations, and
deterrence of undesirable conduct.35
Drafters also might be motivated by factors extraneous to facial
purposes of professional codes. For instance, drafters of professional codes
might be more compelled by protectionist concerns for self-interest than by
concerns for the public good.36 Lawyers have been criticized for potentially
29. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
30. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (state may
not, consistent with first amendment, place an absolute ban on lawyer's good faith claims of
certification where these claims may be presented in a way that is not deceptive); Shapero v.
Kentucky State Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (state may not impose blanket prohibition
against targeted, direct-mail solicitation by lawyer for pecuniary gain); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (printed advertisements aimed at specific audience
cannot be banned unless advertisements are false or misleading); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191
(1982) (state cannot prohibit lawyer from listing fields of practice if listing is not false or
misleading); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (state generally needs to prove actual
wrongdoing to discipline lawyer who engages in solicitation as protected political association);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (state may, consistent with first
amendment, impose blanket prohibition against in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain).
31. See infra notes 39-40.
32. Attanasio, Lawyer Advertising in England and the United States, 32 Am. J. Comp. L.
493, 502 (1986) (although advertising prohibitions were promulgated, they were not en-
forced); FTC Report, supra note 19, at 21 ("[Dluring the 1800s, prescriptions against
advertising did not have much authority."). See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
33. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 48. See also infra notes 54-93 and accompanying text.
34. Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Code of Judicial Conduct scope 12 (1984)
("Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking
the disciplinary process.").
35. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 48; Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of
Lawyers, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 669, 682 (1978) (although professional discipline is rare, "the
existence of sanctions has a deterrent effect").
36. Cf Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism 108 (1976) ("medical profession found
it necessary to protect its tangible interest with a national code .... the medical code etiquette
became the means by which practitioners attempted to... restrict competitive practices [and]
secure and maximize fee schedules"); Gilb, Hidden Hierarchies: The Professions and
Government 20 (1966) (noting that many organizations employ the public interest as a "mask"
in attempting to further their own interests); Illich, Disabling Professions 11, 20 (1977)
("public affairs pass from the layperson's elected peers into the hands of self accrediting elite");
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protectionist regulation.37 Since law is arguably the only profession which
enjoys an absolute privilege of self-regulation,3 8 it is a unique target for
such criticism. Potential protectionism may justify a greater level of scrutiny
in the examination of lawyers' codes of professional conduct.
1. Lawyer Advertising Regulations
The American legal community inherited a general sense of repug-
nance toward lawyer advertising from England.3 9 In the eighteenth cen-
tury, the lawyers of the English Inns of Court condemned lawyer advertis-
ing as beneath the dignity of the profession.40 For many years in America,
vague ethical norms, not professional codes, condemned lawyer
advertising.4' Alabama was the first state to adopt a legal code of ethics.
4 2
Although the Alabama Code explicitly permitted newspaper advertise-
ments that tendered "professional services to the general public," it
condemned as "wholly unprofessional all forms of self-laudation, newspa-
Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis 40 (1977) (asserting that
standardization or codification of professional knowledge can be used as a method for market
control); Barber, Control and Responsibility in the Powerful Professions, 93 Pol. Sci. Q. 599,
603 (1978-79) (professional codes have historically "contributed more to a monopoly of power
and interest for the profession than was good for the public welfare.").
37. See Abel, American Lawyers (1989) (arguing that legal profession historically has acted
to maintain its control over the regulation of lawyers and practice of law); Wolfram, supra note
26, at 48 (stating that protectionism might be a motivation for drafters of professional codes);
Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 639, 667 (1981) (rules
designed primarily to legitimate the role of elite lawyers and secondarily for purposes of
market control); Green, The ABA as Trade Association, in Verdicts on Lawyers (R. Nader &
M. Green eds., 1976) (discussing that while the ABA slowly may be changing, it is still primarily
concerned with preservation of the status quo for the benefit of its members); id. at 19
("[W]hile law is supposed to be a device to serve society ... it is pretty hard to find a group less
concerned with serving society and more concerned with serving themselves than the
lawyers.") (quoting Fred Rodell). For a discussion of the economic benefits of self-regulation,
see generally infra notes 325-82 and accompanying text.
38. The promulgation of lawyer regulations is an "inherent" power of the courts.
Therefore, lawyers as a professional group enjoy a unique privilege of self-regulation
regardless of legislative preoccupation of the field. See Board of Commissioners v. Baxley, 295
Ala. 100, 324 So. 2d 256 (1976) (statute regulating Alabama Bar is an exercise of judicial
powers by the state and therefore is invalid under the state constitution); Sharood v. Hatfield,
296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973) (statute regulating practice of law and distribution of
fees paid by lawyers is exercise of judicial powers and therefore invalid under state
constitution); Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718 (creation of a state bar by the
state supreme court is a valid exercise ofjudicial function) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 939 (1969); cf.
Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law-A Proposed
Delineation, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 783 (1976) (asserting that "virtually all courts claim the inherent
judicial power ... (to] generally regulate the practice of law").
39. Drinker, Legal Ethics 210 (1953) (stating that English trained barristers brought the
advertising bans to America).
40. Francis & Johnson, The Emperor's Old Clothes: Piercing the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13
Willamette L. Rev. 221, 223-24 (1977) ("Advertising, it was believed, would be beneath their
dignity. Since barristers were few and clients plentiful, there was no need for Madison
Avenue.").
41. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 776; Attanasio, supra note 32, at 502.
42. Drinker, supra note 39, at 213.
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per press notices, or editorials."43
2. 1908 ABA Canons of Ethics
In 1908, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted its Canons of
Ethics.44 The ABA Canons consisted of thirty-two advisory statements for
lawyers. These statements established uniform standards for lawyers re-
gardless of the state in which they were admitted to practice.45 The
preamble to the ABA Canons states the objective of maintaining "absolute
confidence in the integrity and impartiality" of the administration ofjustice,
as reflected in the "conduct and motives of the members of our
profession."46
The ABA Canons did not completely prohibit advertising. According
to Canon 27, "the customary use of simple professional cards is not
improper" and "[p]ublication in reputable law lists in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct . .. is permissible. '47 The solicitation of
professional employment was branded unprofessional, however, when
accomplished "by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations. '48
Canon 27 also warned of the "unprofessional" nature of other types of
advertising, such as direct advertising through circulars or personal com-
munication, indirect advertising through newspaper comments or photo-
graphs, and other "self-laudation. ' '49
The ABA Canons were considered unnecessary and widely ignored
for many regulatory purposes. 50 In 1910, only three percent of lawyers in
43. Alabama State Bar Association Code of Ethics (1887). The Alabama Code was
patterned after the lectures of Judge George Sharswood, published in 1854. See Attanasio,
supra note 32, at 503 (noting that Sharswood's work was predicated on his 1854 view of a
homogeneous, tightly knit rural community in which people knew lawyers personally).
44. ABA Canons of Professional Ethics (1908) [hereinafter ABA Canons]. The ABA
Canons were copied largely from the Alabama State Bar Association's 1887 Code of Ethics.
Wolfram, supra note 26, at 54.
45. The Canons were applied in all states, as amended, until the adoption of the Code in
1970. See infra note 54.
46. ABA Canons, supra note 44, at 3.
47. Id. Canon 27. Canon 27 states:
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of the profession practiced; date and place of birth and
admission to the bar; schools attended; with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal author-
ships; legal teaching positions; memberships and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; foreign
language ability; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and





50. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 50.
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the United States belonged to the ABA. 5' Moreover, most lawyers were
general practitioners in small communities who rendered legal services on
a one-to-one basis to people they knew. 52 Appropriately, the ABA Canons
have been interpreted as "an assertion by the elite lawyers in the ABA of the
legitimacy of their claim to professional stature."53
3. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility and Bates
The original 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model
Code) prohibited most lawyer advertising in much the same manner as the
ABA Canons.54 In August 1977, the Supreme Court, in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona,55 extended first amendment protection to fee advertising by
lawyers under the commercial speech doctrine. Immediately following
Bates, the advertising provisions of the Model Code were amended.
56
Bates arose when the Arizona bar disciplined two lawyers under state
lawyer advertising provisions for placing a newspaper advertisement of
"legal services at very reasonable rates" accompanied by a list of specific fees
for certain legal services.57 The Bates Court stated that commercial speech
"serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable
decision making. s58 Because of its concern with the public need for legal
services, the Court rejected the argument that the practice of law is unique
and should not be analyzed under the "commercial speech" doctrine.59 The
51. Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers 289 (1950).
52. Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the First Amendment, 1981 Am. B. Found. Res. J.
967, 968; Attanasio, supra note 32, at 503 (noting homogeneous, rural society in which most
people knew lawyers personally and lawyers could recognize their legal problems).
53. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 54 (citation omitted).
54. The general language of the original Code, however, is more prohibitive than the ABA
Canons: "A lawyer shall not publicize himself, his partner, or associate as a lawyer through
newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertise-
ments in city or telephone directories, or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he
authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf...." Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 2-101(B) (Final Draft, 1969). This draft was adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates in 1970. Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1970).
55. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
56. In addition to immediate post-Bates amendments, minor amendments to DR 2-101
and 2-102 were made in August 1978, February 1979, February 1980, and August 1980.
Wolfram, supra note 26, at 1021.
57. Bates, 433 U.S. at 350. The services listed were uncontested divorce, uncontested
adoption, uncontested personal bankruptcy, and change of name. The two lawyers were
recent honors graduates who operated a legal clinic that did a high volume of standardized
work at low cost. The lawyers believed that they needed to advertise in order for the clinic to
survive. Id. at 353-54. The lawyer advertising provisions effective in Arizona at the time were
modelled after the ABA Code.
58. Id. at 364-65.
59. Id. at 371-72. Commercial speech is speech that proposes a commercial transaction.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S. 748, 761
(1976). Traditionally, commercial speech lacked constitutional protection. See, e.g., Valentine
v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (first amendment forbids blanket ban on communi-
cating information in public, but government may regulate such dissemination of "purely
commercial speech"). Over the years, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of Chrestensen.
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819-20 (1975) (communications conveying information
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Court also rejected arguments that lawyer advertising: has an adverse effect
on professionalism; 60 is inherently misleading because legal services are
individualized; 61 has an adverse effect on the administration of justice by
encouraging fraudulent claims and excessive litigation; 62 has the undesir-
able economic effects of increasing fees and creating a substantial entry
barrier to young lawyers;63 has an adverse effect on the quality of legal
services; 64 and should be banned due to enforcement difficulties.65
Although the Bates Court held that a blanket ban on lawyer advertising
violates the first amendment, 66 it specifically stated that a state can restrain
about commercial activities related to the public's "constitutional interests" may deserve first
amendment protection). In 1976, the Court explicitly extended a level of first amendment
protection to commercial speech. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 770 (commer-
cial speech entitled to first amendment protection but certain regulation still permissible).
Today, commercial speech receives substantial first amendment protection. See, e.g., Dun &
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (credit reportings entitled to the
substantial protection afforded by first, amendment); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Council, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (first amendment protects lawyer advertising which accurately
represents information regarding legal rights of potential clients); see also infra notes 94-101
and accompanying text (commercial speech is not subject to the overbreadth doctrine).
60. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-72. The Court felt it was deceiving for fee-earning lawyers to
conceal that they were engaged in commercial activity. Moreover, the Court said "the absence
of advertising may be seen to reflect the profession's failure to reach out and serve the
community." Id. at 370.
61. Id. at 372-75. The Court found that "routine" legal services can be advertised for a set
price because consumers of legal services are capable of diagnosing their need for legal
representation, and prohibition of lawyer advertising would only increase existing client
ignorance. Advertisements for routine legal services are not misleading if the lawyer fully
performs the service for the advertised fee. However, "[t]he only services that lend themselves
to advertising are the routine ones: the uncontested divorce, the simple adoption, the
uncontested personal bankruptcy, a change of name, and the like-the very services advertised
by appellants." Id. at 372.
62. Id. at 375-77. The Court "[could] not accept the notion that it is always better for a
person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action." Id. at 376. Rather, the
Court stressed the role of advertising in informing the public about lawyers and legal rights.
Id. at 376 n.32.
63. Apparently, the Court dismissed this argument as irrelevant to first amendment
considerations. Id. at 377. The Court found it plausible that advertising would effectively
increase price competition, thus reducing an artificially high level of fees. Id. Moreover,
advertising could allow new attorneys to penetrate the market more rapidly by increasing their
contacts with the community. Id. at 377-78.
64. Id. at 378-79. The Arizona Bar argued that advertising would induce the lawyer to cut
quality in order to deliver a standard package of services, regardless of individual client needs.
The Court reasoned that restricting advertising was not the best way to deter the incompetent
practice of law. Id. at 379. Lawyers who are inclined to deliver low quality services will continue
to do so regardless of advertising. Further, some programs prescribe maximum fees, and
standardizing legal services might actually reduce the likelihood of error. Id. at 378-79.
65. Id. at 379. The Court noted the traditional practice of lawyers to uphold the integrity
and honor of their profession. In addition, the legal system provides adequate standards for
lawyer advertising. Id.
66. Id. at 383. The Court rejected the argument that Arizona's disciplinary rules violated
the anticompetitive clauses of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988), and found that the
Arizona Supreme Court was entitled to state action immunity. Id. at 359-63. The Court
distinguished Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), which held minimum fee
schedules for attorneys violative of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Goldfarb Court found the
conduct was that of the bar association and not the state itself. Id. at 791. Arguably
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"false, deceptive, or misleading" advertising and advertising of illegal
services.67 Additional "reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and
manner of advertising" by the state are constitutional. 68 Such restrictions
might include disclaimers to protect the public, 69 limitations on in-person
solicitation,70 and regulations required by advertising on electronic media,
as based on the "special consideration" noted in Bates.
71
Whether Bates prompted intense competition in legal advertising is
debatable.72 However, Bates clearly hurled state bar associations and courts
into an extensive reworking of constitutionally permissible limits of state
regulation. 73 Substantial controversy erupted within state bar associations
over whether Bates should be read broadly to protect all advertising that is
not false or misleading or narrowly to protect only limited types of
information.74 This controversy resulted in diverse regulatory approaches
among the states.
75
The amended Model Code allows lawyer advertising, although not
without restriction. 76 The Model Code states that "[a] lawyer shall not...
use or participate in the use of any form of public communication
containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or
anticompetitive behavior of the legal profession is exempt from federal scrutiny so long as the
regulation involves direct and active involvement by the state's supreme court. See Wolfram,
supra note 26, at 42; See also Maute, Scrutinizing Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation Rules
Under Commercial Speech and Antitrust Doctrine, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 487, 488, 528
(1986) (comparing antitrust and first amendment analysis of lawyer advertising cases, and
opining that latter doctrine should be preferred).
67. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383. States may require a higher standard of integrity for legal
advertising than for other types of commercial advertising because the "public lacks sophis-
tication concerning legal services." Id.
68. Id. at 384.
69. Id. See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
70. Id. See infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
71. Id. See infra notes 165-69, 213-26 and accompanying text.
72. See Ramson, Counselor, Advocate, Salesman? Attorney Advertising and Solicitation:
An Overview, Ariz. Att'y 18 (Oct. 1988) (noting the magnitude of the lawyer advertising
trend); see also Reidinger, Lawpoll, 70 A.B.A. J. 25 (1987). But cf. Wolfram, supra note 26, at
780 n.46 (claiming Bates had remarkably little effect on the way that most lawyers conduct their
practices; citing the same data as Ramson, but looking only at earlier years); LawPoll: Lawyer
Advertising Levels Off: P.R. Use Growing, 70 A.B.A. J. 48 (1984). The percentage of lawyers
who advertised rose sharply as the attorney's income and the size of the law firm decreases.
Lawpoll: Advertising Attracting Neither Participants Nor Supporters, 67 A.B.A. J. 1618
(1981).
73. See Wolfram, supra note 26, at 780 (noting that the narrow reading of Bates by some
states and the proposed amendments to the ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility
have provided a "minimally constitutional set of rules").
74. Andrews, supra note 52, at 986-88; Wolfram, supra note 26, at 780 n.48.
75. See Andrews, Birth of a Salesman: Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation 43 (1980); infra
notes 102-69 and accompanying text (discussing current state regulations).
76. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101 (1981). See Andrews, supra note
52, at 971. The Model Code was amended to conform with Bates. See supra note 56 and
accompanying text; see also Wolfram, supra note 26, at 780 n.48 (noting that following Bates
some states only prohibited "false or misleading advertising," while other states only
accommodated Bates with great reluctance).
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unfair statement or claim. '77 Further, advertising is limited to specific
information, which must be "presented in a dignified manner. s78 The
Model Code does not distinguish between electronic media and print media
in its restrictions of the content and manner of advertising.
79
Immediately following the Bates case, many states adopted the Model
Code's strict regulatory approach.80 Subsequently, political, social, and
cultural concerns leading to divisive debates over the provision of legal
services and lawyer advertising caused extreme variation among the states
in their acceptance of the Model Code.81 In 1977, the president of the ABA
appointed a Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (Kutak
Commission) to conduct a thorough examination of ethical premises and
problems within the legal profession.
8 2
4. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The Kutak Commission proposed a report to reform the Model Code
to the ABA House of Delegates in 1981.83 This report was adopted as the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in 1983.84 Advertising
provisions of the Model Rules allow a lawyer to advertise services through
77. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101 (1986).
78. Id. DR 2-101(B). A lawyer may only advertise the following items:
[N]ame, address and telephone number; fields of law in which the lawyer practices;
date of birth; date and place of admission to bar; schools attended; public or quasi-
public offices; military service; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; bar
association memberships and positions; memberships in other legal groups; technical
and professional licenses; memberships in scientific, technical, and professional
associations; foreign language ability; names and addresses of bank references;
names of clients regularly represented; prepaid group legal services plans in which
lawyer participates; whether credit arrangements are accepted; office and telephone
answering service hours; fee for an initial consultation; availability of written fee
schedule or estimated fees; contingent fee rates; range of fees; hourly rates; and fixed
fees for specific legal services.
Id.
79. "If the advertisement is communicated to the public over television or radio, it shall be
prerecorded, approved for broadcast by the lawyer, and a recording of the actual transmission
shall be retained by the lawyer." Id. DR 2-101(D) (1981). Compare Iowa's regulations, which
distinguish print and electronic media, infra notes 213-26 and accompanying text.
80. See Wolfram, supra note 26, at 780 n.48. Thirty-one states based their rules in part on
DR 2- 101 of the Model Code. These states allowed lawyers to list "only those items specified
in DR 2-101." Andrews, supra note 52, at 986-88. The other nineteen states adopted a more
permissive approach, and allowed advertising that was not "false, fraudulent, misleading, or
deceptive." Id. at 988.
81. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 50. Many factors precipitated debates within the bar: the
Watergate episode, Supreme Court advertising and solicitation decisions, Securities Exchange
Commission attacks on lawyers, and criticisms that the Model Code was too oriented toward
the adversary model and insufficiently concerned with the public interest of clients. Pirsig &
Kirwin, Professional Responsibility 25 (4th ed. 1984).
82. ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, Chairman's Introduction (Proposed Final Draft, 1981) [hereinafter "Proposed
Model Rules"].
83. Id.
84. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1984).
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public media, including radio and television.85 The only qualifications are
that the advertisement may not be "false or misleading, 86 it must contain
the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content, 7 and it must be
kept on record for two years after its dissemination.88 The Model Rules
address several additional aspects of advertising, including payment for
promotion, 9 communication of fields of practice, 90 firm names and
letterheads,9' and solicitation.92 The Model Rule's regulatory approach,
unlike that of the Model Code, does not limit advertisements to specific
information.
93
B. Constitutionality of Commercial Speech
State action affecting lawyer advertisements that are solely commercial
speech is subject to the test set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission.94 The state may completely prohibit misleading
85. Id. Rule 7.2.
86. Id. Rule 7.1.
87. Id. Rule 7.2(d).
88. Id. Rule 7.2(b).
89. Id. Rule 7.2(c). The rule states:
A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's
services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertisements or
written communications permitted by this rule and may pay the usual charges of a
not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service organization.
Id.
90. Id. Rule 7.4. A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not
practice in particular fields of law. A lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is a
specialist unless admitted to patent practice, admiralty practice, or other practice of special-
ization designated by state. Id.
91. Id. Rule 7.5. Cf Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-102 (1986) (regulat-
ing professional notices and letterheads of lawyers and law offices).
92. In-person, telephone, and certain direct mail solicitation are generally prohibited.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 7.2 (a), 7.3 (1984).
93. See id. Rule 7.1 (allowing lawyer to make any communication so long as not false or
misleading). Compare Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(B) (1987) (listing
specific items which may be advertised).
94. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In Central Hudson, the Court articulated the following test:
In commercial speech cases ... a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we
must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566.
The Court's analysis of lawyer advertising cases distinguishes between substantial and
arguable state interests. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 781. An example of a substantial interest
is the prevention of consumer fraud through false or misleading communications; the
prevention of consumer confusion caused by the word "clinic" in a firm name would be an
arguable interest. A state may regulate advertising in order to protect a substantial interest if
the state also demonstrates: (a) the lawyer'scommunication violates a specific rule; (b) the facts
of the particular qase show that a substantial state interest is in fact violated; and (c) the
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or deceptive speech or speech concerning an unlawful activity.95 The state
may restrict all other commercial speech if. (1) the state asserts a substantial
interest in restricting the speech; (2) the restriction directly promotes that
state interest; and (3) the restriction "is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest."96 This test has been applied so strictly that it has
never upheld a regulation of lawyer advertising.
97
The overbreadth doctrine allows a party to challenge a regulation on
its face as overbroad even if it is not overbroadly applied to the facts at
hand.98 To the extent that lawyer advertising is commercial speech, it is not
subject to the overbreadth doctrine. 99 A recent case, however, suggests the
overbreadth doctrine may apply to noncommercial aspects of a commercial
message.' 00 The Court has suggested that lawyer advertisements may
contain noncommercial messages, such as political and associational
information. 101 An argument exists that the overbreadth doctrine applies to
this noncommercial content of lawyer advertisements.
C. Recent Regulation of Lawyer Advertising by the States
States remain deeply divided over the regulation of lawyer
advertising. 10 2 With the exception of California, 03 each state has adopted
its own version of either the Model Code or the Model Rules, sometimes
with minor revisions. 10 4 Some state codes allow lawyer advertising only in
regulation is not applied any broader than necessary to maintain the state's specified interest.
Id.
95. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
96. Id. Under the Supreme Court's most recent formulation, "no broader than necessary"
does not mean that no less restrictive alternatives exist. Instead, it means that the regulation
is reasonably related to a substantial state interest. Board of Trustees of New York v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
97. See Ramson, supra note 72, at 19.
98. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 12-27, 28 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the
overbreadth doctrine).
99. Id. at 1023 n.5. See supra note 59 (discussing Bates and inapplicability of overbreadth
to commercial speech).
100. A recent Supreme Court case mentions in dicta that although commercial speech is not
protected by the overbreadth doctrine, the noncommercial content of commercial messages is
subject to first amendment guarantees. Where a law restricting commercial speech is valid as
applied, an overbreadth challenge may protect the noncommercial content of the message of
the speech. Fox, 492 U.S. at 481-84.
101. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978) (noting communication of advertisements by
ACLU lawyers as means of political expression and association provided useful information).
102. See Andrews, supra note 75, at appendix III (surveying approaches of the states);
Andrews, supra note 52, at 969 n.1 1 (noting that the amended code sections reflect the wide
variety of state regulation over type, content, and format of lawyer advertising and solicita-
tion); Wolfram, supra note 26, at 781-85 (examining state approaches to different lawyer
advertising issues).
103. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 64. Many local bar associations in California have adopted
the Model Code as part of their bylaws. Opinions of California courts and bar ethics
committees refer to the Model Code for guidance where the California Rules are silent or
obscure. Id.
104. Though the Model Code initially was accepted uniformly among the states, states have
been more hesitant in adopting the Model Rules. Id. at 63.
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those situations where the Supreme Court has delineated constitutional
protection, 05 while others liberally permit lawyer advertising with few
additional restrictions so long as it is not false or misleading. 10 6 Recent
lawyer advertising trends among the states pull at the extremes. On the one
hand, several states have instituted efforts to curb advertising.'07 On the,
other hand, many states have adopted very liberal rules that only prohibit
false or misleading advertising.'
08
1. General Approaches Among the States
A state clearly may prohibit lawyer advertising which is "false or
misleading."' 1 9 States that have adopted the Model Code also tend to
105. See States Continue Efforts to Regulate Advertising, 5 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABAIBNA) 277-78 (discussing regulations in Iowa and proposed restrictions in Florida); see
also Marcotte, Lawyer Ad Limits, 75 A.B.A. J. 42 (1989); Peltz, Legal Advertising-Opening
Pandora's Box? 19 Stetson L. Rev. 43, 103 (1989) (discussing pending regulations in Florida).
106. See FTC Report, supra note 19, at 103-05 (grouping states as "liberal," "moderate," or
"restrictive," according to lawyer advertising content and media restrictions).
107. Such states include Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, and Kentucky. See N.Y. Times,
June 30, 1989, at 20Y. Iowa and Florida have been pushing the limits of constitutionally
permissible regulations of lawyer advertising. States Continue Efforts to Regulate Advertising,
5 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 277-78 (1989) (discussing regulations in Iowa and
proposed restrictions in Florida). For a detailed discussion. of Iowa's regulations, see infra
notes 170-226 and accompanying text. Florida's proposed restrictions: (1) prohibit actors,
lyrics, jingles, dramatizations, and testimonials; (2) require disclaimers advising consumers to
ask for lawyer qualifications; (3) permit only Florida lawyers to appear in commercials; (4)
require full disclosures of client fees and costs; and (5) completely ban direct mail to potential
personal injury and wrongful death clients. Marcotte, supra note 105, at 42. A new bar
committee would review all materials; violators would be required to forfeit their attorney's
fees. Id. See also Peltz, supra note 105, at 103 (discussing pending regulations in Florida). The
Florida regulations were approved, with minor modifications, by the Florida Supreme Court
on December 21, 1990. See The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the
Florida Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1990).
108. See, e.g., California State Bar Act, Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1-400(D) (1990)
(prohibiting untrue, false, confusing, and deceptive communications or solicitations); Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court Rules, Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Rule 20:7.1 (West
Special Pamphlet 1989) (prohibiting lawyer from making false or misleading statements).
109. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.1 (1984) ("[A] lawyer shall not make
a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services."). The Supreme
Court has upheld most communications as not inherently misleading. See Peel v. Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 106 (1990) (letterhead making bona fide
claim of certification by national board not actually or inherently misleading); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (illustrations or pictures in advertisements
not inherently misleading); id. (newspaper advertisement targeted to persons with specific
legal problem and inviting them to use particular firm not inherently misleading); In re R.MJ.,
455 U.S. 191, 205 (1982) (listing jurisdictions in which lawyer is admitted to practice not
inherently misleading); id. (nondeceptive listing of areas of practice which deviates from
precise areas required by disciplinary rule not inherently misleading); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 382 (1977) (offering legal services for uncontested divorce at "very
reasonable prices" when price falls within range of prices commonly charged in lawyer's
geographic area not inherently misleading); id. at 381-82 (referring to standardized legal
practice that offers multiple services as "legal clinic" not inherently misleading); id. at 382
(failing to state consumer may perform service without lawyer's help not inherently mislead-
ing).
The Court, however, has held some types of advertising by lawyers misleading. See Zauderer,
471 U.S. at 652-53 (statement that no fee will be charged unless recovery is misleading unless
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prohibit "self-laudatory" advertising" 0 and require that communications
about legal services be "dignified.""' Iowa is one such state." 2 Significant
differences exist among the states with respect to item prohibitions," 3
disclaimers," 4  solicitation and direct mail," 5  and electronic media
advertising.
116
it informs client of liability for costs and expenses of litigation); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205
(listing lawyer as member of U.S. Supreme Court Bar in large capital letters might be
misleading to general public unfamiliar with admission requirements); see also Matter of Zang,
154 Ariz. 134, 142, 741 P.2d 267,275 (1987).(print advertisements referring to courtroom and
trial expertise misleading where firm has policy of referring actions that went to trial to other
lawyers), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1067 (1988); Leon v. State Bar of Calif., 39 Cal. 3d 609, 626-68,
704 P.2d 183, 193-95, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423, 434 (1985) (direct-mail stating recipient needs $60
to apply for debt relief but failing to state lawyer's fees would be ten times that amount
misleading).
110. The enforceability of prohibitions of "self-laudatory" statements is questionable.
According to one author, these prohibitions apparently cover statements such as "most
successful litigator" or "member of Million Dollar Verdict Club." See Wolfram, supra note 26,
at 782.
111. Whether a statement is "dignified" is a purely subjective question. [1989-90 Transfer
Binder] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 81:207. The state's interest in requiring
"dignified" communications is questionable. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 648 ("[W]e are unsure
that the state's desire that attorneys maintain their dignity in their communications with the
public is an interest substantial enough to justify the abridgement of their first amendment
rights."); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (potential adverse effect of advertising on
professionalism and quality of legal services is not sufficiently related to a substantial state
interest to justify regulation; speech must also be misleading); Bates, 433 U.S. at 369-70,
383-84, (stating that claims that advertising will diminish the reputation of the legal profession
are unsubstantiated and restrictions based on such claims are impermissible).
112. Iowa prohibits a lawyer from advertising statements or claims that are "false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory, or unfair." Iowa Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 2-101 (1989). A 1989 ABA annual meeting, entitled "Lawyer Advertising:
How Far Can Regulation Go?", discussed lawyer advertising regulations recently adopted by
Iowa and Florida. 5 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) 277 (1989). Iowa's regulations
have focused primarily on allowing only "informational" advertisements, requiring that
information be presented in dignified manner and requiring a disclaimer on all advertise-
ments. Id at 278. Additional Iowa regulations require filing direct-mail advertising documents
for pre-dissemination review and limit electronic media advertising to a single non-dramatic
voice. Id. The proposed Florida regulations, which were approved with minor modifications
in December 1990, generally "aim to regulate not only false and misleading advertisements,
but also advertisements that have an adverse impact on the administration of justice." Id.
Additional proposed Florida regulations limit television advertisements to members of the
Florida Bar and completely prohibit direct-mail solicitation in wrongful death and personal
injury cases. Id. The Florida regulations were approved, with minor modifications, on
December 21, 1990. See Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990). New Jersey, like Iowa, requires that
television advertisements be "predominantly informational" and not solely promotional. In re
Petition of Felmeister, 104 N.J. 515, 520-21, 518 A.2d 188, 194 (1986). For further discussion
of Iowa's regulations, see infra notes 170-226 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 117-31 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 138-64 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
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a. Item Restrictions
The Supreme Court has consistently struck down lawyer advertising
regulations that do not pass the test articulated in Central Hudson. In In re
R.M.J., 17 the Court ruled that the state, which did not apply the Central
Hudson test,1 18 had wrongly disciplined a lawyer for not following the state's
language and content restrictions.' 19 The Court confirmed that states may
prohibit false or misleading attorney advertising, but stressed that regula-
tions may be no broader than necessary to prevent deception.120
Three years later, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,121 the
Court strongly reaffirmed a lawyer's first amendment right to advertise
while emphasizing the public's right to be informed. 22 The Court struck
down as unconstitutional state prohibitions on solicitation through adver-
tisements concerning specific legal problems 23 and state restrictions on the
use of illustrations in lawyer advertising. 124 The Court also questioned
whether a "[s]tate's desire that attorneys maintain their dignity in their
communications with the public is an interest substantial enough to justify
abridgement of their first amendment rights."125
117. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
118. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
119. The lawyer advertised that he was admitted to practice before the United States
Supreme Court, and described his practice areas in language other than that prescribed by the
state. Additionally, he did not employ the required disclaimer, and he mailed professional
announcement cards to persons other than former clients. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 196-97.
120. Id. at 203. The Court noted that a state could require a lawyer to stamp "This is an
Advertisement" on the envelope of a mailing. Id. at 206 n.20.
121. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). In Zauderer, a lawyer placed two newspaper advertisements. The
first offered to defend drunk drivers and stated that the "full legal fee" would be refunded if
the client was convicted of drunk driving. The second was directed at women who had been
injured by the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device and included a line drawing of the device. Id.
at 630-31.
122. Id. at 633.
123. Zauderer advertised that he would not charge attorney's fees unless the client received
a recovery. The advertisement did not warn clients that they would be liable for "costs" even
if their lawsuits were unsuccessful. The Court did find that the state could require disclosures
relating to the terms of the contingent fee arrangement. However, unjustified or unduly
burdensome disclosure requirements that chill protected commercial speech may violate the
first amendment. Id. at 653-54 n.15.
124. The Court found that the use of illustrations or pictures in advertisements attract the
attention of the audience and may serve to direcdy import information to the public. Thus,
commercial illustrations enjoy the same first amendment protection as verbal commercial
speech. Id. at 647.
125. Id. at 647-48. The Court noted that even if the state interest was substantial, a
prophylactic rule could not be tolerated. Id. at 644. Although two cases have upheld attempts
by states to regulate dignity in lawyer advertising against first amendment and vagueness
challenges, the Supreme Court has never considered the issue. See Bishop v. Committee on
Prof. Ethics and Conduct, 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (state may prohibit advertising
through fliers, leaflets, billboards and telephone covers to prevent "commercialization" of the
legal profession), vacated as moot, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982) ; In re Petition for Rule of
Court, 564 S.W.2d 638 (Tenn. 1978) (state may prohibit handbills because they are beneath
the dignity of the legal profession). Many commentators consider the dignity standard too
subjective to conform to the first amendment. [1989-90 Transfer Binder ] Law. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABAIBNA) 81:206; Ramson, supra note 72, at 22 n.6.
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In Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, the Supreme
Court held that it is unconstitutional for a state to prohibit a lawyer from
advertising as a "Certified Trial Specialist" by the National Board of Trial
Advocacy. 126 A plurality of the Court held that Peel's advertisement of
certification in a letterhead was not "actually or inherently misleading."'
127
The Court also cited with approval the standard presented by Justice Powell
in In re R.MoJ.: "States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain
types of potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of
practice, if the information also may be presented in a way that is not
deceptive."' 28 Because the certification information Illinois prohibited in
lawyer advertisements could have been presented in nondeceptive ways,
the Court held this regulation unconstitutional. 29 Although some states
allow lawyers to advertise any information so long as it is not false or
misleading,130 most states limit the information a lawyer may advertise to
specific "informational" items.' 3 '
b, Labels and Disclaimers
The Bates Court noted that states may require disclaimers for lawyer
advertisements. 3 2 States generally require two distinct sorts of disclaimers
or qualifying language to accompany lawyer advertising. A popular ap-
proach requires a lawyer's communication to be labelled an
"advertisement."' 33 A less typical approach requires lawyer advertisements
126. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
127. Id. at 111 (plurality); id. at 111 (Marshall, J., concurring).
128. The language originally appeared in In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203; it is cited in Peel, 496
U.S. at 100-0 1 (plurality); id. at 111 (Marshall, J., concurring).
129. The court reaffirmed that a state retains the authority to regulate communications that
are not misleading, but only where the state asserts a substantial interest. Id. at 4687 (citing In
re R.M.J.). In concurrence, Justice Marshalljoined by justice Brennan, suggested that Illinois
could constitutionally require lawyers to provide additional information (e.g., explanations or
disclaimers) with their certification claims. Id.
130. See supra notes 106, 108, 109.
131. Thirty-one states generally follow the Model Code. See supra note 80 and accompa-
nying text. Several of these states, however, have a modified "informational" item list. The
states which have generally followed the Model Code or modified the Model Code list include:
Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming.
132. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). See also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,
201 (1982) (state may require warnings or disclaimers in order to dissipate the possibility of
consumer confusion or deception).
133. For example, Arkansas requires communication to be clearly marked "Advertising."
Arizona requires direct-mail communication to have printed on envelope and first page of the
communication "ADVERTISING MATERIAL: THIS COMMERCIAL SOLICITATION
HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA" in red ink in size at
least double that used in communication. Florida requires advertising lawyers to "mark
'Advertising' on envelope and on top of each page... in type one size larger than the largest
type used in the communication." Indiana requires identification of advertisement as such,
unless its nature is apparent from the context. Iowa requires direct-mail communications to be
labelled "ADVERTISEMENT ONLY" in red ink, 9-point or larger type. Massachusetts
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to contain disclaimers of the advertisement's value.134 For example, Ala-
bama requires that any advertisement mentioning a fee include a message
that no representation is made about quality or expertise.135 However, Bates
also noted the importance of narrowly drawn regulations.13 6 Some have
argued that mandatory disclaimers are tenuously relevant to an advertised
message and thus are plainly inconsistent with the rationale of Bates.'
3 7
c. Solicitation and Direct Mail
Direct, personal solicitation of prospective clients by lawyers tradition-
ally has been prohibited. 38 The Bates Court noted that in-person solicita-
tion poses dangers of overreaching and misrepresentation. 3 9 One year
requires each solicitation by written communication, audio or video cassette, or other
electronic means to be clearly labeled "Advertisement" on its face and on any envelope or
container. New Mexico requires "advertising material" on the face of the outside envelope and
first page of communication, and if recorded communication, dearly state at beginning and
end that it is advertising; South Carolina requires labelling "ADVERTISING MATERIAL" in
prominent type on envelope and each page, and recorded message must clearly state at both
beginning and end that communication is an advertisement. Virginia requires identification of
public communication for which lawyer has paid unless it is apparent from context that it is
such a communication. Wisconsin requires written communication to be conspicuously labeled
"Advertisement." See [1989-90 Transfer Binder) Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA)
81:403-04.
134. See, e.g., Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(A) (1989) (all communi-
cations must include: "The determination of the need for legal services and the choice of a
lawyer are extremely important decisions and should not be based solely upon advertisements
or self-proclaimed expertise. This disclosure is required by rule of the Supreme Court of
Iowa."); South Carolina Rules on Lawyer Advertising Rule 7.3(c)(3) (Law Q. 1989) (commu-
nications must include: ANY COMPLAINTS ABOUT THIS LETTER (OR RECORDING)
OR THE REPRESENTATION OF ANY LAWYER MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE, POST OFFICE BOX 11220,
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, 29211-TELEPHONE NUMBER 803-734-1150."); see
also [1989-90 Transfer Binder ] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 81:405 n.83.
Arizona has considered a disclaimer requirement identical to Iowa's. Letter from Steve Cox to
Dean Paul Bender, Board of Governors of State Bar of Ariz. (March 16, 1989) (citing proposed
ER 7.2 (e)(2), ER 7.2 (g)). The Florida Bar considered disclaimers that would state that
selecting a lawyer is an important decision, that consumers should ask lawyers for their
qualifications, and whether the lawyer in the ad will be doing the legal work. Marcotte, supra
note 105, at 42. However, the only disclaimers submitted to the Florida Supreme Court for
approval were disclaimers for electronic media advertisements. The Florida Bar: Petition to
Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990).
For policy reasons, the Florida Supreme Court refused to approve the disclaimer requirement
for electronic media advertisements. Id. at 459.
135. Alabama Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2- 102(A)(7)(F) (1986).
136. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379-80.
137. See Spencer v. Justices of Pa., 579 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (stating
mandatory disclaimer requirement is not the least restrictive alternative); Wolfram, supra note
26, at 782-83.
138. See generally Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Commercial Speech-
Attorney Solicitation-Inre Von Wiegen, 34 U. Kan. L. Rev. 191, 194-95 (1985); Note, Lawyer
Solicitation: The Effect of Ohralik and Primus, 13 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 960 (1979); Annotation,
Modern Status of Law Regarding Solicitation of Business by or for Attorney, 5 A.L.R. 4th 866
(1981).
139. Bates, 433 U.S. at 366.
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later, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,140 the Court unanimously
decided that a state may, consistent with the first amendment, impose a
blanket prohibition against in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. 141 The
Court found that in-person solicitations commonly exert pressure and
require an immediate response. 14 2 In contrast, other types of lawyer
advertising provide the opportunity for comparison or reflection. 143 This
decision recognized the substantial state interest in regulating lawyers
because of the role they serve in the administration ofjustice and as officers
of the court. 144 Several commentators have argued that the outcome of
Ohralik, which involved a classic "ambulance-chasing" lawyer, would have
been different if the facts of the case had been less extreme.
145
Both the Model Rules and the Model Code contain a general prohi-
bition against in-person solicitation.146 Most states have incorporated either
the Model Rules or Model Code into their solicitation provisions. 47 The
general trend among the states dearly favors prohibiting most, if not all,
in-person solicitations by lawyers. 14
8
140. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). This was a classical "ambulance chasing" case. A lawyer solicited
two teenagers in the hospital where they were recovering from an automobile accident. Id. at
449-50. One of the victims was still in traction. Id. at 450-51. Ohralik secured agreements of
representation. Id. The clients both attempted to revoke their agreements with Ohralik and
filed a complaint with the local bar. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the lawyer's
suspension for violating Ohio's rules against in-person solicitation. Id.
141. Id. at 447.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 457.
144. Id. at 460.
145. See id. at 470 (J. Marshall, dissenting) ("[W]hat is objectionable about Ohralik's
behavior here is not so much that he solicited business for himself, but rather the circum-
stances in which he performed the solicitation and the means by which he accomplished it.");
see also Friedman, The First Amendment Case for Attorney Solicitation, 15 Colum. J.L. & Soc.
Probs. 101 (1979); Comment, Benign Solicitation of Clients by Attorneys, 54 Wash. L. Rev.
671 (1979); cf. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System 113 (1975) (lawyers have
something of a "professional duty to chase ambulances"). Some have argued that permissible
forms of conduct with potential clients, such as luncheons, expensive brochures, membership
in clubs, speeches to groups on general law-related topics, and meeting with heads of potential
institutional clients, are still solicitation for pecuniary gain; only the audience is different.
Elliot, Trolling for Clients, 60 Conn. B.J. 219 (1986). Cf Comment, Benign Solicitation of
Clients by Attorneys, 54 Wash. L. Rev. 671 (1979) (people in middle and low income brackets
tend to know little about the law and are therefore injured by solicitation rules that keep legal
information from them).
146. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 (1984) ("A lawyer shall not by
in-person or live telephone contact solicit professional employment frdm a prospective client
with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a significant
motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain."); Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 2-103 (1986) ("A lawyer shall not [except through lawful advertising
referrals] ... recommend employment as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or
associate to a layperson who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer...
."); see also Proposed Model Rules, supra note 82, at 194 (exceptions for relatives, close friends,
public or charitable legal services organizations, or bona fide trade organizations).
147. See [1989-90 Transfer Binder ] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) 81:2003.
148. See id. (detailing various states' restrictions on in-person solicitation by lawyers). It
must be noted, however, that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held
a Florida statutory ban on in-person solicitation unconstitutional. Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d
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In the companion case to Ohralik, In re Primus, 49 the Court held that
a state may not prohibit direct mail solicitations involving matters of a
"political or ideological" character not undertaken for pecuniary gain. 50
Primus, a lawyer affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union, wrote
a letter offering free legal representation to a woman who had been
sterilized as a condition for receiving Medicaid.15 The Court found the
letter imparted importarit information and was not facially misleading.
52
Unlike in-person solicitation, the letter did not involve an "appreciable
invasion of privacy" or provide an opportunity for overreaching or
coercion.1
55
In Shapero v. Kentucky State Bar Association,154 the Supreme Court ruled
that a state may not, consistent with the first and fourteenth amendments,
impose a blanket prohibition against targeted, direct-mail solicitation by a
lawyer for pecuniary gain. 55 In ruling for a lawyer who sent a letter to
people he knew were having their homes foreclosed, the Shapero Court
relied heavily on Zauderer.156 The Shapero Court also distinguished
Ohralik57 by focusing on the form of solicitation. 158 The Court found the
in-person solicitation in Ohralik "rife with possibilities of overreaching,
invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and outright fraud,"
and therefore impossible to regulate. 159 In contrast, a letter can readily "be
considered later, ignored, or discarded."' 60
Some states require contemporaneous or prepublication review of
direct-mail advertisements for specific services.' 6' Others argue such
1514 (11 th Cir. 1991). The Fane court held that the ban violated the first amendment because
it did not advance directly the state's interest in protecting the integrity, independence, and
objectivity of an accountant while performing the "attest" function-the issuance of an
independent opinion regarding a client's financial stability based on an audit or review of a
client's financial statements. Id. at 1518-19. The court emphasized that the state's interest
"could be equally well served" by a less restrictive regulation. Id. at 1520.
149. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
150. Id. at 434. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 476 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) ("[Ilt is open to doubt whether the state's interests are sufficiently compelling to
warrant the restriction on the free flow of information which results from a sweeping
nonsolicitation rule and against which the First Amendment protects."). The validity of
"political" mailed solicitations in cases where the lawyer earns a fee has not been resolved by
the courts. See Ramson, supra note 72, at n.7.
151. Primus, 436 U.S. at 416.
152. Id. at 435.
153. Id. at 412,435 (letter sent by lawyer to client was used only for explanation of events).
154. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
155. Id. at 478-79 (finding letter that liberally used underscored, upper-cased letters and
included "subjective predictions of client satisfaction" still fell short of the solicitation impact
of verbal solicitation).
156. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
157. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
158. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472.
159. Id. at 475.
160. Id. at 476.
161. See, e.g., Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3(c) (West Supp. 1990)
(requiring that a copy of targeted solicitation letter be submitted simultaneously to dissemi-
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review is constitutionally suspect. 162 Recently, the Florida Bar proposed a
complete ban on targeted mail solicitation of wrongful death and personal
injury cases. 163 The Florida Supreme Court refused to approve this ban on
constitutional grounds.
64
d. Electronic Media Advertising
According to the Bates opinion, advertising on electronic media
requires close examination. 65 Other cases have noted that electronic media
advertising results in less consideration and deliberation by its audience
than print advertising. 166 A few states permit electronic media advertising,
but only under substantial restrictions that limit the information advertisers
can provide. 167 Such limitations on visual or oral communication generally
nation to both the clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court and the State Bar); Hawaii Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 2-103(B) (Michie 1991) (requiring that a copy of communica-
tion be sent simultaneously to prospective client and Office of Disciplinary Counsel); Iowa
Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(B)(4) (West 1991) (requiring direct-mail
advertisements to be filed and, for specific legal services, determination made as to whether
false or misleading prior to mailing; the lawyer bears the burden of proof); Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 7.2 (Michie 1991) (copy of communication must be kept three years
but not subject to review prior to dissemination); New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 16-702 (Michie 1991) (requiring written advertisements to be kept two years after last
dissemination along with record of when and where used, with no prior review); South
Carolina Rules on Lawyer Advertising Rule 7.3 (Law. Co-op. 1989) (requiring that each
written communication be filed with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline within 10 days after it is sent and accompanied by a $10 fee; mandating also that
lawyers who advertise must maintain a file to show how the lawyer knows the person solicited
needs legal services and the factual basis for statements the lawyer makes in the communica-
tion, which the lawyer must turn over upon request); Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules Rule
20:7.3 (West Special Pamphlet 1990) (requiring copy to be filed with the Board of Attorney
Professional Responsibility within five days after it was sent; no prior review required).
162. Cf. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976) (commercial speech doctrine "may also make inapplicable the prohibition against prior
restraints"); Wolfram, supra note 26, at 783 ("extremely unlikely that the Supreme Court
would permit a state to require a lawyer to litigate the constitutionality of an anti-advertising
rule before advertising").
163. See States Continue Efforts. to Regulate Advertising, 16 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 277-78 (1989); Peltz, supra note 105, at 105-06; Marcotte, supra note 105, at 42.
164. "[W]e find that the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Shapero and Peel
effectively hold that we cannot totally prohibit targeted mail advertising .. " The Florida
Supreme Court also rejected the argument put forth by the Florida Bar that Fox overrules
Shapero. Florida Bar: Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 459 (1990).
165. 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
166. Committee on Prof. Ethics and Conduct v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1984),
on remand, 377 N.W.2d 643 (1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986).
167. See Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(B)(5) (West 1991) (limiting
electronic media advertisements to informational content and single, nondramatic voice not
that of lawyer with no other background sound); New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 7.2 (West 1991) (requiring that all advertisements be "predominantly informational" and
that television advertisements not contain drawings, animations, dramatizations, music, or
lyrics); Florida Bar: Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (1990) (approving Florida Rule
4-7.2(b), which requires that electronic media advertisements contain only factual information,
with no dramatizations, and that electronic media advertisements be conveyed by a single voice
with no background music).
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eliminate the dramatic value or attractiveness of such advertising. 68 The
stricter regulation of electronic media advertising particularly affects multi-
office legal clinics, which require television advertising in order to maintain
business.169
2. Iowa's Approach
Iowa has adopted the "toughest" restrictions against lawyer
advertising. 70 The Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers
(Iowa Code), based on the Model Code, was originally adopted by the Iowa
Supreme Court in 1971.171 The Iowa Supreme Court periodically revises
advertising rules upon the recommendation of the Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association. 172 The most
recent revision was made in April 1989.173
a. Advertising Generally
DR 2-101 of the Iowa Code contains the key provisions concerning
lawyer advertising. 174 This rule forbids a lawyer from using or participating
168. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 783.
169. Id.; cf. Nat'l L.J., Apr. 16, 1984, at 2, col. 2 (one national clinic spent 17% of total of
$17,803,300 spent by all lawyers on television advertising in 1983). The Supreme Court has
held that restrictions on the use of specific media could have the effect of prohibiting
communication of specific messages to specific audiences, thus denying equal access to
information. Linmark Assoc's, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977). For example,
advertising limited to print media of general circulation is biased against persons whose
income and education are lower than the average reading public. Grievance Comm. v.
Trantolo, 192 Conn. 15, 470 A.2d 228 (1984) (restricting advertising to print media violates
first amendment because it would deny the illiterate, handicapped, and those with financial
difficulties access to information about legal services).
170. Podgers, Staff Counsel to ABA's Commission on Advertising, in 5 Law. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABAIBNA) 288 (1989). But see Marcotte, supra note 105, at 42 ("Rules in Iowa,
Mississippi, New Jersey, Nevada and South Carolina are also restrictive, but the Florida Bar's
proposals are among the most comprehensive."). Although the regulations proposed by the
Florida Bar clearly would have been the most restrictive, they were approved with modifica-
tions that leave them very similar to, and no more restrictive than, the Iowa Rules. See The
Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar- Advertising Issues, 571
So. 2d at 451.
171. The original 1908 ABA Canons were not specifically applicable in Iowa until 1958.
The 1969 ABA Code was reviewed, studied, revised, and recommended by the Committee on
Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association in 1970. See Gaudineer,
Ethics: The Grievance Commission, 22 Drake L. Rev. 114 (1972).
172. See Committee on Prof. Ethics and Conduct v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565,569 (Iowa
1984), on remand, 377 N.W.2d 643 (1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986); see also
Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(E) (1989) ("[Committee ... shall, from
time to time, consider and recommend to the [supreme] court proposed amendments to
[advertising] ... rules.").
173. See Order of Iowa Supreme Court (filed Apr. 28, 1989), 5 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 175 (1989).
174. Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101 (1989). A lawyer cannot give
money or anything of value to representatives of the media in return for professional publicity
in a news item. Id. DR 2-101(J). See also id. DR 2-103(A) (stating that a lawyer cannot
recommend her employment to nonlawyer who has not sought advice regarding legal




in the use of any form of public communication containing a "false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory, or unfair statement."'' 75 A
lawyer cannot use or participate in the use of "any statement or claim
relating to the quality of the lawyer's legal services, which appeals to the
emotions, prejudices, likes, or dislikes of a person, or which contains any
claim which is not verifiable."' 76 All communications by a lawyer must
contain a disclaimer stating that "[t]he determination of the need for legal
services and the choice of a lawyer are extremely important decisions and
should not be based solely upon advertisements or self-proclaimed
expertise." 77
b. Content Restrictions
In the tradition of the Model Code, the Iowa Code contains several
restrictions on the content of lawyer advertisements. For example, all
information must be presented in a "dignified manner."' 78 The Iowa Code
also restricts the informational content of an advertisement, 7 9 the manner
in which fee information is presented, 80 and the areas of practice and
specialization a lawyer may declare.' 8 '
i. Limitations to Informational Content
The Iowa Code limits a lawyer's communication to items that are
"informational and not solely promotional."'1 2 Specific items categorized as
"informational" by the Iowa Code include the following: Name; 8 3 fields of
practice, limitation of practice, or specialization; 8 4 date and place of birth;
date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal courts; schools
175. Id. DR 2-101(A).
176. Id. "Limited and dignified identification" as a lawyer in political advertisements, public
notices, bona fide business and civic announcements, legal documents or publications, and
communications by a qualified legal assistance organization are exempt from DR 2-101. Id.
DR 2-101(I). Professional notices, letterheads, signs, and cards must be in "dignified form" and
may not violate DR 2-101(A). Id. DR 2-102(A). DR 2-102 also regulates firm names.
177. Id. DR 2-101(A). This disclaimer must be in 9-point type or larger. Id. DR 2-101(K).
Recent amendments to the Iowa Code require this disclaimer for all advertisements. See Des
Moines Reg., May 4, 1989, at 1.
178. Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(C) (1989). The requirement that
information be presented in a "dignified manner" has been questioned by some as pointless.
See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
182. Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(C) (1989). See Committee on Prof.
Ethics v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565, 570-71 (Iowa 1984), on remand, 377 N.W.2d 643, 647
(Iowa 1985) appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986).
183. "[I]ncluding name of law firm, names of professional associates, addresses, telephone
numbers, and the designation 'lawyer', 'attorney', 'law firm', or the like." Iowa Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 2-101 (C)(1) (1989).
184. Limited to the extent permitted by Iowa Code DR 2-105. See infra notes 196-201 and
accompanying text.
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attended; 8 5 public or quasi-public offices; military service; legal author-
ships; legal teaching positions; memberships, offices, and assignments in
bar associations; memberships and offices in legal organizations; technical
and professional licenses; and memberships in scientific, technical, and
professional organizations. 186 All other items are solely promotional.
ii. Fee Restrictions
A lawyer may use "restrained subjective" characterizations of fees, 8 7
but must avoid "unrestrained subjective" characterizations.188 General
print media, classified directory listings, in-person or written solicitations,
direct mail, or electronic media advertising may communicate initial
consultation fees,18 9 availability of fee estimates,19 0 and contingency fees.' 9 '
A lawyer may advertise fixed fees for specific legal services or hourly fee
rates only if specific limitations are disclosed in print at least as large as the
fee information. 9 2 If a lawyer advertises fee information in the classified
185. A lawyer may include dates of graduation, degrees, and other scholastic achievements.
Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101 (C)(5) (1989).
186. Id. DR 2-101(C)(6)-(13).
187. For example, "reasonable," "moderate," and "very reasonable." Id. DR 2-101(A).
188. For example, "cut-rate," "lowest," "give away," "below-cost," "discount," and "special."
Id.
189. Id. DR 2-1O1(D)(1).
190. Id. DR 2-101(D)(2).
191. Id. DR 2-101(C)(3).
[P]rovided that the statement discloses whether percentages are computed before or
after deduction of costs and advises the public that in the event of an adverse verdict
or decision, the contingent fee litigant could be liable for court costs, expenses of
investigation, expenses of medical examinations, and costs of obtaining and present-
ing evidence.
Id. See Committee on Prof. Ethics and Conduct v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1984),
vacated 472 U.S. 1004 (1985), on remand, 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985), appeal dismissed, 475
U.S. 114 (1986) (injunction upheld against television advertisement which did not assist viewer
in making informed decision regarding legal services and which might make viewer believe
that undertaking the listed actions was cost-free).
192. Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(D)(4) (1989). The lawyer must
disclose that: (1) fixed fees will be available only to clients whose matters are covered by the
described services; and (2) if a client's matters are not covered by the advertised services, or if
an hourly fee is stated, the client is entitled to, at no obligation, a specific written estimate of
total fees. Id.
Under DR 2-101(E), "specific legal services" are limited to the following: Abstract exami-
nations and title opinions not including services in clearing title; uncontested dissolutions of
marriage without a custody dispute, alimony, child support, or property settlement; outright
wills; income tax returns for wage earners; uncontested personal bankruptcies; name changes;
simple residential deeds; residential purchase and sale agreements; residential leases; residen-
tial mortgages and notes; powers of attorney; and bills of sale. The Committee on Professional
Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association may recommend amendments
expanding or constricting this list using the following criteria:
1) The description of the service would not be misunderstood by the average
layperson or be misleading or deceptive;
2) Substantially all of the service normally can be performed in the lawyer's office
with the aid of standardized forms and office procedures;
[1991]
LAWYER ADVERTISING
section of a directory, the lawyer is bound to render the stated service. 19
For other fee advertisements, a lawyer is bound to render service for the
advertised fee for at least ninety days after the advertisement.194 Interest-
ingly, the Iowa Code forbids a lawyer from using advertised fee information
for a specific service as an "indirect means" of attracting clients for legal
services not related to the specific legal services advertised. 95
iii. Practice Area Restrictions
A lawyer may indicate the areas of law in which the lawyer practices
to particular areas of law, so long as the lawyer does not list more than
three areas' 96 and does not use the term "general practice" in the
adverdsement.197 The Iowa Code limits the use of "clinic," "center," or
similar collective terms.198 If a lawyer practices only in the areas of law listed
in the advertisement, the lawyer must precede the listing with the phrase,
"practice limited to."'199 If, on the other hand, a lawyer practices primarily
in listed fields but accepts other legal matters as well, the lawyer must
3) The service does not normally involve a substantial amount of legal research,
drafting of unique documents, investigation, court appearances, or negotiations with
other parties or their attorneys; and
4) Competent performance of the service normally does not depend upon ascertain-
ment and consideration of more than a few varying factual circumstances.
Id. DR 2-101(E).
193. Id. DR 2-101(D).
194. The lawyer is not bound to perform a service if the lawyer specifies a time period for
performance in the advertisement, or if the client's matters do not fall within the described
service. Id.
195. Id. A lawyer may not "advise the institution of litigation" in a communication unless it
is disclosed "that the filing of a claim or suit solely to coerce a settlement or to harass another
could be illegal and could render the person so filing liable for malicious prosecution or abuse
of process." Id. DR 2-101(F).
196. Id. DR 2-105(A)(2). The areas of law a lawyer may specify include: administrative law;
admiralty law; alternative dispute resolution; antitrust and trade regulation; appeals; banking;
commercial and retail collections; constitutional law; corporation and business law; criminal
law; debt and bankruptcy law; domestic relations and family law; environmental law; health
law; immigration law; insurance law; international and foreign law; international trade and
investment; discrimination and civil rights law; labor law; malpractice or professional
negligence; military law; municipal law; pension and profit sharing law; personal injury law;
product liability law; public utility law; real estate law; securities law; social security disability;
taxation law; trademarks and copyright law; trial law; wills, estate, and probate law; and
workers' compensation law. Id. The Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the
Iowa State Bar Association shall consider and recommend to the Iowa Supreme Court
amendments to rules expanding or restricting this list. Id. Special regulations govern lawyers
admitted to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Id. DR 2-
105(A)(1).
197. Id. DR 2-105(B).
198. Id. DR 2-101(G). These terms may only be used if a lawyer's practice is limited to
specific services as defined in DR 2-101(E). See supra note 192. The costs of rendering these
services "can be substantially reduced because of the repetitive nature of the services
performed and the use of standardized forms and office procedures." Iowa Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(G) (1989).
199. Id. DR 2-105(A)(3)(a).
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precede the listing with the phrase "practicing primarily in." 200 Prior to
advertising a description or indication of limited practice in an advertise-
ment, a lawyer must report to the Commission on Continuing Legal
Education that the lawyer has: (1) devoted the greater of two hundred
hours or twenty percent of her time spent in actual law practice to each
specified field of practice for each of the last two years; and (2) completed
at least ten hours of accredited continuing legal education courses in each
specified field of practice during the preceding year.
201
c. Medium Restrictions
Iowa does not subscribe to a wholesale prohibition against lawyer
advertising in any medium-whether newspaper, telephone directory,
in-person solicitation, direct mail, or electronic media. The advertising
lawyer or firm must preserve a copy of each advertisement for at least three
years and a record of the name and dates of the publication or medium in
which the advertisement appeared. 202 A lawyer may advertise in newspa-
pers, periodicals, shoppers, and other media published and distributed in
the geographic area where the lawyer maintains offices or where a
significant part of the lawyer's clientele lives.203 Lawyers licensed to practice
law in Iowa204 may advertise in alphabetical listings,205 classified listings,206
200. Id. DR 2-105(A)(3)(b). If the lawyer describes or limits her practice in the advertise-
ment, the lawyer must also include the following disclosure:
A description or indication of limitation of practice does not mean that any agency or
board has certified such lawyer as a specialist or expert in an indicated field of law
practice, nor does it mean that such lawyer is necessarily any more expert or
competent than any other lawyer. All potential clients are urged to make their own
independent investigation and evaluation of any lawyer being considered. This notice
is required by rule of the Supreme Court of Iowa.
Id. The advertisement must also include the disclaimer required in DR 2-101(A), see supra
note 177 and accompanying text. Id.
201. Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-105(A)(4) (1989). If a lawyer is unable
to complete the required hours of continuing legal education, extensions may be granted upon
specified written request under DR 2-105(D). Id.
202. Id. DR 2-101(B)(7).
203. Id. 2-101(B)(1). Such advertising is contingent on the publisher agreeing in writing to
publish disclaimers required by 2-101(A) "in type size not smaller than 9-point on each page
bearing the advertisement." Id. Lawyers can only distribute biographic and informational
brochures or pamphlets to clients and members of the bar, when responding to direct
requests. Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(B)(6) (1989). These brochures
must include the disclaimers required by DR 2-101(A). Id. DR 2- 101(B)(6); see DR 2-101(D);
DR 2-101(F); DR 2-105(A)(3).
204. Or a law firm, "all of whose members are licensed to practice law in Iowa." Iowa Code
of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(B)(3) (1989).
205. Id. DR 2-101(B)(2)(a). A lawyer may only list her lawyer narpe, address, telephone
number, and designation as a lawyer in alphabetical advertisement. Id. See id. DR 2-
101(B)(3)(a) (law firm may list its name, members' names, address and telephone number in
such advertisement).
206. Id. DR 2-101(B)(2)(b). Lawyers may advertise under general heading of "Lawyers,"
"Attorneys," or areas of practice listed in DR 2-105(A)(2), see supra note 196. See id. DR
2-101(B)(3)(b) (same for law firm).
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or display and box advertisements of telephone directories.
20 7
i. Solicitations
In Iowa, a lawyer may not solicit legal business in-person or by
telephone. 208 A lawyer, however, may solicit business by direct mail subject
to certain restrictions.20 9 The Iowa Code distinguishes between solicitations
made to the general public and those made to persons who may need
specific services. A lawyer may solicit the general public via direct mail so
long as other relevant provisions of the Iowa Code are met.210 However, if
a lawyer intends to engage in direct-mail solicitation of persons who may be
in need of a specific legal service, then the lawyer must submit proposed
documents to the Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the
Iowa State Bar Association prior to mailing.21' The lawyer may disseminate
the documents by direct mail only if the Committee renders a finding that
the solicitation is not "false, deceptive, or misleading.
212
ii. Electronic Media
Iowa's electronic media restrictions are among the most stringent in
the United States.213 The Iowa Code permits information to be communi-
cated over radio or television "only by a single nondramatic voice, not that
of the lawyer, and with no other background sound. '214 On television, the
Iowa Code allows no visual display except the words in print articulated by
207. Id. DR 2-101(B)(2)(c). Disclaimers are required. Id. See id. at DR 2-101(B)(3)(c) (such
advertising by law firm may contain the firm name, names of individual members, address,
and telephone number, and must include certain disclaimers).
208. Id. DR 2-101(B)(4)(a).
209. Id. DR 2-101(B)(4)(b). Any solicitation by direct mail and its envelope must contain in
red ink, in 9-point or larger type, a disclaimer stating "ADVERTISEMENT ONLY." A copy
of all direct-mail advertising must be filed with the Administrator of the Committee on
Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association prior to or contempora-
neously with mailing. Id. DR 2-101(B)(4)(b),(d).
210. These untargeted mailings must include disclaimers, id. DR 2-101(B)(4)(c); be marked
"ADVERTISEMENT ONLY"; and be filed with the Committee on Professional Ethics and
Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association. See supra note 209.
211. Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(B)(4)(b) (1989). The occurrence or
condition giving rise to the need for specific legal services must be known or, upon reasonable
inquiry, be possible of being known by the lawyer. The soliciting lawyer bears the burden of
proof regarding:
i) the truthfulness of all facts contained in the proposed communication;
ii) how the identity and specific legal need of the potential recipient were discovered;
and
iii) how the identity and knowledge of the specific need of the potential recipient were
verified by the soliciting lawyer.
Id.
212. Id. "No information disseminated by the soliciting lawyer shall make any reference to
such submission and finding." Id.
213. Reynoldson, The Case against Lawyer Advertising, 75 A.B.A. J. 60, 60-61 (1989)
(surveying Iowa's regulation of lawyer television advertising).
214. Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-10I(B)(5) (1989).
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the announcer.215 To the extent possible, electronic media communications
must be limited to the geographic area where the lawyer maintains offices
or where a significant part of the lawyer's clientele lives.
2 16
In Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Humphrey,217 the Iowa
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Iowa's advertising
restrictions. 218 The Humphrey court interpreted Bates219 as protecting infor-
mational communication, but not protecting speech of a promotional
nature. 220 Further, the court relied on the warning in Bates that electronic
media advertising "will warrant special consideration." 22' The Humphrey
court reasoned that the possibility of deceit was sufficient to uphold the
regulation2 22 and that the regulations were sufficiently limited because they
only prohibited items that "would manipulate the viewer's mind and
215. Id.
216. Id. These advertisements must contain disclosures required by DR 2-101(A), DR
2-101(D), DR 2-101(F). See supra notes 177, 192, 195.
217. 355 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1984), vacated, 472 U.S. 1004 (1985) (in light of Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 629 (1985)), on remand, 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa
1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986).
218. Iowa Code DR 2-101(A) prohibits "self-laudatory" statements. See supra note 175 and
accompanying text. DR 2-101(B)(5) prohibits television advertisements containing back-
ground sound, visual displays, and more than a single, nondramatic voice. See supra note 214
and accompanying text. The court held that DR 2-101 is not more extensive than necessary to
protect state interests since it merely prohibits the "tools" of manipulation. Humphrey, 355
N.W.2d at 571. The court also held that the terms "non-dramatic voice" and "laudatory" are
not too vague. Id.
219. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
220. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d at 570-71. The court found the Bates rationale inapplicable to
irrelevant information, defined as information "mak[ing] no contribution to informed decision
making." Id. at 570. The court concluded that prohibiting such information does not impede,
but rather advances rational decision making by the public and maintains the bar's profes-
sionalism. Id. See also Bishop v. Committee on Prof. Ethics, 521 F. Supp 1219, 1229 (S.D. Iowa
1981) (interpreted by Humphrey court to allow prohibition of all electronic promotional
advertising).
On appeal, the Humphrey court continued to draw the line "between the dissemination of
protected information and crass personal promotion." Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 647. It
refused to believe that the public entitlement to legal information protected in Bates and
Zauderer extended to "electronically conveyed image-building." Id.
. 221. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d at 569-70 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350,
384 (1977)). The dissent, however, interpreted the dicta from Bates not as meaning electronic
advertising is potentially more misleading, but rather as meaning that it requires "special
consideration" of problems such as its nonselectivity and transitory nature. See Humphrey, 377
N.W,2d at 656-57; Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d at 573 (Larson, J., dissenting).
222. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d at 570. The court, "[w]ithout suggesting that the advertise-
ments here were deceitful .... [determined that] in the medium defendants chose, the public
could well be misled by them." Id. The court supported state regulation of "those types of
advertising which result in intrusion, intimidation, overreaching, or undue influence" Id.
(interpreting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462). The court also allowed state regulation of "advertise-
ments which are inherently likely to deceive, or which the experience has proven to be subject
to abuse." Id. (relying on In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202-03). But see id. at 573 (Larson, J.,
dissenting) (applying the Central Hudson test, citing Bates and In re R.M.J. as evidence that the
Supreme Court requires advertising to "be more than 'possibly' misleading" to withstand
restrictions on such first amendment activity).
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will. '228 On remand from the United States Supreme Court after its
decision in Zauderer,224 the Iowa Supreme Court upheld Humphrey because
"the situation in electronic advertising lies closer to face-to-face solicitation
. . . than to printed advertising. '225 The Supreme Court has never
addressed whether this restrictive treatment of electronic media is consti-
tutional. Many authorities, however, have criticized Iowa's approach as
unconstitutional under the reasoning of the Supreme Court in other lawyer
advertising cases.226
223. Id. at 571. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on unpublished empirical
evidence collected by the Iowa State Bar Association in a small focus group setting. This survey
questioned a group of representative persons on their attitudes about lawyers both before and
after viewing television commercials. Following the viewing, opinions dropped significantly
with respect to the following characteristics of a lawyer: Trustworthiness from 71% to 14%;
professionalism, from 71% to 21%; honesty, from 65% to 14%. See Ward, The Case Against
Lawyer Advertising, 75 A.B.A. J. at 60-61 (Jan. 1989).
224. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
225. 377 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa 1985). Zauderer, applying the Central Hudson test, held that
a prohibition of "self recommendation" and a "blanket ban" on use of illustrations could not
be upheld absent a showing that the advertisement was false or misleading, or that the state
showed a substantial governmental interest in the regulation. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplin-
ary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985). See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text. In
Humphrey, the Iowa Supreme Court recognized a substantial governmental interest in
"fostering rational, intelligent, and voluntary decision making in determining the need for
legal services and selecting a lawyer." Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d at 571 (citing Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 377 (1977)). But see Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct
v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643, 657 (Iowa 1985) (Larson, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Supreme Court expressly rejected this "paternalistic" approach in Bates).
On remand, the court did not apply the Central Hudson test or explore less restrictive
measures. The court restated the governmental interest in regulating "a very real potential for
abuse," reasoning that a viewer or listener of electronic media is allowed much less deliberation
than the reader of printed media who has an opportunity "to pause, to restudy, and to
thoughtfully consider" the printed advertisement. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 646. The majority
determined that Zauderer carefully omitted the subject of electronic media advertising. Id. at
645-56. But see id. at 657-60 (Larson, J., dissenting) (Zauderer is controlling because: (1) it
rejected the use of prophylactic restrictions of lawyer advertising in the presence of less
restrictive means; (2) it emphasized that regulation of lawyer advertising is generally the same
as regulation of other commercial advertising; and (3) it reaffirmed that the underlying
rational for lawyer advertising is the public's need for information concerning their legal
rights).
226. Most recently, Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91
(1990), reaffirmed that states cannot prohibit advertising of information that is potentially
misleading if it can also be presented in a nonmisleading way. Id. at 100-01. Iowa's approach
prohibits the presentation of information through certain media, e.g., television commercials
with actors and background sound, that can be presented in a nonmisleading way in those
media. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557 (1980) (requiring courts to strike down regulations which are more extensive than
necessary to meet governmental interest); id. at 564 n.6 (government interest exists in
protecting professional reputation of lawyers, but recognizing that merely assuring dullness in
lawyer television commercials may be more extensive than necessary); Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d
at 572 (Larson, J., dissenting) (both Iowa's content and technique regulations are unnecessarily
restrictive, and combine to violate the first amendment by "inhibiting dissemination of
relevant information without a showing of a substantial state interest"); Maute, supra note 66,
at 519 (although narrowly designed stricter regulation of broadcast advertising should be
upheld to promote important state interest of providing public with truthful information,
Iowa's ban is overbroad to advance any state interest in fostering intelligent lawyer selection);
Tomlins, Attorney Advertising, 3 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 639, 652-53 (1985) (asserting that
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III. LAWYER ADVERTISING AND CONFLICTING NOTIONS OF PROFESSIONALISM
Discussion within the bar concerning the appropriate level of regula-
tion of lawyer advertising parallels the debate about whether lawyers should
be allowed to advertise at all.22 7 Opponents of lawyer advertising assert that
it tarnishes the image of lawyers, undermines the judicial system, and may
actually repel clients.228 Proponents argue lawyer advertising increases
business and provides the public with information necessary to make
informed decisions about legal services. 229 Both would agree, however, that
advertising in poor taste harms the image of the bar and causes the public
to view the judicial system as a commercial enterprise.
230
Bar associations assert several interests in regulating lawyer advertis-
ing. Among these interests are the preservation of both law as a
"profession" 231 and the role of the lawyer as an administrator of justice.232
Economic theory and empirical evidence, however, suggest that lawyer
advertising, by increasing access to legal services, leads to overall gains in
consumer welfare. 233 The essential question in the regulation of lawyer
advertising, therefore, is whether advertising restrictions are effective
means of preserving the judicial system's positive image and protecting the
public's interest in access to legal services.
A. Professionalism and Lawyer Advertising
American lawyers have been recognized as an organized profession
since the late nineteenth century.234 The dominant definition of a profes-
Humphrey, in failing to find advertisement in question misleading, was obligated to apply
Central Hudson analysis; unlikely that regulations were drawn as narrowly as possible to meet
concerns about deception; and although Zauderer did not address electronic media, its
prohibition of blanket ban on illustrations because they are not inherently misleading seems to
prohibit overbroad bans on electronic media advertising). Iowa's electronic media restrictions
also may be invalid under an overbreadth challenge to noncommercial content of commercial
speech. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text (discussing Fox). But see Ramson, supra
note 72, at 21 (noting that the Court chose to dismiss appeal from Humphrey for want of a
substantial federal question and arguing that the Court might uphold "this type of regulation
since Bates, R.M.J., and Zauderer can logically be limited to print communicationV").
227. Hazard, Pearce, & Stempel, Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A Market
Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1084, 1087 (1983).
228. See generally Bianchi, All Our Lawyers are Juris Doctors, 63 Fla. B.J. 63-65 (1989);
Lawyer Advertising-Marketing, Professionalism, the Future, Res Gestae, Aug. 1988, at 63;
Reynoldson, supra note 213 at 60.
229. See generally Calvani, Langenfeld, & Shuford, Attorney Advertising and Competition
at the Bar, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 761 (1988); Cox, Attorney Advertising: The Alpha and the
Omega!, Ariz. Att'y, Oct. 1988, at 23; Trapani, Advertisement v. Solicitation: Shapero Ends the
Controversy Over Targeted Direct-Mailings by Attorneys, 63 Fla. B.J. 31 (1989); cf. Luban,
Political Legitimacy and the Right to Legal Services, 4 Bus. & Prof. Ethics J. 43 (1985).
230. Lawyer Advertising-Marketing Professionalism, the Future, supra note 228, at 63
(stating there is little dispute that distasteful advertising hurts everyone).
231. See infra notes 234-59 and accompanying text.
232. See infra notes 260-99 and accompanying text.
233. See infra notes 325-82 and accompanying text.
234. Other "traditional" professions include medicine, teaching, and the ministry. Bowie,
The Law: From a Profession to a Business, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 741,743 (1988). Though the legal
profession has a deep traditional foundation in England, its historical roots in America are
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sion is a community of persons with specialized knowledge who operate in
the public interest.235 Sociological theories, such as the structural-
functionalist school of Emile Durkheim, have given this definition theoret-
ical force.236 According to the structural-functionalist model, professions
create social order in a society composed of self-interested individuals who
lack common values and are unrestrained by the traditional institutions of
the family, religion, and locality.237 On this view, a profession acts as a
moral protector by guarding society against professional members misusing
privileged knowledge for self-gain. 238 A profession also creates confidence
in the institutions which structure society as a whole by presenting itself as
an altruistic community within an egotistic society.239
1. "Professionalism" Defined
The popular tendency is to define professions according to a dominant
"trait" approach.240 On this view, an activity or occupation qualifies as a
profession if it sufficiently possesses each of many features or
characteristics. 24' For example, the English Royal Commission on Legal
much weaker. For most of the first hundred years of independence, the majority of law
associations were either weak or confined to cities or counties. Abel, supra note 37, at 40; see
also Larsen, The Rise of Professionalism 167-77 (1977) (analyzing the social evolution of the
legal profession).
235. See, e.g., Hansell, Professionalism: Alive and Well in Iowa, 50 Iowa St. B. A. News Bull.
4 (Jan. 1990); Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 Vand. L. Rev.
717-23 (1988).
236. Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Responsibility (1957). The first part of this
section presents the professional concerns of lawyers within a Durkheimian framework. It is
important to note, however, the influence of two alternative theories on notions of profes-
sionalism. First, Max Weber and his followers understand professions as establishing a sense
of social closure in order to enhance their market power. Second, Marx and his followers
understand professions as either a vestige of the petty bourgeoisie or a mediating functionary
between the polars of capital and labor. See Abel, supra note 37, at 15-16; J. Kultgen, Ethics
and Professionalism 62-66 (1988) (discussing these sociological models); id. at 72-98 (discuss-
ing the functionalist model). The second part of this section applies the neoclassical economic
paradigm to give force to a Weberian understanding of professions.
237. Abel, supra note 37, at 16; see also Lombardi, Self-Regulation: Business and the
Professions, 5 Bus. & Prof. EthicsJ. 68, 70-71 (1986) (professional organizations are necessary
to exert pressure for enforcement of organizations' public service goal).
238. See infra notes 239, 241, 327-28 and accompanying text.
239. Abel, supra note 37, at 16; Hall, Emile Durkheim on Business and Professional Ethics,
2 Bus. & Prof. Ethics J. 51, 56 (1982). Of course, many commentators espouse more negative
perceptions of professions. See e.g., Bowie, supra note 234, at 744 (claiming the problem in the
legal system "is that most lawyers are using their specialized knowledge to enable the rich and
powerful to exploit the poor and ignorant while enriching themselves in the process").
240. See Abel, supra note 37, at 16-17.
241. See, e.g., Callahan, Ethical Issues in Professional Life 28 (1988) (stating that a
profession requires extensive training, a significant intellectual component, and important
service to society; other common factors are licensing, organization of members, and
autonomy in their work); Barber, Some Problems in the Sociology of the Professions, 92
Daedalus 669, 672-73 (1963) (noting that the attributes of a profession include a high level of
systematic knowledge, community-oriented interest, self-monitored behavior through an
internalized code of ethics, and a system of rewards which symbolizes work achievement);
Bayles, Professional Power and Self-Regulation, 5 Bus. & Prof. EthicsJ. 26,27 (1988) (arguing
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Services defines the five central features of a profession as follows: 242 (1) A
governing body with powers of control and discipline over its members; (2)
education, training, practical experience, and continuing education in a
specialized field of knowledge; (3) admission dependent on a period of
training, including examinations and tests of competence; (4) self-
regulation, requiring its members to observe higher standards than im-
posed from without; and (5) an emphasis on the priority of the client's
interest.243 It is axiomatic that lawyers as a community possess each of these
that professions provide an important service, possess special knowledge requiring higher
education, and exist as an organization); Bowie, supra note 234, at 743 (stating that a
profession must be extraordinarily complex in its core of knowledge and have a theoretical
grasp of that knowledge, which it must strive to improve and pass on to posterity in an
organized fashion); Goldman, Professional Values and the Problem of Regulation, 5 Bus. &
Prof. Ethics J. 47 (1988) (adopting Bayles' position but adding the attribute of self-regulation);
Goode, Community Within a Community: The Professions, 22 Am. Soc. Rev. 200 (1957)
(stating that the attributes of a profession include a sense of identity, terminal status,
commonly shared values among members, common rule definitions, a common language not
readily understood by outsiders, hegemony from the larger community, and control over the
selection of recruits); Greenwood, Attributes of a Profession, 2 Soc. Work 44 (1957) (accepting
the same attributes as Barber but also emphasizing the existence of a culture); Rice,
Commentary on "Professional Values and the Problem of Regulation," 5 Bus. & Prof. Ethics
J., No. 2, at 66, 66 (1988) (accepting Goldman's definition with the modification that the skill
is predominantly mental rather than physical).
242. 1 The Royal Commission on Legal Services, Final Report, 1979, Cmnd. No. 7648, at
28, 30.
243. Id. at 30. The Model Rules adopt a less systematic definition:
A lawyer is an officer of the legal system, a representative of clients, and a public
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice ....
(In professional functions] a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the
administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession.
As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law
beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to
strengthen legal education. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the
administration ofjustice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are
not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote
professional time and civic influence on their behalf ....
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the
occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain
the legal profession's independence from government domination. An independent
legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse
of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not
dependent on government for the right to practice.
ABA, Comm. on Evaluation of Prof. Standards, Model Rules of Prof. Conduct 1-2 (Proposed
Final Draft 1981).
One author defines professionalism as "public service, not self-service." Udall, Professionalism
and its Fragile and Necessary Foundations, Ariz. Att'y, Oct. 1988 at 25, 26. The legal
profession reminds lawyers of their duties to educate the public about the rule of law and the
judicial system. It demands that lawyers do public, civic, and bar service. It inspires lawyers to
do more than is required, even though their worthy actions may never be revealed. Id. Others
assert that a professional's chief function is to use expert knowledge to "protect ignorant
clients from exploitation, not to maximize income." Bowie, supra note 234, at 744; Metzger,
What is A Profession?, 52 C. & U. at 8-9 (1976). The decline in legal professionalism could be
attributed to lawyers' emphasis with "using their specialized knowledge to enable the rich and
powerful to exploit the poor and ignorant while enriching themselves in the process." Bowie,
supra note 234, at 744.
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features and qualify as a profession.
English and early-American lawyers regarded themselves, and were
viewed by the public, as professionals "dedicated more to serving the cause
and administration of justice than to their own personal and financial
interests."244 Lawyers in America take an oath which proclaims their
obligations to the courts, the clients, and the legal profession.2 45 Some
argue this oath obligates lawyers to keep abreast of developments in public
matters, remain active in public activities, and take part in the public forum
by defending, improving, or otherwise influencing public institutions.2 46
Clearly, one of the lawyer's most important roles is to make legal services
accessible to the public.2 47
The United States Supreme Court has not recognized protecting the
image of lawyers simpliciter as a valid state interest to justify the regulation
of lawyer advertising.248 Recently, Justice O'Connor, in her dissent to
Shapero v. Kentucky State Bar Association,249 rejected this approach and
argued that the line of advertising-solicitation cases is rooted in "defective
premises and flawed reasoning."250 According to Justice O'Connor, the
state has a valid interest in preserving the "high ethical standards" of law as
a profession. 251 Further, she reasoned that allowing states to constrain
advertising would "play an important role in preserving the legal profession
as a genuine profession." 252
244. Udall, supra note 243, at 25. However, the legal profession was much more established
in England than in the early American colonies and remained that way until the late
nineteenth century. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
245. See Morgan & Rotunda, Model Code of Professional Responsibility 218 (1988).
246. Levinson, Making Society's Legal System Accessible to Society: The Lawyer's Role and
Its Implications, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 789, 801-02 (1988). While some lawyers may prefer to
ignore these duties, they are inescapable. Because of the public nature of the legal profession,
lawyers retain these duties throughout their careers. Id. at 802; see Luban, Political Legitimacy
and the Right to Legal Services, 4 Bus. & Prof. Ethics J., Nos. 3 & 4, Spring/Summer 1985, at
43 (arguing that increased access to legal services is a right without which individuals are
denied equality before the law).
247. Levinson, supra note 246, at 804. This role requires lawyers, as a profession, to "retain
distinctive attitudes, traditions, and methods of reasoning and analysis." Id.
248. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460-61; see infra Section III.A.2.
249. 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (holding that first amendment prohibits a total ban on targeted
direct-mail advertising).
250. Id. at 480.
251. Id. at 490.
252. Id. at 491. Advertising is sure "to undermine professional standards." Id. at 485-86.
Justice O'Connor further noted that the Court's advertising-solicitation decisions reflect the
belief that our nation:
will benefit from a constitutional theory that refuses to recognize either the essence
of professionalism or its fragile and necessary foundations. In one way or another,
time will uncover the folly of this approach. I can only hope that the Court will
recognize the danger before it is too late to effect a worthwhile cure.
Id. at 491.
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a. ABA Commission on Professionalism
The ABA has also emphasized the importance of law as a "profession."
In 1986, the ABA Commission on Professionalism issued a report contain-
ing recommendations designed to enhance the professionalism of
lawyers. 253 The report suggests reasons why the public might believe the
legal profession "has abandoned principle for profit, professionalism for
commercialism." 25 4 First, many blame lawyers for grave public crises, such
as the increase in medical malpractice litigation and the high costs of
liability insurance. 55 Second, the public views litigation as consuming large
amounts of resources.256 Third, many members of society feel that lawyers
lack moral character.25 7 Some commentators welcomed the report's
approach, 258 while others criticized it.
2 59
253. ABA, Commission on Professionalism, "[I]n the Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint
for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986) [hereinafter ABA Report
on Professionalism]. The Commission recommends that all segments of the bar: (1) preserve
and develop within the legal profession integrity, competence, fairness, independence,
courage and a devotion to the public interest; (2) resolve to abide by higher standards of
conduct than the minimum requirements of the ABA Code and Model Rules; (3) increase the
participation of lawyers in pro bono activities and help lawyers recognize their obligation to
participate; (4) refuse to make the acquisition of wealth a primary goal of law practice; (5)
encourage innovative methods that simplify and reduce the costs of rendering of legal
services; (6) educate the public about legal processes and the legal system; and (7) resolve to
employ all the organizational resources necessary to assure that the legal profession is
effectively self-regulating. Id. at 296-304.
254. Id. at 253-54.
255. Id. at 253.These suggestions raise very broad criticisms of the legal profession and
assume lawyers do more harm than good. For example, although the existance of a medical
malpractice "crisis" is a widely held assumption, careful analysis shows that it may not be true,
or perhaps even backwards. Is the alternative of not holding professionals responsible for their
negligence any more beneficial to society? See Michael Saks, Do we Really Know Anything
About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1147
(1992); See also They're only Trying to Help, Newsweek, Jan. 27, 1992, at 47.
256. ABA Report on Professionalism, supra note 253, at 253-54.
257. Id, at 254. In a nonrandom survey of 234 corporate executives and judges conducted
by the Commission, 6% of corporations utilizing lawyers rated "all or most" lawyers as
"professionals." Only 7% felt professionalism was increasing among lawyers; 68% believed it
had decreased over time. Similarly, 55% of the responding judges perceived lawyer profes-
sionalism as declining. ABA Report on Professionalism, supra note 253, at 254 (citing G.
Shubert, Survey of Perceptions of the Professionalism of the Bar (unpublished 1985)).
258. See Bowie, supra note 234, at 755 (1988) (endorsing ABA report as fulfilling "its
obligations to support the moral and political values that underlie the law-especially the
values of equal opportunity, fairness, equality before the law, and justice").
259. See Levinson, supra note 246, at 791 (concluding the commission wrongly implied that
professionalism cannot be equated with profit and commercialism with principle; use of the
label "professional" may gratify some lawyers' egos "but will not help . . . articulate or
accommodate [their] conflicting duties"); Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Commen-
tary on the Report of the American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism, 18 Loy.
U. Chi. L.J. 1149 (1987) (arguing law is improving as a "profession"). For a humorous
response, see A. Roth &J. Roth, Devil's Advocates: The Unnatural History of Lawyers (1989)
(surveying historical anecdotes, satires, poems, and sayings, and reassuring lawyers that people
have always hated them).
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b. Professionalism Within an Adversary System
The American legal system depends on public approval for its
existence. 260 Some argue that professionalism is essential to the preserva-
tion of this system because the public consent that exclusively franchises
lawyers and judges to operate a system of justice can be withdrawn.261
Lawyers occupy a unique position to evaluate and change the legal system.
This position stems from lawyers' knowledge of and extensive interest in
the legal system, capacity to recognize its strengths and weaknesses, and
ability to prescribe and implement reforms they believe, in good faith, will
effectuate society's aspirations for the most desirable legal system.262 When
society demonstrates a need for change, lawyers have a duty to give serious
attention to society's concerns.26
3
The American adversary system deeply affects the public's perception
of legal professionalism and the need for reform. The "adversary ethic"'264
influences lawyers to consider the adversarial nature of the judicial process
when resolving conflicts of duty between clients and others.265 It is
generally accepted that justice emerges when lawyers serve as zealous
advocates for their clients and that allowing lawyers' duties to be biased
toward the client best serves society.
266
260. Udall, supra note 243, at 26. The American system ofjustice endures by "the consent
of the governed." Id.
261. Id. "Ifa majority of the governed come to regard" the legal profession as a mere trade,
the justice system and its institutions may become extinct because under the Constitution,
"every federal court except the Supreme Court" could be abolished. Id. See Levinson, supra
note 246, at 804 (concluding society would be more supportive of the existing legal system "if
[lawyers] effectively articulated the duties [they] owe to society, and... conscientiously carried
them out").
262. Levinson, supra note 246, at 800.
263. Id. at 801; see Bowie, supra note 234, at 742 (stating that the legal profession should
respond to negative public perceptions of lawyers, even if incorrect).
264. The late Justice Abe Fortas explained the American "adversary ethic:" "Lawyers are
agents, not principals; and they should neither criticize nor tolerate criticism based upon the
character of the client whom they represent or the cause that they prosecute or defend. They
cannot and should not accept responsibility for the client's practices." Fortas, Thurmon
Arnold and the Theatre of the Law, 79 Yale L.J. 988, 1002 (1970).
265. Levinson, supra note 246, at 799.
266. Id. See People v. Belge, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)
(finding duty of confidentiality more important than duty to notify public health officials
about unburied corpses or reveal information to victims' families; society in general has an
interest in preserving attorney-client privilege), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390
N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976). See also Levinson, supra note 246, at 804 (arguing de-emphasis of
adversarial process might transform judicial system into general problem solving technique
that interfuses the traditional methods of lawyers with those of other professionals, and that
this transformation should not occur without the sanction of society). But see Shaffer, The
Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 697 (1988) (criticizing
"adversary ethic" for excusing lawyers from personal responsibility to act with integrity and
administer justice). Cf Freedman, Lawyer's Ethics in an Adversary System (1985) (suggesting
that lawyers have a duty to "chase ambulances").
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2. Maintaining Professionalism: The Bar's Interest in Regulating
Lawyer Advertising
The Supreme Court has recognized the bar's interests in preventing
consumer deception 267 and in maintaining the bar's integrity and profes-
sional image.268 A related reason for regulating lawyer advertising, albeit
invoked less often by the bar, is protecting the public from hasty or poor
legal decisions. 26 9 The Supreme Court also has recognized the bar's interest
in fostering rational decision making in the determination of the need for
legal services and the selection of a lawyer.
270
Lawyers play an important role in our society. As officers of the court,
they swear to preserve the judicial system. 27 1 The public may view lawyers
267. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), (discussed supra at notes 55-71
and accompanying text); id. at 383 (false, deceptive, or misleading advertising is subject to
restraint); id. at 383-84 (claims of quality or in-person solicitation might warrant restriction);
id. at 384 (warnings or disclaimers may be required to prevent consumer deception); In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (discussed supra at notes 117-20 and accompanying text); id. at
202-03 (bar can regulate advertisements which are inherently likely to deceive, or which have
been proven to be subject to abuse); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)
(discussed supra at notes 140-45 and accompanying text); id. at 462 (bar can regulate
in-person solicitation resulting in intrusion, intimidation, overreaching, or undue influence).
See also Bishopv. Comm. on Prof. Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1229 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (electronic
promotional advertisements not aiding public in making informed decisions and not protected
by first amendment); Comm. on Prof. Ethics v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Iowa 1984)
(regulation by bar permissible where particular advertising is inherently likely to deceive or
where particular form or method has in fact been deceptive).
268. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460-61 (recognizing bar's interest in maintaining the integrity of
the profession, but holding interest in the image of the profession is insufficient to justify
regulation). The Iowa Supreme Court also recognized this interest in Humphrey. See Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643, 646-47 (Iowa 1985) (prohibiting
"image-building" through electronic media); supra notes 217-26 and accompanying text; see
also Bianchi, supra note 228, at 63-65; Hansell, supra note 235, at 4 (stating concern is the
negative image of the profession created by lawyer advertising); Lawyer Advertising-
Marketing, Professionalism, the Future, supra note 228, at 63 (distasteful advertising harms
the image of the Bar, and of the justice system); Reynoldson, supra note 213, at 60 (arguing
enhancement of professionalism is principal concern in regulating lawyer advertisements).
269. See Calvani, Langenfeld, & Shuford, supra note 229, at 761; Cox, supra note 229 at
23-24; Trapani, supra note 229, at 31-33.
270. See Peel, 496 U.S. at 110 ("Information about certification and specialization facilitates
the consumer's access to legal services and thus better serves the administration of justice.");
R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 200-01 (noting that a warning or disclaimer may be appropriate in order
to dissipate consumer confusion or deception); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457 (stating in-person
solicitation may disserve the individual and societal interest in facilitating informed and
reliable decision making); Bates, 433 U.S. at 377 (noting that a rule restraining advertising
would be in accord with the bar's obligation to facilitate intelligent selection of lawyers and to
assist in making legal services available); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens'
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (recognizing society's general interest in
fostering rational and informed decisionmaking).
271. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) ("The interest of the States
in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental
function of administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of the courts.'"); supra
note 245-46 and accompanying text.
[1991]
LAWYER ADVERTISING
as linked to the functions of the judicial system. 2 72 Because state courts
depend on public respect for the vindication of their judicial power and
their effectiveness is enhanced by the perception that the courts are aided
by an alliance of competent and professional officers, these officers, in turn,
should be perceived as having high "moral character."273
The primary justification for lawyer advertising is that it informs and
educates the public about the availability and cost of legal services. 274 The
bar typically concedes that neither lawyers nor the public benefit from
sensationalist lawyer advertising. Such advertising has become common-
place despite the bar's regulatory efforts.2 7 5 Regulating advertising that is in
no way harmful, however, may stigmatize lawyers who legitimately adver-
tise within the legal community and deter advertising which provides useful
information to the public. 276
Commentators have suggested several alternatives to media advertis-
ing which provide the public with information about access to legal services.
Lawyers could, as is traditionally done in England and the United States,
make their availability known to the public through reputation, conven-
tional listings, participation in bar work, and various other civic activities.277
Advertising might be performed more professionally with appropriate
disclaimers and qualifications.278 For example, lawyers who feel traditional
272. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422 (1978) (stating lawyers are essential to adminis-
tering justice and have historically been officers of the courts); Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 648
(Reynoldson, J., concurring) ("Lawyers have been inextricably linked in the minds of persons
generally, as well-as in fact, to the functions of the courts and the adjudication process.").
273. See Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 652 (Reynoldson,J., concurring); infra notes 295-99 and
accompanying text (discussing the nexus theory).
274. See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 110
(1990) ("Information about certification and specialization facilitates the consumer's access to
legal services and thus better serves the administration ofjustice."); Shapero v. Kentucky State
Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 478 (1988) (advertising of value to clients); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (advertising of value to consumers); In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 199 (1982) (rejecting the potential adverse effect of advertising on the
adminstration of justice); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 435-36 (1978) (solicitation aids in an
informed decision to pursue litigation); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455
(1978) ("[M]eetings with the prospective clients apprised them of their legal rights and of the
availability of a lawyer."); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 382 (1977) ("[Aldvertising
will permit the comparison of rates among competitors.").
275. See Lawyer Advertising-Marketing, Professionalism, the Future, supra note 228, at
63 ("distasteful lawyer advertising hurts everyone"); Udall, supra note 243, at 25 (lawyer
advertising, some of it offensive, has become commonplace); Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 81:208 (1988) (Preamble to ABA Aspirationa Goals for Lawyer Advertising)
("[I]f advertising employs false, misleading or deceptive messages or degenerated into
undignified and unprofessional presentations, the public is not served, the lawyer who
advertised does not benefit and the image of the judicial system may be harmed.").
276. See supra notes 246-47.
277. Udall, supra note 243, at 26. This view has been subject to criticism. See Abel, supra
note 37, at 119-22 (arguing this view tends to favor large, elite firms); Attanasio, supra note 32,
at 510 (1984) (arguing English public has less need for advertising than United States public
because of extensive government paid legal aid, which justifies English restrictions on
advertising).
278. Udall, supra note 243, at 26. Alternatively, the bar could allow lawyers to advertise but
require disclaimers and qualifications to accompany advertisements. Id. This approach has
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means are insufficient could collectively contact and inform potential
clients through institutional advertisements contracted for through bar
associations.2 79 This approach might make advertising appear more
professional.280 However, whether this approach would succeed equally in
informing the public and providing access to legal services is an empirical
question.
a. Aspirational Goals For Lawyer Advertising
In August 1988, the ABA's Commission on Advertising submitted
several "Aspirational Goals for Lawyer Advertising" (Aspirational Goals) to
the ABA House of Delegates for approval.281 After nearly two years of
been taken by several states. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
279. Udall, supra note 243, at 26.
280. Id.
281. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) 81:208-09 (1991). The Aspirational Goals
are as follows:
1. Lawyer advertising should encourage and support the public's confidence in the
individual lawyer's competence and integrity, as well as, the commitment of the legal
profession to serve the public's legal needs in the tradition of the law as a learned
profession.
2. Since advertising may be the only contact many people have with lawyers,
advertising by lawyers should help the public understand its legal rights and the
judicial process and should uphold the dignity of the legal profession.
3. While "dignity" and "good taste" are terms open to subjective interpretation,
lawyers should consider that advertising which reflects the ideals stated in these
Aspirational Goals is likely to be dignified and suitable to the profession.
4. Since advertising must be truthful and accurate, and not false or misleading,
lawyers should realize that ambiguous or confusing advertising can be misleading.
5. Particular care should be taken in describing fees and costs in advertisements. If
an advertisement states a specific fee for a particular service, it should make clear
whether or not all problems of that type can be handled for that specific fee. Similar
care should be taken in describing the lawyer's areas .of practice.
6. Lawyers should consider that the use of inappropriately dramatic music, un-
seemly slogans, hawkish spokespersons, premium offers, slapstick routines or out-
landish settings in advertising does not instill confidence in the lawyer or the legal
profession and undermines the serious purpose of legal services and the judicial
system.
7. Advertising developed with a dear identification of its potential audience is more
likely to be understandable, respectful and appropriate to that audience, and,
therefore, more effective. Lawyers should consider using advertising and marketing
professionals to assist in identifying and reaching an appropriate audience.
8. How advertising conveys its message is as important as the message itself. Again,
lawyers should consider using professional consultants to help them develop and
present a clear message to the audience in an effective and appropriate way.
9. Lawyers should design their advertising to attract legal matters which they are
competent to handle.
10. Lawyers should be concerned with making legal services more affordable to the
public. Lawyer advertising may be designed to build up client bases so that
efficiencies of scale may be achieved that will translate into more affordable legal
services.
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studying how lawyer advertising affects the image of the legal profession, 28 2
the Commission presented the Aspirational Goals in an effort to guide
lawyers in achieving the benefits of advertising while minimizing or
eliminating its negative effects.283 The preamble to the Aspirational Goals
recognizes that, although most people locate a lawyer through family,
friends, and work associates, advertising, "when properly done," can help
people better understand and obtain the legal services available.2-8 4 Because
lawyers are officers of the court, "they have a special obligation to assure
that their conduct conforms to the highest ideals of the legal profession."
28 5
Thus, according to the Aspirational Goals, advertising lawyers should
consider the possible effects of their advertising on both their own
professional image and the public's perception of the judicial system.
286
b. Iowa's "State Interest" in Regulation
The Iowa Bar's extensive restrictions on lawyer advertising have been
justified by its interest in maintaining law as a profession. 287 After Bates,288
the Iowa Supreme Court requested the Committee on Professional Ethics
and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association to re-evaluate Iowa's rules
concerning lawyer advertising. 28 9 The Committee was particularly con-
cerned about allowing lawyers to advertise the availability of legal services
while at the same time "safeguarding a relatively uninformed public from
Id. Since the ABA does not regulate the conduct of lawyers, these Aspirational Goals have no
binding effect on lawyers absent adoption by states. Id. at 208.
282. Aspirational Goals for Attorney Advertising, Ariz. Att'y, Oct. 1988, at 27.
283. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 81:208 (1988) (Preamble); see 4 Law. Man.
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 269 (1988) (steps must inevitably be taken to ensure advertising
is informative and helpful while simultaneously "upholding the dignity of the profession").
284. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 81:208 (1988) (Preamble).
285. Id.
286. Id. "Accordingly, lawyer advertising should exemplify the inherent dignity and
professionalism of the legal community. Dignified lawyer advertising tends to inspire public
confidence in the professional competence and ability of lawyers and portrays the commitment
of lawyers to serve clients' legal needs in accordance with the ethics and public service tradition
of a learned profession." Id. Lawyer Ad Limits, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1989, at 42 (citing survey
showing 11% of personal injury victims solicited by lawyers through mail were unable to serve
as impartial jurors); see Reynoldson, supra note 213, at 61 ("The public perceives a strong
nexus between courts and the lawyers who serve as officers of the court."). The Project did not
find solid empirical support for Reynoldson's "nexus" theory, see infra notes 413-20 and
accompanying text.
287. See Hansell, supra note 235, at 4; Reynoldson, supra note 213, at 60.
288. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
289. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d at 568. The Committee conducted public hearings and
examined the issue of lawyer advertising. The Iowa Supreme Court, after conducting its own
study, adopted the committee's recommendations. Id. Iowa amended its rules after each of the
Bates, 433 U.S. 350; Bishop, 521 F. Supp. 1219; and Zauderer, 471 U.S. 629, decisions. Iowa
continues to adopt a "safe harbor" approach by restricting lawyer advertising to a specified list
of allowable items and manners of dissemination. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d at 569. Iowa's
restrictions are narrowly drawn to limit protection of lawyer advertising to the minimum level
required by the Supreme Court. See supra notes 170-226 and accompanying text.
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misleading or potentially deceptive broadcast advertising practices." 290 In
Humphrey, the Iowa Bar asserted that the state possesses an interest in
preventing emotion from governing the selection of lawyers, guarding
against both inadvertent and intentional deception of the public, and
preserving the integrity of the legal profession. 29' The Iowa Bar further
argued that the public needs objective information rather than persuasion,
drama, and promotional appeals to intelligently choose a lawyer.292 The
Humphrey court accepted these arguments, finding a substantial govern-
mental interest in "fostering rational, intelligent, and voluntary decision
making in determining the need for legal services and selecting a
lawyer.1293 On appeal, the court restated the governmental interest as
regulating "a very real potential for abuse," emphasizing the potential lack
of deliberation in responding to electronic media advertising.294
Chief Justice Reynoldson, in his concurrence, shared concerns about
television advertising absent the safeguards provided by Iowa's rules. He
argued that states indisputably possess a compelling state interest in being,
and being perceived to be, "forums in which controversies will be seriously
and dispassionately resolved, and justice administered, in a structured,
disciplined, and dignified environment."295 This state interest serves as the
foundation of the "nexus theory" formulated by Justice Reynoldson. This
theory holds that, in the public view, lawyers are "inextricably linked" to the
judicial process.2 96 Because of this nexus, Reynoldson suggests that "[t]he
effectiveness of state courts, which have only moral suasion and public
respect for the ultimate vindication of their judicial power, is enhanced by
the perception that courts are served by a cadre of professional court
officers." 29 7
In addition to formulating the "nexus theory," Judge Reynoldson's
concurrence addressed the courts' insufficient resources to police mislead-
ing lawyer advertising. 298 Thus, he commented on the difficulty of protect-
290. Brief for Plaintiff at 3-4, Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa
State Bar Ass'n v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985) (J. Allbee testifying). For a detailed
recitation concerning the background of Iowa Code DR 2-101, see Rapp & Gillium v. Comm.,
504 F. Supp. 1092 (S.D. Iowa 1980). Compare Florida, which is currently considering the
broadest lawyer advertising restrictions of any state. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1989, § Y
(Magazine) (The Law), at 20 ("What we're trying to do ... is balance the First Amendment
rights of lawyers against the public's need for fair and honest advertising.") (quoting S. Zack,
head of Florida Bar).
291. Brief for Plaintiff at 3-4, Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643 (J. Allbee testifying).
292. Id. at 5. The Iowa restrictions on electronic media attempt to protect the public from
manipulation by taking away the necessary tools-drama and emotion. "Without these potent
tools, the manipulation, i.e., emotional and mood plays, implantation of perceived need,
response-reaction and all of the other conditions used to control the public's mind, are
powerless." Id. at 58.
293. 355 N.W.2d at 571.
294. 377 N.W.2d at 646.
295. 377 N.W.2d at 648 (Reynoldson J., concurring).
296, Id.
297. Id. at 652 (footnotes omitted).
298. Id. Reynoldson noted that "[tihe task would loom even larger if the sights, color,
sounds, subliminal messages, and not-so-hidden persuaders of commercial television adver-
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ing "the stature of the courts against the excesses of unprofessional court
officers" if "solicitation for services in state courts is to be delegated to
'authoritarian' pitchmen utilizing all the slick imagery, promotion, and
aggressive overreaching of Madison Avenue in the invasion of lay persons'
living rooms. ' 299 Thus, Reynoldson upheld the Iowa rules as necessary to
protect the integrity of the courts in fulfilling their primary function of
administering justice.
3. Law Practice as "Business"
Whether or not there is a clear, causal connection between the line of
Supreme Court lawyer advertising cases 300 and current public perceptions
of the profession, some believe the practice of law is becoming a business
rather than a profession.30' While higher profits are not inherently evil, the
legal profession's current business mentality may divert lawyers from
attending their higher duties and quicken the decline of professionalism.30 2
Lawyers have a duty to society, and self-interested pursuit of wealth might
well impede the fulfillment of this duty.30 3
Business is not considered a traditional profession because profit
maximization is its primary motive.304 Business is thought generally to lack
the altruistic spirit of other professions, such as doctors and lawyers.305
Commentators, however, generally agree that differences between the
conduct of lawyers and other professionals is narrowing. Some commenta-
tors suggest lawyers are acting less professionally than in the past, while
tising were added to the burden." Id. at 649.
299. Id. at 652. Justice Reynoldson expanded further on the problems of policing lawyer
advertisements:
Solemn forums for the litigation of cases whose lawyer-officers resemble carnival
barkers at the doors scarcely can avoid being viewed as carnivals, or at least, places
where justice is bought and sold as in any marketplace. Judicial systems are not
equipped, nor do they have the time, to police Madison Avenue.
Id. at 650.
300. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); see also Udall, supra note 243, at 25 (claiming the Bates Court
"declared that lawyers have become trddesmen").
301. Udall, supra note 243, at 26. "The profession is on a money-seeking binge. It appears
to be driven by 'bottom-line' economics rather than public service where the seeking of income
is an essential incident, not the primary goal." Id.
302. Id.
303. See Bowie, supra note 234, at 743-48 (stating lawyers should be motivated by an
altruistic spirit in contrast to business people, who are primarily motivated to maximize their
profit). But see Levinson, supra note 246, at 799-800 (arguing the pursuit of wealth is as
legitimate an enterprise for lawyers as anyone else, except where. the pursuit of wealth comes
into conflict with other duties, especially duties owed to clients or society).
304. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 133 (1962) (business' sole social responsibility is to
increase its profits while engaging in free competition without deception or fraud).
305. Bowie, supra note 234, at 745, 746 (arguing "invisible hand" economic theory is not
applicable to lawyers; outcomes based on raw politics will not always be in the public interest).
77 IOWA LAW REVIEW
nonlawyers are acting more professionally. 06 Others simply reject the idea
of an inherent difference between the "professionalism" of lawyers and the
"commercialism" of business.307
4. Studies of the Effects of Advertising on the Professional Image of
Lawyers
The effect of lawyer advertising on the image of lawyers is of concern
for three reasons: (1) If lawyers who advertise project a poor image to the
public, .this may reflect poorly on all lawyers; (2) negative imagery of
lawyers in lawyer advertising may reflect poorly on the image of the legal
profession; and (3) negative imagery of lawyers in lawyer advertising, by
reflecting poorly on the legal profession, may undermine the legitimacy of
the political system. While the Supreme Court has recognized the third
concern as a valid state interest in regulating lawyer advertising, the first
two concerns are constitutionally suspect.8 08 Several studies have addressed
empirically the effect of 'advertising on the image of lawyers and the legal
profession. Most of these studies have attempted to examine whether
public exposure to lawyer advertisements increased negative perceptions of
lawyers. The studies, however, do not attempt to relate these findings to the
state's interest in regulating lawyer advertising.
In 1983, the Iowa State Bar Association commissioned a research firm
to conduct a survey of the public's attitudes and opinions toward law firms
who advertise.30 9 The primary objective of the survey was to determine the
effect of certain lawyer television commercials on public perception of the
legal profession.310 The research firm selected a random sample from Linn
County, Iowa, and four one-hour, in-studio sessions were held.31' A
majority of the sample (55%) thought television advertisements would give
306. Id. at 748. Bowie perceives that the public feels the practice of law has become a
business and lawyers are motivated by greed. Id. at 741. Even though one may dismiss as
uninformed the public's perceptions that lawyers overcharge, manufacture work, and create
delays in order to make more money without producing anything useful, it is only prudent for
the profession to take notice of how the public views the motives of lawyers. Id. at 741-42; see
Anshen, Changing the Social Contract: A Role for Business, 5-6 Colum. J. World Bus. 6-14
(1970) (arguing business must play a greater role in resolving social problems).
307. Levinson, supra note 246, at 791. This author defines the term "profession" as a type
of occupation entered into for compensation, and the term "business" as an enterprise
conducted for profit. Id. at 792. These definitions regard a law firm as "a business that engages
in the profession of practicing law." Id. The author does observe, however, that lawyers differ
from individuals engaged in other occupations in many respects, such as "education, standards
for admission, average ificome, [and] type of work." Id. Moreover, lawyers' "ability to
manipulate, improve, or abuse the system that has been entrusted to [their] care" places them
in a fiduciary position. Id. at 800; see Kultgen, supra note 236, at 145-46 (stating that despite
a possible distinctive professional service motive, "professionals often are selfish and business
people often are public spirited").
308. In Ohralik, the Supreme Court noted that protecting the image of lawyers simpliciter is
an insufficient reason to justify regulation of lawyer advertising. 436 U.S. at 460-61.






useful information and solicit new clients, but respondents generally did
not believe that television commercials would answer many questions
concerning legal rights.3 12 After viewing lawyer television commercials,
respondent's average perceptions of lawyer characteristics declined
sharply: trustworthiness, from 71% to 14%; professionalism, from 71% to
21%; honesty, from 65% to 14%; and dignity, from 45% to 14%.313
Recently, the ABA conducted the Survey on the Image of Layers in
Advertising. 314 The survey solicited lawyer and consumer reactions to print
and television advertisements.315 The questions asked were designed to
discern attributes the public associates with a "dignified" image in lawyer
advertising.
The survey results showed that dignified lawyer advertising reflects
more positively both on specific lawyers who advertise and on the legal
profession.316 The results from the ABA study also suggest that neither
medium, print nor television, inherently conveys a greater amount of
dignity than the other.317
According to the survey, lawyer advertisements are most likely to be
seen as "dignified" when they are viewed as "not tacky" and "convincing" to
members of the public.318 The study suggests that "dignity" is not closely
related to the substantive message of the lawyer advertisements. 319 Produc-
tion quality, however, is closely related to public perceptions of "dignity" in
lawyer advertisements. 320 It follows that rules limiting production quality
produce negative perceptions of lawyers-a result opposite of the one the
rules were intended to accomplish.
The ABA study concluded that "dignified" advertising will best
achieve professional, responsible, and effective advertising, and that the
public and the legal profession would benefit from "dignified" lawyer
advertising.32' According to the authors of the study, dignified advertising
312. Id.
313. Id. at 61-62; see supra note 223 (ISBA study); see also Reynoldson, supra note 213, at
60 (arguing results of this study show the "public perceives a strong nexus between courts and
the lawyers who serve as officers of the courts").
314. ABA Commission on Advertising, Report on the Survey on the Image of Lawyers in
Advertising (Jan. 1990).
315. The lawyer reactions to television advertisements were solicited while on-site at the
ABA's 1987 annual meeting in San Francisco. Lawyer reactions to print advertisements were
solicited through the mail. A total of 300 lawyers were subjects in the survey. A total of 300
consumers were presented television and print advertisements at shopping centers in Atlanta,
Minneapolis, and Phoenix. Both lawyers and consumers completed the same survey instru-
ment. Id. at 7-11.
316. Id. at 39.
317. Id. at 24. The most dignified commercial, according to consumers, was a television ad.
Id.
318. Id. at 45.
319. Id. at 46-49.
320. Id. at 50-53.
321. Id. at 56.
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is best promoted by the Aspirational Goals3 22 and by regulatory approaches
similar to Iowa's.323 The study did not examine how public perception of.
lawyer advertisements as "dignified" affects the public perception of
lawyers and the legal profession. Further, the study did not establish that
undignified lawyer advertisements are viewed by the public in a negative
manner.3 2
4
B. Economics of Lawyer Advertising
Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest lawyer advertising
tends to facilitate public access to legal services, stimulate competition
among lawyers, and lower lawyers' fees.325 Economic theory assumes that a
market for legal services exists. In this hypothetical market, lawyers and the
public simultaneously pursue their self-interest through the exchange of
legal services for compensation. Neoclassical economic theory provides an
alternative to the Durkheimian model of professionalism presented
above. 326 According to Max Weber and his followers, professions arise as
the result of actors attempting to gain competitive advantages within a
relatively free market.327 Under this view, professions allow members to
protect economic rewards and social status, which are in part a consequence
of wealth and in part its legitimation.3
28
There are two plausible objections to applying economic analysis to
legal services markets. First, one might believe that lawyers, unlike other
"market actors," are not self-interested. 32 9 Second, one might argue that
legal services are different from other goods and services because clients of
legal services do not have insight to evaluate their legal problems and
needs.330 Therefore, a market imperfection exists and economic analysis
cannot provide guidance.
322. Id. For a discussion of the Aspirational Goals, see supra notes 281-86 and accompa-
nying text.
323. ABA Commission on Advertising, supra note 314, at 4.
324. After concluding that "not tacky" best explains advertisements rated as being digni-
fied, the study states "an advertisement that is tacky is not dignified and vice versa." Id. at 45.
However, many additional attributes of advertisements were not included in the study.
325. Calvani, Langenfeld, & Shuford, supra note 229, at 775-79 (presenting economic
arguments for the liberalization of restrictions on lawyer advertising).
326. See supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text.
327. Abel, supra note 37, at 15 (discussing Weberian theories of professionalism). See
generally Freidson, Profession of Medicine (1970); Johnson, Professions and Power (1972);
Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (1977); Weber, Law in Economy
and Society (M. Reinstein trans. 1954).
328. Abel, supra note 37, at 15.
329. See Bowie, supra note 234, at 758-59 ("mo the extent that lawyers abandon altruistic
motivation and become more like traditionally characterized business persons, the profession
should feel considerable unease."); Reynoldson, supra note 213, at 61 (the legal profession,
unlike business, is a "calling" that "still involves the unique and basic concept that a client's
interests must be put before that of the lawyer.") (paraphrasing Justice Rowell).
330. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 485-86 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing price advertising of legal services is misleading because consumers in
general lack the expertise to determine how routine or complex their problem is and what type
of service will best solve their problem).
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However, neither of these objections withstand scrutiny. Even assum-
ing that lawyers are economically self-interested, such an assumption does
not necessarily preclude that a lawyer may also be altruistically inclined.33'
Moreover, economic theory makes assumptions about human nature in
order to arrive analytically at conclusions, and so long as the conclusions
predicted by economic theory are empirically accurate, economics is a
useful explanatory device regardless of the empirical precision of its
assumptions.33 2 Thus, extending economic analysis to the legal services
market is no different in spirit from the economic analysis of agencies333 or
politicians.3
34
Economists generally agree that the public and lawyers possess differ-
ent levels of information concerning legal services in certain circumstances.
The legal services market might be divided into individualized and stan-
dardized services to compensate for this discrepancy. 335 Standardized
services are consistently recognized as appropriate for economic analysis
because of their simple, homogenous nature. Furthermore, economists
generally agree advertising is one way to reduce asymmetry of information
between lawyers and the public in legal services markets.3 3 6 The belief that
typical consumers do not possess insight into their legal problems and
needs might be overstated. A recent study shows an increasing number of
individuals are adequately representing themselves in relatively standard-
ized legal matters.3 37 This study suggests, because certain legal transactions
are relatively simple, lawyers can effectively communicate information
331. Self interest, though a necessary and significant motive, need not be the only motive.
Brennan & Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 Va. L. Rev.
179, 181 (1988). An individual might find it in her interest to pursue altruism, although many
would consider this oxymoronic. Furthermore, altruism may be a trait which has survived in
the evolution of egoistic individuals. See generally Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation
(1984).
332. See Curtis, Microeconomic Concepts for Attorneys 4 (1984) (economics does not
explain in detail the activities of economic units in the real world but instead establishes
general principles concerning these activities).
333. Judges have also been subjected to economic analysis. See Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice
Processes: An Application of Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the FCC, and the Courts, 88 Yale
L.J. 717, 717 (1979) (applying public choice analysis to judicial decision making).
334. See generally Buchanan & Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962) (extending
economic analysis to voting and other decision making by agencies and legislatures).
335. The Supreme Court in Bates originally distinguished between routine and nonroutine
legal services, and extended constitutional protection to fee advertising for the former. 433
U.S. at 372-73. One can distinguish between individualized and standardized services
depending "on the degree of risk that the particular problem poses for the client." Hazard,
Pearce, & Stempel, supra note 227, at 1090-91. Risk depends upon: "1) the gravity of the
consequences to life, liberty, or property ... and 2) the probability that one or more of these
consequences will actually occur." Id. Individualized legal services are appropriate in situations
that involve relatively significant risks for clients and thus require involved, sophisticated
lawyer involvement. To contrast, standardized services are appropriate for relatively routine
situations that involve lower client risk and thus require comparatively little direct lawyer
participation. Id.
336. See infra notes 343-44 and accompanying text.
337. Cox & Dwyer, A Report on Self-Help Law 70-91 (1987). In 1985, almost one-half of
the approximately 14,000 marriage dissolutions in Maricopa County (Phoenix), Arizona, were
handled by the parties themselves. In 1980, the fraction was about one-quarter. Id. at 2.
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about these matters to the public.338
1. Predictions of Economic Theory
Economic theory offers several predictions of the effects of advertis-
ing. In general, lawyer advertising affects both price and quality of legal
services.339 Certain economic theories suggest advertising affects price
through buyer search, seller competition, or entry barriers.3 40 Alternative
theories predict opposite effects on the price of legal services.3 41 Similarly,
the theoretical effects of lawyer advertising on the quality of legal services
are ambiguous.
342
a. Effects on Price
To make an informed decision about purchasing legal services, an
individual must be familiar with the legal services provided by a large
variety of lawyers or firms.343 Advertising tends to reduce the costs of
searching for the least expensive solution to a legal problem. 3 " Therefore,
advertising should stimulate fee comparison shopping and cause more
individuals to obtain lawyers at lower fees.3 45
Economic theory also predicts that advertising increases competition
among sellers of a good or service.3 46 There are two views concerning the
effect that seller competition will have on price. The "information/search"
338. See Cox, supra note 229, at 23-24.
339. See infra notes 343-56 and accompanying text.
340. See infra notes 347-49 and accompanying text.
341. See infra notes 350-51 and accompanying text.
342. See infra notes 352-56 and accompanying text.
343. The first and possibly strongest source of consumer information is personal knowledge
about a product. Relatively few individuals, however, have sufficient direct experience with
legal services to make an informed choice among service providers. See Curran, The Legal
Needs of the Public: The Final Report of a National Survey 185-86, 190 (1977).
A second source of information is reputation. However, some individuals have greater
access than others to reputation information, and not all prospective purchasers of legal
services are equally well-equipped to "assess the quality of service being received." For
example, personal contact with a lawyer (one valuable source of reputation information) is
concentrated most heavily among whites and property owners with high income and better
education. Hudec & Trebilcock, Lawyer Advertising and the Supply of Information in the
Market for Legal Services, 20 U.W. Ont. L. Rev. 53, 64-65 (1982); see also Hazard, Pearce, &
Stempel, supra note 227, at 1084, 1090-91.
344. George Stigler, in a seminal article on the economics of information, presented the
theory of buyer search. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961).
Under the assumption that consumers face a distribution of seller-quoted prices in a market
for a homogeneous commodity, the rational consumer will continue her search process so long
as the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs. Id. at 216. Since advertising reduces search
costs, consumers should obtain the commodity at lower prices. See Cox, Advertising Restric-
tions Among Professionals: Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, in The Antitrust Revolution 134, 137
(Kwoka & White eds. 1989); Calvani, Laganfeld, & Shuford, supra note 229, at 776.
345. Cox, supra note 344, at 137-38.
346. See Comanor & Wilson, The Effect of Advertising on Competition: A Survey, 17 J.
Econ. Lit. 453, 459 (1979).
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view hypothesizes that in markets for relatively homogenous products,
advertising stimulates consumer price activity. This, in turn, causes the
demand curve facing each seller to become more price elastic. 347 Conse-
quently, any seller that raises prices experiences reductions in sales, and
each seller faces incentives to lower prices.3 48 Where the quality of goods or
services cannot be thoroughly assessed by typical consumers, this theory is
less applicable.3
49
The "product differentiation" view provides an opposite prediction.
Firms which advertise differentiate their products in the eyes of the public.
Consequently, they gain greater market power and insulate themselves
from competition from rivals.3 50 This view implies that advertising, by
increasing the price of competition in a market, will have adverse entry
barrier effects.35'
b. Effects on Quality
The effects of advertising on product quality predicted by economic
theory are ambiguous. One theory suggests that sellers who advertise will
offer higher quality service on average.3 52 Advertising increases consumer
"search" for and experience with products, and consumers will purchase
347. In the case of search goods, this will be accomplished by directly informing consumers
of the availability and qualities of alternative products. In the case of experience goods,
advertising will indirectly increase consumer information by encouraging experimentation
with more market brands. Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 311,
227 (1970). See also Hazard, Pearce, & Stempel, supra note 227, at 1092-94.
348. See Cox, supra note 344, at 137; Hazard, Pearce, & Stempel, supra note 227, at
1091-94.
349. Because of the high costs of quality comparison information, the consumer in markets
for such goods is particularly vulnerable to fraud and deception. These goods have been called
credence goods-goods the quality of which is difficult for the consumer to ascertain, even ex
post. See Darby & Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J. L. &
Econ. 67 (1973).
350. The Bates case was brought on the opposite rationale: that advertising would allow
lawyers to break into the market. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 378 (1977); see
Calavani, Langenfeld, & Shuford, supra note 229, at 777 ("[A]dvertising tends to lower prices
by making entry easier for new firms to gain recognition and challenge established firms.");
FTC Report, supra note 19, at 82 ("[N]ew firms are kept at a competitive disadvantage during
the time that consumers are less aware of their presence than of the older and more
established firms.").
351. Entry barrier effects will exist if there are economies of scale to advertising. Two
phenomena may lead to economies of scale: consumer brand loyalty and the accumulative
effect of advertising. Either effect causes seller's promotion costs to be less per customer served
than those of other new entrants to the market. Cox, supra note 344, at 139.
352. Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. Pol. Econ. 729, 732 (1974); see Calvani,
Lagenfeld, & Shuford, supra note 229, at 777-78 ("[Aldvertising may actually reduce
consumer deception and improve the ability of consumers to evaluate the quality of legal
services."); Hazard, Pearce, & Stempel, supra note 227, at 1099 (advertising "tends to cause
consumers to seek information about the producer's reputation and about other consumers'
direct experience"); Schulenburg, Regulatory Measures to Enforce Quality Production of Self-
Employed Professionals-A Theoretical Study of Dynamic Market Processes, in Law and
'Economics and the Economics of Legal Regulation 133-47 (Schulenburg & Skogh eds. 1986)
(criticizing existing regulatory measures and proposing a policy of market-oriented quality
enforcement even for services which the consumer has difficulty evaluating in advance).
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products with high quality-to-price ratios. Since advertising costs are
invested, advertising sellers depend on repeat purchases and therefore tend
to offer higher quality products than non-advertising sellers.
3 -5
An alternative theory predicts advertisers tend to provide poorer
quality products than non-advertisers. Sellers of legal services possess more
knowledge of what constitutes quality. Due to the general consumer's lack
of knowledge regarding legal services, it is costly for the individual to
evaluate the quality of such services, even after they have been rendered.3 54
Although consumers might be willing to pay for quality, they may purchase
low price, poor quality options because they cannot evaluate quality.3 55
Because of consumer quality uncertainty, the opportunity for fraud by
sellers is great.3 56
2. Studies of Economic Effects of Lawyer Advertising
Studies of advertising in various products and services markets sup-
port the hypothesis that advertising leads to lower prices by increasing seller
competition.3 57 Empirical research of the legal services market suggests
lawyer advertising leads to lower fees for routine services.358 Evidence from
studies of both non-legal3 59 and legal3 60 markets concerning the effect of
advertising on quality is ambiguous.
a. Non-Legal Products and Services
Studies of advertising in non-legal products markets support the
hypothesis that advertising increases competition among sellers and there-
fore leads to lower prices.3 6 1 A study of state bans on eyeglass advertising
found an average difference between restrictive and non-restrictive states
of five to six dollars for a thirty to forty dollar pair of eyeglasses.3 6 2 Another
study found that eyeglasses and lenses were generally less expensive if the
dispensing optician or optometrist provided price information by tele-
353. A problem with this theory is that it assumes that consumers can determine the quality
of legal services both ex post and ex ante. Cox, supra note 344, at 140.
354. Id.
355. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q.J. Econ. 488, 489-90 (1970) (bad goods and services may drive out good ones under quality
uncertainty).
356. Darby & Karni, supra note 349, at 68.
357. See infra notes 361-67 and accompanying text.
358. Lawyer advertising research does not support the hypothesis that lawyer advertising
leads to lower fees by increasing buyer search activity, but rather leads to lower fees through
increased seller competition. See infra notes 373-77 and accompanying text.
359. See infra notes 368-69 and accompanying text.
360. See infra notes 378-82 and accompanying text.
361. Calvani, Lagenfeld, & Shuford, supra note 229, at 779-81; Cox, supra note 344, at
141-42, 148-49; Hazard, Pearce, Stempel, supra note 227, at 1109.
362. Eyeglasses in the state with the strictest advertising regulations sold for approximately
$19 more per pair than the state with the least strict regulations. Benham, The Effects of
Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. L. & Econ. 337, 342-44 (1972).
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phone and advertised outside of the telephone directory.363 Similar studies
of prescription drug3 64 and retail gasoline3 65 sales reveal substantial savings
to consumers when advertising bans and restrictions were removed.
Studies of non-legal services markets provide similar support. For
example, one study revealed that states with bans on advertising by
optometrists and opticians had service prices approximately eleven percent
higher than states with no bans or states with restrictions on one group but
not the other.3 66 Additional studies of optometric advertising bans found
eye examination and glasses prices were significantly higher in areas with
highly restrictive advertising regulations than in lesser restrictive areas.
3 6 7
Studies of the effect of advertising on the quality of non-legal products
and services markets present mixed findings. A study of prescription drug
advertising suggested advertising regulations tend to affect prices directly,
rather than indirectly, by serving as an incentive to provide lower quality
services at a lower price.36 8 However, later studies found no negative
relationship between advertising and the quality of optometric services.
369
363. Maurizi & Moore, Price Advertising of Eyewear: An Analysis of Legal Restraints in Los
Angeles (paper presented at annual meeting of W. Econ. Ass'n, June 1978), cited in Cox,
supra note 344, at 141.
364. A study of prescription drugs showed that prices were approximately three percent
higher in states with advertising bans than in those states without such bans. The aggregate
potential savings to consumers from the elimination of prescription drug price advertising
bans was estimated to be $135 million to $152 million. Cady, An Estimate of the Price Effects
of Restrictions on Drug Price Advertising, 14 Econ. Inquiry 493, 510 (1976).
365. An early study assessed the impact of city ordinances prohibiting on premise
advertising of retail gasoline prices. In the cities where such prohibitions existed, the
dispersion in gasoline prices was higher, but the average price quoted was significantly lower
than seven other cities. Maurizi, The Effect of Laws Against Price Advertising: The Case of
Retail Gasoline, 10 W. Econ. J. 321, 323 (1972). Maurizi's early findings, however, were
somewhat tainted because of the poor wholesale price data available. See Cox, supra note 344,
at 141. A later study usinj a somewhat larger sample and better data showed prices on average
were negatively related to posting of prices by retail gasoline stations. The potential dollar
savings to consumers of universal posting were estimated to be from $500 million to more than
$800 million annually. Maurizi & Kelley, Prices and Consumer Information 47 (Am. Ent. Inst.
for Public Policy Res. 1978).
366. Feldman & Begun, Does Advertising of Prices Reduce the Mean and Variance of
Prices?, 18 Econ. Inquiry 487, 491 (1987); see Feldman & Begun, The Effects of Advertising
Restrictions-Lessons from Optometry, 13 J. Hum. Res. 247 (Supp. 1978) (finding state
restrictions on optometric service price advertising raises the price of an eye examination by
optometrists for presbyopic patients).
367. These studies were based on experimental data. Trained subjects with routine visual
problems were sent to different cities across the United States to purchase eye examinations
and glasses. See Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, Effects of Restrictions on Advertising
and Commercial Practice in the Professions: The Case of Optometry 4-5, 39-47 (April 1980)
(Wash. D.C.) (hereinafter FTC Report (Optometry)]; Kwoka, Advertising and the Price and
Quality of Optometric Services, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 211, 213-14 (1974).
368. Cady, supra note 364, at 493; see Cox, supra note 344, at 141.
369. One study measured service quality by: (1) thoroughness of eye examination; (2)
accuracy of eyeglass prescription; (3) accuracy and workmanship of eyeglasses; and (4) extent
of unnecessary prescribing. FTC Report (Optometry), supra note 367, at 6-26. The other
study measured quality by the mean input time spent on eye examinations. Kwoka, supra note
367, at 215.
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b. Legal Services
The Bates370 decision prompted several studies of the effects of lawyer
advertising on price and quality.3 7' The studies hypothesized that lawyer
advertising should lead to lower prices due to increased buyer search and
seller competition. The studies also hypothesized lawyer advertising should
not lead to a significant decline in quality. These studies determined that
lawyer advertising leads to lower fees on average for routine legal services.
The findings were ambiguous as to whether lawyer advertising has a
positive or negative effect on quality.
3 72
An empirical study of advertising and buyer search was conducted to
test the hypothesis that lawyer advertising leads to lower legal fees because
of increased buyer search activity.373 The study found no evidence of a
positive relationship between lawyer advertising and buyer search activity.
In fact, the study found the average consumer was willing to pay the first
price given, even if this price was higher than average price quotes.3 74 One
explanation for this may be that consumers are choosing between high
priced sellers who offer some quality guarantee and low priced sellers who
do not.3
75
A comprehensive study of lawyers' fees for routine services in sixteen
different cities concluded:
Attorneys in the more restrictive states, on average, charged
higher prices for most simple legal services than those in the less
restrictive states. The fact that stronger restrictions on advertising
are associated with higher prices suggests that, in this type of
market, the dominant effect of advertising is to enhance price
competition by lowering consumer search costs.
376
370. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
371. Significant variation in state regulation of lawyer advertising following Bates created an
ideal environment for empirical studies of the effects of lawyer advertising. In 1978, the
National Science Foundation (NSF) funded a pilot study of lawyer advertising and pricing
behavior in Phoenix. The results of the study showed that several routine legal service markets
(simple wills with and without a trust provision, uncontested divorces, and uncontested
personal bankruptcies) were characterized by substantial fee variation and that each service
tended to be priced on a flat fee basis. This suggested that consumers of routine legal services
in the post-Bates era were highly ignorant of market alternatives and that it would be possible
to measure actual attorney fees via surveys. Cox, DeSerpa & Canby, Consumer Information
and the Pricing of Legal Services, 30 J. Indus, Econ. 305 (1982).
In 1980, NSF funded a follow-up study which compared lawyers' fees and advertising
behavior across six cities with widely differing advertising regulations. In 1982, the FTC
replicated the NSF study research design in eleven additional cities. See Calvani, Langenfeld,
& Shuford, supra note 229, at 783-84; Cox, supra note 344, at 145-46.
372. See infra notes 378-82 and accompanying text.
373. Schroeter & Cox, Estimating the Distribution of Search Costs and Reservation Prices:
An Application to Routine Legal Services Markets (1986) (paper given at Ariz. State Univ.).
374. Id. at 16-17, tbls 2 & 3.
375. Cox, supra note 344, at 138, 147-48.
376. FTC Report, supra note 19, at 79. In all cases except personal injury lawyers, lawyers
who advertised a specific service tended to charge less than either lawyers who did not
advertise at all or lawyers who did not advertise the specific service. Id. at 127. On average,
however, data suggested that personal injury cases are less expensive in cities where
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Another study using the same data but different empirical techniques also
supports the finding that lawyer advertising leads to lower fees through
increased seller competition.3 77
There are conflicting theories about the effect of advertising on the
quality of legal services. One theory suggests that advertising should have
either a positive effect or no effect on service quality. An alternative theory
suggests that advertising leads to lower quality services. Both theories find
support in empirical studies of the relationship between advertising and
quality of legal services. An early study provided subjective and objective
evidence to refute "the proposition that firms relying on advertising to
charge lower prices will necessarily produce lower quality services. 378
Customers described a legal clinic which used advertising to attract clients
as more prompt, interested, and honest; as better able to explain matters,
keep clients informed, and charge more reasonable fees than traditional law
firms. 379 Comparison of child support awards showed that the legal clinic
obtained more favorable results for its clients than did the traditional law
firm.
3 8 0
Another study of legal services found, however, advertising and
service quality are unrelated among attorneys within routine legal services
markets, but suggested that for certain services advertising and average
quality were inversely related.38' A recent study of jury verdicts in Las
advertising is allowed than cities which restrict advertising. Id.
Surveys interviewed 250 lawyers in each city with reference to the fees they charged for
routine services. The services included: "a simple reciprocal will for a married couple with two
children; a reciprocal will with a trust provision to take effect if both parents died within a
short time of one another; an uncontested non-business bankruptcy for a husband and wife;
an uncontested dissolution of marriage when there are no children and the property
settlement has been agreed upon; and an automobile accident where the driver of the other
car has admitted responsibility and there is no permanent pain, disability, or lost earnings
capacity." The lawyers were asked the flat fee or hourly rate they charged for each of these
services. They were also asked how many hours it would take them to complete each service
and how many clients they had billed for each service in the past three months. For personal
injury actions, lawyers were asked their contingency rates. Id. at 84-85.
377. Schroeter, Smith, & Cox, Advertising and Competition in Routine Legal Services
Markets: An Empirical Investigation, 36J. Indus. Econ. 49-60 (1987). Butsee Abel, supra note
37, at 122 ("mhe increase in the number and heterogeneity of lawyers following the erosion
of professional control over the production of producers may have reduced professional
control over production by producers, but it certainly did not lead to free competition.").
378. McChesney & Muris, The Effect of Advertising on the Quality of Legal Services, 65
A.B.A. J. 1503-06 (1979). The authors cautioned that their study examined only one legal
clinic. Id. at 1506.
379. Id. at 1505.
380. Id. at 1506; see also Slonim, Survey: Ads Not Drawing Malpractice Claims, 67 A.B.A.
J. 25 (1981) (reporting survey that found no correlation between legal firms that advertised
and malpractice claims).
381. Cox, Schroeter, & Smith, Attorney Advertising and the Quality of Routine Legal
Services, 2 Rev. Indus. Org. 340, 347 (1986). This study used attorney time input data as a
proxy for service quality. The authors suggest that lawyers in these markets might be offering
inefficiently high levels of service quality and that in more competitive markets brought about
by advertising, lawyers might be forced to reduce their fees and the inefficiently high levels of
quality they provide, thus increasing access to legal services. Id. at 347-48; Cox, supra note
344, at 152. For evidence consistent with this theory, see Feldman & Begun, The Welfare Cost
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Vegas supports the hypothesis that jurors have a tendency to vote against
personal injury plaintiff lawyers who advertise on television more often
than against those who do not.
3 8 2
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
The first three sections of the Project provide the reader with a
framework in which to examine the data compiled in the Project. Theories
of "professionalism" and economic theories of lawyer advertising provide
important background for the next section.383 This background, together
with the Project data, "shape" the form of the lawyer advertising debate.
This section begins by addressing several issues concerning the pub-
lic's attitudes toward lawyer advertising.38 4 Next, the Project discusses
attitudes of lawyers toward lawyer advertising. It also examines advertising
behavior of lawyers, and advertising's effects on the delivery of legal
services. The Project explores the relationships between the demographics
of legal practice and lawyer advertising. Finally, it considers whether lawyer
advertising affects the cost or quality of legal services.
Iowa and Wisconsin were chosen as comparative forums for this study
because the states are geographically and demographically similar and
because the states have adopted different approaches in the regulation of
lawyer advertising.385 The Iowa Bar has enacted extensive regulations
intended to uphold the dignity of the profession.38 6 The Wisconsin Bar, on
the other hand, regulates lawyer advertising less restrictively.38 7 The
Project employed three primary research devices: a mail survey of the
general Iowa and Wisconsin populations, a studio EMT session which
examined the attitudes of the general public and law students, and a mail
survey of Iowa and Wisconsin lawyers.
A. Public Survey
The population portion of the Project allows examination of several
issues regarding the public's attitudes towards lawyer advertising: first,
whether the public views lawyers who advertise less favorably than lawyers
as a profession; second, if so, whether any negative perceptions of lawyers
who advertise carry over to the public's perceptions of the court system; and
third, whether exposure to lawyer advertising affects the public's percep-
tions of the truthfulness of these advertisements.
of Quality Changes Due to Professional Regulation, 34J. Indus. Econ. 17-32 (1985); Kwoka,
supra note 367, at 211-16.
382. de Benedictis, Study Reheats Advertising Debate, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 28.
383. See supra notes 26-226 and accompanying text (providing history of and current
approaches to lawyer advertising regulation); supra notes 227-324 and accompanying text
(addressing the concept of "professionalism"); supra notes 325-82 and accompanying text
(discussing the economics of lawyer advertising).
384. See infra notes 388-448 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 15.
386. See supra notes 170-226 and accompanying text.
387. Compare supra notes 108, 133, 161 (noting Wisconsin regulations) with notes 170-226
and accompanying text (discussing Iowa regulation).
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1. Perceptions of Lawyers and Courts
The population survey asked respondents to rate individually lawyers
as a professional group, lawyers who advertise, and the court system for
each of the following attributes: honesty, competence, helpfulness, effec-
tiveness, and reliability. The scale ranged from a low score of one (1) to a
high score of seven (7).388 The Project hypothesized that if Iowa is
successful in its efforts to uphold the dignity of the profession through
extensive regulation of lawyer advertising, it would follow that the Iowa
public holds a higher opinion of lawyers than does the Wisconsin public. In
fact, the data supports this hypothesis. Table 1 shows that Iowa respon-
dents rated lawyers more favorably on every attribute surveyed:
Table 1
Ratings of Lawyers as a Profession
(low = 1, high = 7)
Attribute Iowa Wisconsin
Honesty3 89  4.60 4.11
Competency390  4.91 4.55
Helpfulness 9 '  4.78 4.30
Effectiveness 3 9 2  4.72 4.43
Reliability3 9 3  4.70 4.22
The survey attempted to determine whether this trend carried over to
lawyers who advertise. Predictably, more people from Wisconsin have seen
a lawyer advertisement: 96% of the Wisconsin public surveyed compared to
67% of the Iowa respondents. 394 Of those who had viewed a lawyer
388. See infra Appendix A, at questions 1, 2, 9.
389. A "t-test" was used to determine whether the mean values rating lawyers as a
professional group varied significantly among Iowa and Wisconsin residents. The t-test
produces probability statements regarding whether two independently sampled populations
represent a single population. See R. Sprinthall, Basic Statistical Analysis 165 (2d ed. 1987). For
each t-test, a "t-value" is calculated and a significance level (p) is given. A calculated
significance level of less than .05 indicates that the probability the result would occur by chance
alone is less than 5%-thus we can conclude that differences are "real" differences and not due
to chance. In this instance, the t-value for the data (t=3.673) was significant at p < .001
(df=371).
390. The t-value for the data (t=3.080) was significant at p < .01 (df=372).
391. The t-value for the data (t=3.508) was significant at p < .01 (df=370).
392. The t-value for the data (t=2.155) was significant at p < .05 (df--370).
393. The t-value for the data (t=3.360) was significant at p < .01 (df=370).
394. Iowa Wisconsin
Have Viewed 139 (67%) 171 (96%)
Have Not Viewed 68 (33%) 8 (4%)
No Answer 1 0
A chi-square test was used to determine whether the frequency of viewing advertising differed
significantly between states. The chi-square test determines whether frequency differences
between discrete categories of nominal data vary on the basis of chance. Sprinthall, supra note
389, at 277. For each analysis, a chi-square statistic (%2) is calculated and its significance level
233
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advertisement, more respondents from Wisconsin than Iowa had viewed
those advertisements within their home state.395 Interestingly, despite the
relative lack of lawyer advertising in Iowa, the number of respondents from
Iowa and Wisconsin who felt that they definitely or probably possess
sufficient information to find a competent lawyer was approximately
equivalent.39
6
Table 2 reveals that respondents from Iowa and Wisconsin did not
differ in their evaluations of lawyers who advertise.
Table 2
Ratings of Lawyers Who Advertise
(low = 1, high = 7)
Attribute Iowa Wisconsin
Honesty3 97  3.68 3.74
Competency398  3.89 3.84
Helpfulness3 99  4.08 4.03
Effectiveness400  4.00 3.94
Reliability40  3.79 3.73
Moreover, a comparison of the data in Table 1 with Table 2 shows that
respondents from both Iowa and Wisconsin rated lawyers who advertise
significantly lower than lawyers in general with respect to all five attributes
(p) is determined. A calculated significance level of less than .05 indicates that the probability
the result would occur by chance alone is less than 5%-thus we can conclude that differences
are "real" differences and not due to chance. If the significance level of the calculated
chi-square statistic for the age group size data is smaller than that expected by chance, then we
conclude that there is a significant difference of lawyer advertising between the age groups. In
this instance, the chi-square value for the data (z2 = 49.778) was significant at p < .001 (df= 2).
395. Iowa Wisconsin
Viewed Within State 97 (71%) 163 (95%)
Not Viewed Within State 39 (29%) 8 (5%)
Respondents who had never viewed a lawyer advertisement (68 in Iowa and 8 in Wisconsin)
did not answer this question. The chi-square value for the Iowa/Wisconsin variation
(x2=86.714) was significant at p < .001 (df=2).
396, See infra Appendix A, question 12.
397. The t-value for the data (t=.467) was not significant at p = .641 (df= 292).
398. The t-value for the data (t=.250) was not significant at p = .803 (df=289).
399. The t-value for the data (t= .276) was not significant at p = .783 (df= 287).
400. The t-value for the data (t=.348) was not significant at p = .728 (df= 289).
401. The t-value for the data (t=.244) was not significant at p = .807 (df=287).
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surveyed: honesty,40 2 competency, 403 helpfulness, 404 effectiveness, 405 and
reliability.
406
In a related series of questions, respondents were asked to rate the
descriptive accuracy of several statements concerning lawyers and the legal
profession. 407 The scale ranged from a low of one (1), strongly disagree, to
a high of five (5), strongly agree.
Table 3
Agreement With Statements About Lawyers
(disagree = 1, agree = 5)
Statement Iowa Wisconsin
"sympathetic to their client's interests"4 0 8  3.64 3.38
"concerned with their own interests" ' 40 9  3.31 3.69
"concerned with the interests of the legal profession"'4 1  3.76 3.61
"dedicated to making the justice system work"' 3.17 2.93
As Table 3 illustrates, the Iowa public viewed each of the "positive"
statements about lawyers as significantly more descriptive than did the
Wisconsin public, with the exception of the statement that lawyers are
"concerned with the interests of the legal profession." Both Iowa and
Wisconsin respondents thought "concerned with their own interests" was
more descriptive of lawyers than "dedicated to making the justice system
work," although this difference was more pronounced among citizens of
Wisconsin, who are more frequently exposed to lawyer advertisements.41 2
The hypothesis that Iowans would also rate the court system more
favorably can be derived from the above findings that the Iowa public views
lawyers more favorably than does the Wisconsin public. This prediction
stems from the "nexus theory" relied upon by Justice Reynoldson in his
concurring opinion in Humphrey,4 13 a decision upholding Iowa's regulations
402. The t-value for the Wisconsin data (t= 3.885) was significant at p < .001 (df= 161) and
for Iowa data (t=7.241) was significant at p < .001 (df= 128).
403. The t-value for the Wisconsin data (t= 6.607) was significant at p < .001 (df= 159) and
for the Iowa data (t=9.566) at p < .001 (df= 127).
404. The t-value for the Wisconsin data (t=2.319) was significant at p < .05 (df= 157) and
for the Iowa data (t=4.366) at p < .001 (df= 126).
405. The t-value for the Wisconsin data (t=3.937) was significant atp < .001 (df= 159) and
for the Iowa data (t=4.655) at p < .001 (df= 125).
406. The t-value for the Wisconsin data (t= 3.734) was significant at p < .001 (df= 157) and
for the Iowa data (t= 6.054) at p < .001 (df= 126).
407. See infra Appendix A, at question 13.
408. The t-value for the data (t=2.662) was significant at p < .01 (df=380).
409. The t-value for the data (t=3.272) was significant at p < .01 (df=379).
410. The t-value for the data (t= 1.539) was not significant at p = .125 (df=375).
411. The t-value for the data (t= 2.023) was significant at p < .05 (df= 378).
412. The value of the F-Ratio (F= 11.210) was significant at p < .01 (df= 1, 377).
413. Committee on Prof. Ethics and Conduct v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Iowa
1985) (Reynoldson, J., concurring), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986). See supra notes
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of lawyer advertising. This theory recognizes a compelling state interest in
ensuring that the judicial system appears just. The theory also assumes that
an inextricable link exists, in the mind of the public, between lawyers and
the courts. It follows that the state has a compelling interest in regulating
lawyer advertising to preserve the integrity of the justice system.
According to the nexus theory, the ratings of lawyers and of the court
system should parallel each other. Because the general public in Iowa rated
lawyers as a profession significantly higher on all attributes than did the
Wisconsin public, Iowans should also rate the court system higher. How-
ever, notwithstanding the more negative perceptions of lawyers found
among Wisconsin residents, citizens of the two states held substantially
similar views of the court system. As is evident from Table 4, none of the
differences are significant.
Table 4
Ratings of American Court System
(low = 1, high = 7)
Attribute Iowa Wisconsin
Honesty414  4.32 4.35
Competency 415  4.08 3.89
Helpfulness4 1" 6  3.89 3.71
Effectiveness417  3.76 3.49
Reliability418  3.83 3.78
Interestingly, citizens of both states held more favorable views of
lawyers than of courts. Iowa respondents rated lawyers in general more
favorably than the court system on all five attributes, and Wisconsin
295-99 and accompanying text (discussing "nexus theory" in more detail).
414. The t-value for the data (t=.182) was not significant at p = .856 (df= 366).
415. The t-value for the data (t= 1.253) was nott significant at p = .211 (df= 371).
416. The t-value for the data (t= 1.154) was not significant at p = .249 (df=369).
417. The t-value for the data (t= 1.624) was not significant at p = .105 (df=367).
418. The t-value for the data (t=.325) was not significant at p = .745 (df=368).
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respondents rated lawyers higher on all attributes except honesty.4 19 Both
the Iowa and Wisconsin samples rated lawyers who advertise significantly
more helpful and effective than the court system, lawyers who advertise
and the court system as equally competent and reliable, and the court
system as more honest than lawyers who advertise. 420 Because the favorable
ratings of lawyers given by Iowa respondents did not carry over to the
ratings of the court system, the data does not support the nexus theory.
In addition to completing the above ratings of lawyers and courts, the
subjects were asked to rate the content of advertisements in general and the
content of attorney advertisements as either "truthful" or "misleading. '421
The scale ranged from one (1) to five (5), with 1 being the most truthful and
5 being the most misleading.
419. Iowa Ratings
Attorneys Courts t-value p-level df
Honesty 4.601 4.321 2.075 < .05 191
Competence 4.910 4.076 7.469 < .001 193
Helpfulness 4.784 3.888 8.856 < .001 191
Effectiveness 4.721 3.759 8.755 <.001 191
Reliability 4.698 3.832 8.854 < .001 191
Wisconsin Ratings
Attorneys Courts t-value p-level df
Honesty 4.114 4.349 2.15 < .05 171
Competence 4.459 8.886 6.358 < .001 174
Helpfulness 4.295 3.714 5.531 < .001 172
Effectiveness 4.429 3.494 7.513 < .001 173
Reliability 4.220 3.782 3.758 < .001 172
420. Iowa Ratings
Attorneys Courts t-value p-level df
Honesty 3.67 4.32 -4.315 < .001 130
Competence 3.88 4.08 -.478 = .633 129
Helpfulness 4.08 3.89 2.473 < .05 128
Effectiveness 4.00 3.76 2.883 < .01 127
Reliability 3.78 3.83 .188 = .851 129
Wisconsin Ratings
Attorneys Courts t-value p-level df
Honesty 3.74 4.35 -4.358 < .001 158
Competence 3.84 3.89 .101 = .919 159
Helpfulness 4.03 3.71 2.867 < .01 158
Effectiveness 3.94 3.49 4.014 < .001 159
Reliability 3.74 3.78 0.49 = .961 157
421. See infra Appendix A, at questions 15, 16.
77 IOWA LAW REVIEW
Table 5
Effect of Viewing Lawyer Advertisement
Have viewed Have not viewed
lawyer advertisements lawyer advertisements
Iowa 422  Wisconsin 421 Iowa 4
24  Wisconsin 425
Advertisements in General 2.96 3.24 2.97 2.43
Lawyer Advertisements 2.82 3.11 2.96 2.14
As indicated by Table 5, neither Iowa nor Wisconsin respondents perceived
a difference between advertisements in general and lawyer
advertisements. 42 6 However, Iowa respondents who have seen a lawyer
advertisement rated lawyer advertisements as significantly more truthful
than advertisements in general. 427 This distinction does not exist for Iowans
who have never seen a lawyer advertisement. The effect was similar, but not
as pronounced, for the Wisconsin public. The finding that viewing lawyer
advertisements does not negatively affect the perceived truthfulness of
those advertisements suggests that the viewers remain. open to the infor-
mation contained in the advertisement.
2. Comparison with the EMT Study
The EMT portion of the Project addressed, in focus group setting, the
perceptions of two sample groups: members of the public and law students.
The two sample groups allow comparison of views of the general public
with the professional bias which lawyers may develop in the process of legal
education and through self identification. Members of the public partici-
pating in the EMT session 428 were significantly more accepting of lawyer
advertising than were participating law students. When asked how they feel
about lawyers and law firms that advertise, 60% of the public participating
in the session thought that lawyer advertising was acceptable, 429 compared
to only 41% of the participating law students.430
422. The t-value for the data (t= 1.991) was significant at p < .05 (n= 132).
423. The t-value for the data (t= 1.812) was not significant at p = .072 (n= 166).
424. The t-value for the data (t=0.000) was not significant at p = 1.000 (n=55).
425. The t-value for the data (t=.795) was not significant for p = .457 (n=7).
426. For Iowa, the mean for advertisements in general was 2.96 and for lawyer advertise-
ments was 2.86; the t-value for the data (t= 1.700) was not significant at p = .091 (df= 187).
For Wisconsin, the mean for advertisements in general was 3.21 and for lawyer advertisements
was 3.09; the t-value for the data (t= 1.958) was not significant at p = .052 (df= 172).
427. That is, the average rating by Iowans who had viewed lawyer advertisements was 2.82
while Iowans who had not viewed a lawyer advertisement gave an average rating of 2.96.
428. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
429. A total of 63 members of the public participated in the survey. Sixty percent (38) of the
members thought lawyer advertising was acceptable. Eight percent (5) of the members of the
public were ambivalent towards lawyer advertising. Sixteen percent (10) of members of the
public thought that lawyers' advertising was unacceptable.
430. A total of 27 law students participated in the EMT session. Of the law students,
forty-one percent (11) thought that lawyer advertising was acceptable. Thirty percent (8) of the
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The viewing of lawyer advertisements had a negative effect on the
perceptions of lawyer advertising by both sample groups. Before the EMT
session, 76% of the members of the public agreed when asked whether it
was proper for lawyers and law firms to advertise, while 56% of the law
students thought that lawyer advertising was proper.
43'
A portion of the EMT session presented to the participants television
and radio advertisements for legal services. Throughout the presentation,
the participants were asked to continuously rate whether they liked each
advertisement. For each advertisement, the mean rating was significantly
higher for members of the public than for the law students.432 For example,
67% of the members of the public who participated in the EMT session,
compared to only 33% of the law students, indicated before the testing that
they would use the services, if needed, of a lawyer who advertises. Following
the testing session, a greater number of both members of the public (74%)
and law students (38%) indicated that they would use the services, if
needed, of lawyers who advertise. 433 These results are shown in Table 6:
law students were ambivalent toward lawyer advertising. Thirty percent (8) of the law students
thought that legal advertising was unacceptable.
43 1. See Rowan & Blewitt, supra note 23, at 23.
432. See id. at 45, 49, 55, 59, 64, 68, 72, 76, 80.
433. See id. at 25.
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Post-testing
Public Law Students
Is it proper for law






between law firms and
attorneys.435
I would use the





public's image of law
firms and attorneys.43 7
Advertising by law
firms and attorneys
would tend to lower





public's image of law
firms and attorneys.43 9
Advertising by law
firms and attorneys
would tend to lower
the credibility of their
profession.440
How appropriate is it




76% (proper) 56% (proper) 70%
59% (agree) 42% (agree) 54%
67% (agree) 33% (agree) 74%
28% (agree) 49% (agree) 37%
33% (agree) 62% (agree) 34%
16% (agree) 38% (agree) 20%
23% (agree) 64% (agree) 35%
49% (O.K.) 15% (O.K.) 43%
434. The data are reprinted from id. at 23.
435. The data are reprinted from id. at 24.
436, The data are reprinted from id. at 25.
437. The data are reprinted from id. at 26.
438. The data are reprinted from id. at 27.
439. The data are reprinted from id. at 28.
440. The data are reprinted from id. at 29.















Question Public Law Students Public Law Students
How appropriate is it
for law firms and'
attorneys to advertise
their services on the
radio?442  49% (O.K.) 19% (O.K.) 64% 23%
How appropriate is it
for law firms and
attorneys to advertise
their services in the
newspaper?44 3  76% (O.K.) 30% (O.K.) 68% 38%
How appropriate is it





office? 44  16% (O.K.) 15% (O.K.) 10% 11%
The law students believed more strongly than did members of the
public that advertising negatively affects the image, credibility, and dignity
of both lawyers and the legal profession. The public perceived lawyer
advertising as more adversely affecting the dignity of lawyers than the
credibility or image of lawyers.
Following the presentation of lawyer advertisements, the participants
were asked what they specifically liked and disliked about the legal
commercials. Multiple responses were solicited. Members of the public
identified the following specific "positive" images in the commercials: Offer
of help, if needed (24%); areas of expertise or specialization (22%);
explanation or protection of rights (19%); informative or factual presenta-
tion (19%); truthfulness or sincerity (17%); humor (16%); no hard-sell
(13%); and production (13%). Members of the public identified the
following specific "negative" images in the lawyer commercials: Hard-sell
mentality (30%); greed or manipulation of the system (16%); cheap
production quality (14%); insincerity or slickness (10%); and patronizing or
manipulative tone (8%).
4 4 5
As discussed above, 446 many states, including Iowa, require the use of
disclaimers on lawyer advertisements. Participants in the EMT session were
asked whether they believe that the public obtains useful information from
such disclaimers. 447 Fifty-four percent of the public participants thought
442. The data are reprinted from id. at 32.
443. The data are reprinted from id. at 33.
444. The data are reprinted from id. at 34.
445. See id. at 83-84.
446. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
447. An example of a disclaimer is as follows: "The choice of a lawyer is an extremely
important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements or self-proclaimed
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that disclaimers were useful, but 30% of these respondents qualified their
answers by stating that disclaimers were likely to be ineffective or that they
invalidated the advertisement. Moreover, 46% of the public participants
felt that the disclaimers do not provide useful information to the public,




In this section, we examine the attitudes of lawyers toward lawyer
advertising in light of data collected from the lawyer mail survey. The data
from the lawyer survey reveal several interesting relationships between the
demographics of legal practice and lawyer advertising. 449 We also examine
data from the lawyer mail survey concerning the advertising behavior of
lawyers and the effects of advertising on the delivery of legal services. 450
1. Lawyer Advertising and the Nature of Legal Practice
For purposes of analysis of the attorney questionnaire, we define
"lawyer advertising" as any affirmative activity by a lawyer (firm) directed to
promote that lawyer's (firm's) services that either: (1) lists more than
name(s), address, and telephone number in the current Yellow Pages of any
telephone book local to the lawyer's (firm's) practice;45' or (2) conveys any
specific information about that lawyer (firm) through other common public
media, such as television, direct mail, newspaper, or radio.452 Of the sample
of lawyers who completed surveys in connection with the Project (425), 36%
(153) indicated that they advertise.
a. Demographic Characteristics of Lawyers Who Advertise
Data from the lawyer survey shed light on several demographic
characteristics of lawyers who advertise. First, we consider how age affects
a lawyer's propensity to advertise. Because Bates and its progeny have
occurred within the last fifteen years, 453 lawyer advertising is a relatively
new phenomenon within the American legal profession. Accordingly, we
might expect younger lawyers-those who attended law school and started
practice with a group of peers who may advertise, and who may wish to
establish their own clientele-to advertise more than older lawyers.
Data from the Project confirm that in fact, younger lawyers do
advertise more than older lawyers. Table 8 divides the distribution into age
expertise." See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure generally);
supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing Iowa's disclosure requirement).
448. See Rowan & Blewitt, supra note 23, at 167- 74.
449. See infra notes 453-68 and accompanying text.
450. See infra notes 469-93, 494-537 and accompanying text.
451. See infra Appendix B, at question 4.
452. See infra Appendix B, at question 8.
453. See supra notes 54-169 and accompanying text.
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quartiles. A systematic relationship is evident: younger lawyers are more
likely to advertise.
Table 8454
Lawyer Advertising by Age
Age Advertise Do Not Advertise
< 37 (111) 44% (49) 56% (62)
37-42 (118) 42% (50) 58% (68)
43-51 (97) 36% (35) 64% (62)
> 55 (93) 20% (19) 78% (73)
Total: (425)455  36% (153) 64% (272)
Second, the data also show that smaller law firms and sole practitioners
might be expected to advertise more frequently than large law firms. This
may be true for two reasons. First, smaller firms are not as likely to have the
reputation that larger, perhaps more established firms might. Second, large
firms are unlikely to advertise because the nature of disagreement among
lawyers in general concerning the propriety of lawyer advertising suggests
that agreement on the issue will become less likely within larger, more
diverse groups of lawyers. A greater percentage of lawyers surveyed who
are either sole practitioners or who practice in firms with less than
twenty-five lawyers advertise than do lawyers in larger firms.
456
Finally, because of the high concentration of lawyers in urban areas, it
might be expected that advertising is more effective and less costly-and
therefore used more often-in urban areas than in rural areas. The results
of the lawyer survey, however, indicate no significant difference in adver-
tising between lawyers who serve clients from primarily metropolitan areas
and lawyers who serve clients from primarily rural areas.457 Similarly, the
lawyer survey results indicate no significant difference in advertising
between lawyers who characterize their practice as "generalized" and
454. To determine whether the frequency of lawyer advertising differed significantly
between age groups, a chi-square test was employed. The chi-square test determines whether
frequency differences data between discrete categories of nominal data vary on the basis of
chance. Sprinthall, supra note 394, at 277. In this instance, the chi-square value for the data
(x2
= 15.210) was significant at p < .01 (df=3).
455. Because of missing data values, the totals on this and other tables may not add up to
the exact number of surveys in the sample (n = 425).
456. Of sole practitioners, 45% (61/135) advertise. Thirty-eight percent of lawyers who
practice in firms with 2 to 25 lawyers advertise. Only 14% of the surveyed lawyers who practice
in firms of 25 or more lawyers advertise. The chi-square value for the data (z2 = 16.336) was
significant at p < .05 (df= 3).
457. Of the lawyers surveyed, the percentage of those who serve primarily metropolitan
clients and who advertise (38%) is greater than the percentage of those who serve primarily
rural clients and who advertise (33%). The chi-square value for the data (%2 = 1.211) was not
significant at p = .05 (df= 1). For purposes of the lawyer survey, "metropolitan area"' was
defined as an area with a population greater than 20,000. See infra Appendix'B, at question
34.
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lawyers who characterize their practice as "specialized. '458
b. The Effects of Regulation on Lawyer Advertising
In designing the Project, we chose the states of Iowa and Wisconsin as
comparative forums for sampling because of their geographic proximity
and demographic similarity.459 However, Iowa has taken a more restrictive
approach in regulating lawyer advertising than Wisconsin. 460 In particular,
Iowa has taken an extremely restrictive approach in regulating lawyer
advertising in certain media, specifically television, newspaper, radio, and
direct mail. 46 ' It might be expected that lawyers in Iowa advertise less than
lawyers in Wisconsin. Data from the Project confirms this conclusion. Of
the lawyers surveyed, only 22% (51/235) of Iowa lawyers advertise, while
54% (102/190) of Wisconsin lawyers advertise. 462 Also, 35% (66/190) of
Wisconsin lawyers advertise in media in addition to Yellow Pages, com-
pared to 12% (25/208) of Iowa lawyers. 46 Of the Iowa lawyers who
completed surveys, less than 1% advertise on television (1/235) or radio
(1/235), 5.5% (13/235) advertise in newspapers, and none advertise by
direct mail. Of the Wisconsin lawyers, however, 3.7% (7/190) advertise on
television,464 4.7% (9/190) advertise on radio,465 26% (39/151) advertise in
newspapers,466 and 3.7% (7/190) advertise by direct mail.467
The effects of each state's regulatory approach operated indepen-
dently of the characteristics of lawyers or law firms. That is, advertisements
were used more in Wisconsin than Iowa without regard to whether the area
was metropolitan or rural, whether the firm was specialized or generalized,
and also without regard to a lawyer's.age or the size of lawyer's firm. Thus,
it appears that none of these other factors can account for the differences
in the advertising practices of Wisconsin versus Iowa lawyers. 468 Accord-
ingly, it appears that Iowa's restrictive approach in regulating media
458. While 34% (79/232) of lawyers who characterize their practice as "generalized"
advertise, 39% (73/184) of lawyers who characterize their practice as "specialized" advertise.
The chi-square value for the data (x2= 1.399) was not significant at p = .05 (df= 1).
459. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Of the 495 surveys sent to lawyers in Iowa,
235 (47.5%) were completed and returned. Of the 483 surveys sent to lawyers in Wisconsin,
190 (39%) were completed and returned. The chi-square value for the data (x2 =4.76) was
significant at p < .01 (df= 1).
460. Compare supra notes 170-226 and accompanying text with notes 108, 133, 161.
461. See supra notes 170-226 and accompanying text.
462. The chi-square value for the data (%2 =46.641) was significant at p < .05 (df= 1).
463. The chi-square value for the data (%2 =36.276) was significant at p < .05 (df= 1).
464. The chi-square value for the data (x2 = 6.040) was significant at p < .05 (df= 1).
465. The chi-square value for the data (x2 = 11.372) was significant at p < .05 (df= 1).
466. The chi-square value for the data (x2 =21.997) was significant at p < .05 (df= 1).
467. The chi-square value for the data (%2 = 6.040) was significant at p < .05 (df= 1).
468. For the main effect of a lawyer's state, the F-ratio (F=32.772) was significant at p <
.001 (df= 1, 363). For the main effect of a lawyer's age, the F-ratio (F=2.932) was significant
at p < .05 (df=3, 363). For the main effect of a lawyer's firm size, the F-ratio (F=4.610) was
significant at p < .01 (df=3, 363). The F-ratio (F=0.838) for the interactive effect between a




advertising indeed has had a chilling effect on media advertising by lawyers
in Iowa.
2. Attitudes of Lawyers Concerning Advertising and Professionalism
The lawyer survey46 9 solicited the attitudes of lawyers with regard to
several issues related to lawyer advertising. First, lawyers were asked to rate
the effectiveness of the various methods of "advertising" they use to obtain
clients. 470 Second, lawyers were asked to rate the descriptive accuracy of a
series of statements regarding the image of lawyers and of the legal
profession.47 1 Finally, lawyers were asked a series of attitudinal questions
concerning lawyer advertising.
472
a. Lawyer Perceptions of the Effectiveness of Lawyer Advertising
Lawyers utilize many different methods to obtain clients, including
media advertising, goodwill promotion, referrals by past and present
clients, referrals by families and friends, and lawyer referral services. The
lawyers surveyed ranked lawyer advertising as a less effective method for
obtaining clients than either goodwill promotion or family, friend, and
client referrals.4 73 Lawyers who advertise more than name, address, and
telephone number in area Yellow Pages or who advertise in other media
ranked media advertising as a significantly more effective means for
obtaining clients than lawyers who do not advertise.
4 74
Interestingly, Wisconsin lawyers who completed the survey view
advertising in media as a more effective means for obtaining clients than do
lawyers in Iowa.475 This implicates two alternative hypotheses. On the one
hand, Iowa lawyers may not view advertising as effective or appropriate and
469. See infra Appendix B.
470. See infra Appendix B, at question 3.
471. See infra Appendix B, at question 50.
472. See infra Appendix B, at questions 51-54
473. Lawyers were asked to rate from 1 (least effective) to 10 (most effective) the
effectiveness of various methods they use to obtain clients. See infra Appendix B, at question
3. The mean values for the various methods are as follows:
Method for obtaining clients Mean effectiveness
1 (least effective), 10 (most effective)
-Advertising in Media 3.715
-Specifically Directed Good will Promotion 4.261
-Referrals by Past and Present Clients 8.661
-Referrals by Families and Friends 7.015
-Lawyer Referral Services 3.145
474. The mean value for advertising in media of lawyers who advertise was 5.403, while the
mean value for lawyers who do not advertise was 2.839. The t-test value for the data (t= 8.681)
was significant at p < .05 (df= 258.7). There is no significant difference in the mean value for
the effectiveness of alternative methods for obtaining clients between lawyers who advertise
and lawyers who do not.
475. The mean value for the effectiveness of advertising in media for Wisconsin lawyers was
4.662, while lawyers in Iowa reported a mean value of 3.715. The t-test value for the data
(t = -2.845) was significant at p < .05 (df= 260.9).
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thus encourage its suppression through regulation by the bar. Alterna-
tively, the Iowa Bar Association's regulation of lawyer advertising may have
suppressed any of its positive value in the eyes of Iowa lawyers.
Are any variables other than state connected to ratings of the effec-
tiveness of media advertising? A lawyer's state has no significant main effect
in explaining the variance between the mean values for media advertising
effectiveness between lawyers who advertise and lawyers who do not
advertise. 476 A lawyer's firm size is the only other factor from the data that
significantly explains the variance across groups of lawyers in rating the
effectiveness of lawyer advertising.
477
b. Lawyer Perceptions of the Legal Profession
The survey asked lawyers to rate the descriptive accuracy of several
statements concerning lawyers and the legal profession.478 As demon-
strated in Table 9, the statement that lawyers rated as most descriptive of
lawyers was "sympathetic to their clients' interests." The statement that
lawyers rated as least descriptive of lawyers was "concerned with the
interests of the legal profession." The lawyers surveyed rated "concerned
with their own interests" as more descriptive of lawyers than "dedicated to
making the justice system work."
Of the lawyers surveyed, there is no significant difference between
Iowa (6.670) and Wisconsin (6.683) lawyers in rating whether the statement
"concerned with their own interests" is descriptive of lawyers. Similarly,
there is no significant difference in the rating of the statement "concerned
with their own interests" between lawyers who advertise (6.662) and lawyers
who do not advertise (6.683).479
476. The dependent variable in the model was the mean effectiveness rating for advertising
in media, while the independent variables were a lawyer's state and whether a lawyer
advertised. For the lawyer's state, the value of the F-ratio (F=.006) was not significant at p
= .941 (df= 1, 259). For whether a lawyer advertised, the F-ratio (F = 53.447) was significant
at p < .05 (df= 1, 259). The F-ratio for the interactive effectiveness of a lawyer's state and
advertising (F= 1.767) was not significant at p = 0.185 (df= 1, 259).
477. The dependent variable in the model was the mean effectiveness rating for advertising
in media, while the independent variables were whether a lawyer advertised and a lawyer's
firm size. For a lawyer's firm size, the value of the F- ratio (F=2.881) was not significant at p
< .05 (df= 3, 238). For whether a lawyer advertised, the F-ratio (F= 24.877) was significant at
p < .05 (dfr= 3, 238). The F-ratio for the interactive effectiveness of a lawyer's firm size and
advertising (F=.41 1) was not significant at p = 0.745 (df=3, 238).
478. See infra Appendix B, at question 50.




Agreement With Statements About Lawyers
(1 = least descriptive of lawyers, 10 = most descriptive of lawyers)
Statement Iowa Rating Wisconsin Rating
1. "sympathetic to their client's interests" 7.784 7.277480
2. "concerned with their own interests" 6.670 6.68348 '
3. "concerned with the interests of the legal profession" 6.498 5.3904s2
4. "dedicated to making the justice system work" 6.372 5.5894,3
As Table 9 illustrates, Iowa lawyers viewed each of the "positive"
statements about lawyers as significantly more descriptive of lawyers than
do Wisconsin lawyers. Most interestingly, the Iowa lawyers surveyed
indicated a significantly stronger belief than Wisconsin lawyers that lawyers
were "concerned with the interests of the legal profession." There were no
significant differences in the descriptive rating of the "positive" statements
about lawyers between lawyers who advertise and lawyers who do not
advertise.
c. Lawyer Perceptions of the Value of Lawyer Advertising
A section of the lawyer survey solicited lawyers' general attitudes
towards advertising in the legal profession. As Table 10 and Table 11
indicate, Wisconsin lawyers believed more strongly than did Iowa lawyers
that lawyer advertising serves the interests of both the public and of the
legal profession. Similarly, lawyers who advertise reacted significantly more
favorably than lawyers who do not advertise to arguments that lawyer
advertising is in the interest of both the public and of the legal profession.
Table 10
"Do you think that advertising by attorneys benefits the public?"
Response All Iowa Wisconsin
4 84 Advertise Do Not Advertise
485
Definitely 6.6% 5.6% 8% 14.4% 2.2%
Generally 25.4% 19.3% 33% 43.8% 14.9%
No Effect 24.5% 23.2% 26.1% 19.6% 27.2%
Generally Not 26.7% 33.9% 24.5% 19.6% 35.5%
Definitely Not 13.8% 18% 8.5% 2.6% 20.2%
480. The t-value for the data (t= 2.209) was significant at p < .05 (df = 378.7).
481. The t-value for the data (t=-.052) was not significant at p = 0.958 (df=389.8).
482. The t-value for the data (t=4.810) was significant at p < .05 (df= 372.4).
483. The t-value for the data (t=3.216) was significant at p < .05 (df=382).
484. The chi-square value for the data (%2= 18.859) was significant at p < .05 (df= 4).
485. The chi-square value for the data (x2 = 85.80) was significant at p < .05 (df = 4).
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Table 11
"Do you think that allowing attorneys to advertise is in the best interests
of the legal profession?"
Response - All Iowa Wisconsin
48 6 Advertise Do Not Advertise487
Definitely 8.3% 5.6% 11.7% 15.1% 4.5%
Generally 19% 14.2% 25% 31.6% 11.9%
No Effect 17.9% 15.5% 20.7% 21% 16%
Generally Not 34.3% 37.9% 29.8% 24.3% 39.9%
Definitely Not 20.5% 26.7% 12.8% 7.9% 27.6%
Table 12 suggests that Iowa lawyers are significantly less receptive
than Wisconsin lawyers to the notion of lawyer advertising as a means to
increase a lawyer's profitability. Table 12 further demonstrates that lawyers
who do not advertise are significantly less in favor of lawyer advertising
than lawyers who do advertise.
Table 12
"If you were convinced that advertising in any print or broadcast
medium would increase the volume of your legal business, would you
advertise?"
Response All Iowa Wisconsin4 88 Advertise Do Not Advertise48 9
Definitely 13.7% 9% 19.7% 30.7% 4.1%
Probably 13.7% 12% 16% 20.3% 10.0%
Possibly 28.2% 28.6% 27.7% 28.8% 27.9%
Probably Not 27.7% 30.3% 25.5% 16.3% 34.2%
Definitely Not 16.6% 20.1% 12.2% 3.9% 23.8%
In Iowa and in many other states, lawyer advertisements must contain
a disclosure about the value of the advertisement. 490 A question in the
survey asked lawyers whether they believe that the public obtains useful
information from such disclosures. 49' Of the lawyers surveyed, 39.6%
stated that they believe the disclosure does not convey useful information to
the public, while 12.2% of the lawyers were uncertain. Approximately half
(51.8%) thought the disclosure was useful. Lawyers from Iowa and Wis-
consin did not differ in their views of whether disclosures convey useful
486. The chi-square value for the data (%2 = 24.445) was significant at p < .05 (df= 4).
487. The chi-square value for the data (x2 = 59.496) was significant at p < .05 (df= 4).
488. The chi-square value for the data (x2= 15.109) was significant at p < .05 (df=4).
489. The chi-square value for the data (x2 =92.201) was significant at p < .05 (di=4).
490. In Iowa, the disclosure, which is required to appear on telephone directory, television,
and newpaper advertisements, must indicate that the choice of a lawyer is an extremely
important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements or self-proclaimed
expertise. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
491. See infra Appendix B, at question 54.
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information to the public.492 There were also no significant differences
between lawyers who advertise and lawyers who do not advertise. 493
3. The Effects of Lawyer Advertising on the Delivery of Legal Services
Several studies have reported the effects of lawyer advertising on the
price and quality of legal services. In general, these studies have suggested
that lawyer advertising is inversely related to the price a lawyer charges for
routine legal services. 494 Studies also suggest that the relationship between
lawyer advertising and the quality of legal service delivered is ambiguous. 4 95
Several questions on the attorney questionnaire solicited information about
the fees lawyers charge for specific services and the average number of
hours they spend in preparing these services.496
As Table 13 indicates, there are no significant differences in the mean
fees charged for any specific services between lawyers who advertise and
lawyers who do not advertise.497 Similarly, there are no significant differ-
ences between lawyers who advertise and lawyers who do not advertise in
the average hourly rates that they charge for their time.
The number of hours that a lawyer spends performing a specific
service may serve as a proxy for the quality of that lawyer's service. 498 As
Table 13 suggests, data from the Project indicate no significant difference
in the amount of time that lawyers spend performing specific services
492. "Do you believe that the public obtains useful information from the following
disclosure accompanying attorney advertisements: 'The choice of a lawyer is an extremely
important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements or self-proclaimed
expertise.'?"
Response All Iowa Wisconsin Advertise Do Not Advertise
Always 16.2% 13.7% 9.5% 16.8% 15.2%
Often 11.2% 12.4% 9.7% 11.2% 11.3%
Sometimes 20.8% 21.4% 20% 20.9% 20.5%
Uncertain 12.2% 9. 8% 15.1% 10.8% 14.6%
No 39.6% 42.7% 35.7% 40.3% 38.4%
The chi-square value for the IowafWisconsin variation (X2 =6.566) was not significant at
p = 0.161 (df=4).
493. The chi-square value (%2 = 1.353) was not significant at p = 0.852 (df=4).
494. See supra notes 373-77 and accompanying text.
495. See supra notes 378-82 and accompanying text.
496. The specific services include a simple will with and without a trust provision, an
uncontested bankruptcy, and an uncontested dissolution of marriage. See infra Appendix B,
at questions 14-32.
497. In the attorney questionnaire, lawyers were asked to report the flat fees and the hourly
fees they charge for specific services. We created surrogate flat and hourly variables to
supplement the available data by multiplying hourly fees by the number of hours a lawyer
expected to spend performing a service and dividing flat fees by the same number of hours.
For each service, therefore, two fee variables-an hourly fee and a flat fee-were available for
final analysis.
498. The mean time spent in performing a routine service has been employed as a proxy
for service quality in several studies of advertising. See Cox, supra note 344, at 151-53.
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between lawyers who advertise and lawyers who do not advertise. Accord-
ingly, whether a lawyer advertises does not appear to affect the quality of
legal services delivered.
By increasing competition among lawyers, lawyer advertising may
decrease the fees charged by and affect the quality of service provided by
not only lawyers who advertise, but also by non-advertising lawyers who
practice in the same legal market as lawyers who advertise. 499 As noted
above, the intensity of advertising among Wisconsin lawyers is significantly
higher than the intensity of advertising among Iowa lawyers. 500 Therefore,
it might be expected that Iowa lawyers charge higher fees than lawyers in
Wisconsin. The data, however, do not support this expectation.
The data presented in Table 13 indicate that the fees charged by Iowa
lawyers for simple wills with or without trust provisions differ significantly
from the fees charged by Wisconsin lawyers. The Iowa hourly and flat fees
for simple wills without a trust provision are significantly lower than
Wisconsin hourly and flat fees. For simple wills with a trust provision, Iowa
hourly fees are significantly lower than Wisconsin hourly fees, while Iowa
flat fees are significantly higher. With the exception of flat fees for
uncontested dissolutions of marriage, there are no other significant differ-
ences in fees between Iowa and Wisconsin lawyers. In fact, as Table 13
indicates, the fees charged by Iowa lawyers generally are less than the fees
charged by Wisconsin lawyers. This seems to contradict the hypothesis that
a greater incidence of lawyer advertising would lead to lower fees for legal
services.
Without further analysis, however, it is unclear whether the lower fees
charged by Iowa lawyers can be attributed to a lower incidence of
advertising by Iowa lawyers. Indeed, this hypothesis would directly contra-
dict the findings of a more sophisticated study by the FTC of the
relationship between lawyer advertising and fees. 501 An alternative expla-
nation may be the higher concentration of lawyers in Wisconsin serving
clients in urban areas. Table 15 confirms that lawyers serving clients from
primarily metropolitan areas generally charge fees that differ significantly
from lawyers serving primarily rural clients. The mean values of the fees
charged by lawyer serving metropolitan clients are greater for each service,
with the exception of an uncontested bankruptcy, than the mean values of
the fees charged by lawyers serving rural clients. Thus, the data are
ambiguous as to lawyer advertising and its effect on the fees lawyers charge
for their services. Because the FTC study focused solely on advertising in
metropolitan areas, 50 2 further research is needed to determine the effects
of advertising of fees in mixed urban/rural populations, such as Iowa and
Wisconsin.
499. See supra notes 347-49 and accompanying text.
500. See supra notes 462-68 and accompanying text.
501. See FTC Report, supra note 19.
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The t-value for the data (t=-1.447) was not significant at p = .149 (df= 299).
The t-value for the data (t= .118) was not significant at p = .906 (df= 295).
The t-value for the data (t=-3.172) was significant at p < .05 (df=300).
The t-value for the data (t -3.447) was significant at p < .05 (df= 296).
The t-value for the data (t=-1.580) was not significant at p = .116 (df=290).
The t-value for the data (t=-1.104) was not significant at p = .271 (df =289).
The t-value for the data (t=-3.4861) was significant at p < .05 (df=291).
The t-value for the data (t = -4.078) was significant at p < .05 (df= 288).
The t-value for the data (t=.377) was not significant at p = .707 (df= 133).
The t-value for the data (t=.012) was not significant at p = .99 (df= 134).
The t-value for the data (t=-.220) was not significant at p = .826 (df= 133).
The t-value for the data (t=-.515) was not significant at p = .607 (df= 134).
The t-value for the data (t = 1.060) was not significant at p = .29 (df= 228).
The t-value for the data (t= .565) was not significant at p = .573 (df= 222).
The t-value for the data (t=-1.154) was not significant at p = .25 (df= 229).
The t-value for the data (t=-2.702) was significant at p < .05 (df 223).
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Table 14
Mean Hours Spent By Lawyers on Services
Service Advertise No Advertise Iowa Wisconsin Metropolitan Rural
Simple will
without trust
provision 1.77 1.84519 1.92 1.73 1.97 1.55520
Simple will
with trust
provision 2.46 1.32521 2.28 2.62522 2.61 2.13523
Uncontested
bankruptcy 6.73 4.10524 7.1 6.39525 6.11 8.16526
Uncontested
dissolution of
marriage 8.3 7.79527 6.73 9.85528 8.26 7.43529
Table 15
Mean Fees Charged by Lawyers Serving Metropolitan and Rural Clients
Metropolitan Rural
Service Hour Fee Flat Fee H F
Simple will without
trust provision $ 80 147 6453° 93531
Simple will with trust
provision $ 89 219 70532 14253
Uncontested
bankruptcy $107 565 99534 640535
Uncontested
dissolution of marriage $108 956 87536 575537
519. The t-value for the data (t=.620) was.not significant at p = .535 (df=301).
520. The t-value for the data (t=-3.739) was significant at p < .001 (df=297).
521. The t-value for the data (t=-.419) was not significant at p = .676 (df= 289).
522. The t-value for the data (t=-2.322) was significant at p < .05 (df= 289).
523. The t-value for the data (t=-3.199) was significant at p < .01 (df= 285).
524. The t-value for the data (t= .129) was not significant at p = .898 (df= 132).
525. The t-value for the data (t= 1.24) was not significant at p = .217 (df= 132).
526. The t-value for the data (t=3.394) was significant at p < .01 (df= 130).
527. The t-value for the data (t=-1.020) was not significant at p = .309 (df= 225).
528. The t-value for the data (t=-7.126) was significant at p < .001 (df=225).
529. The t-value for the data (t=-1.710) was not significant at p < .10 (df=224).
530. The t-value for the data (t=-3.959) was significant at p < .01 (df= 294).
531. The t-value for the data (t=-5.319) was significant at p < .01 (df=291).
532. The t-vahe for the data (t=-3.762) was significant at p < .01 (df= 286).
533. The t-value for the data (t=-4.671) was significant at p < .01 (df=283).
534. The t-value for the data (t=-.529) was not significant at p = 0.598 (df= 131).
535. The t-value for the data (t= 1.349) was not significant at p = 0.180 (df= 131).
536. The t-value for the data (t=-1.592) was not significant at p = 0.113 (df=227).




This Contemporary Studies Project has attempted to examine the
nature and effects of lawyer advertising and present new data relevant for
understanding the arguments for and against restricting advertising by
lawyers. The Project has focused on empirical data obtained through
surveys mailed to the general population5 8 and to lawyers 539 in Iowa and
Wisconsin, and through an EMT focus group session.
540
With respect to the public, Iowa respondents, who are less frequently
exposed to lawyer advertising than Wisconsin respondents, 54' rated lawyers
more favorably than Wisconsin respondents for every attribute tested:
honesty, competency, helpfulness, effectiveness, and reliability. 542 More-
over, the members of the public sampled in both states rated lawyers as a
profession more favorably on all of these attributes than lawyers who
advertise. 543 While on the surface these results might provide ammunition
for those who contend that lawyer advertising harms the dignity of the
profession, upon closer scrutiny it is clear that the results of the Project do
not justify strict regulation of advertising by the bar.
In addition to Iowa's concern with regulating the potential abuses of
electronic media advertising, the nexus theory outlined in Iowa Supreme
Court Justice Reynoldson's concurrence to Humphrey provides a possible
justification for Iowa's current regulation of lawyer advertising.544 This
theory suggests that Iowa has a substantial state interest in regulating
lawyer advertising because the reputation of courts- the foundation of our
legal system-is inextricably connected to the public's perception of law-
yers. Justice Reynoldson argues that, because lawyer advertising degrades
lawyers, the courts will also be degraded by advertising, which in turn will
weaken the legitimacy of our justice system in the eyes of the public. 545 This
theory finds some support in the data, at least to the extent that lawyer
advertising negatively affects the public perception of lawyers. However,
our data also suggests that the public's negative perception of lawyers does
not carry over to the public's perception of the court system.546 This raises
the question of whether the Iowa Bar's interest in maintaining a positive
image of lawyers, absent any negative effect on public perceptions of our
court system, is a sufficiently weighty interest to justify strict regulation of
lawyer advertising. Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
this question, Ohralik suggests that maintaining the image of the profession
538. See supra notes 388-427 and accompanying text.
539. See supra notes 449-538 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 428-48 and accompanying text.
541. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
542. See supra notes 389-93 and accompanying text.
543. Compare Table 1 accompanying notes 389-93 with Table 2 accompanying notes
397-401.
544. 355 N.W.2d 565 (1984), on remand, 377 N.W.2d 643 (1985), appeal dismissed 475 U.S.
1114 (1986).
545. See supra notes 295-99 and accompanying text.
546. See supra notes 413-20 and accompanying text.
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simpliciter is not a sufficient interest to justify regulation of lawyer
advertising.
547
Predictably, restrictive approaches towards the regulation of lawyer
advertising like Iowa's may have the effect of chilling advertising by
lawyers. Our results show that, even when urbanization, firm size, and the
age of lawyers are controlled, Iowa lawyers tend to advertise significantly
less than Wisconsin lawyers in all media. 548 Moreover, Wisconsin lawyers
tend to react more favorably to arguments in favor of lawyer advertising,
549
although it is not clear whether their attitudes have been influenced by
Wisconsin's less restrictive advertising environment. As a whole, the data
concerning the frequency of attorney advertising lead to the inference that
Iowa's restrictive regulation of lawyer advertising has chilled advertising by
Iowa lawyers. 550
With regard to the economic effects of lawyer advertising, the data do
not conclusively establish a positive or negative relationship between lawyer
advertising and the fees charged by lawyers for specific legal services. 551
Similarly, the data do not confirm a significant positive or negative
relationship between lawyer advertising and "objective" measures of
quality.55 2 Data from other studies, however, suggest that lawyer advertis-
ing is inversely related to legal fees. Data from these same studies suggest
an ambiguous relationship between advertising and "objective" measures of
the quality of legal services. 553 We suggest that further studies of the effects
of lawyer advertising on fees and quality of legal services in mixed
urbanlraral areas are needed.
Many states have expressed an interest in following the lead of Iowa in
regulating lawyer advertising. Our study suggests several reasons why these
states should identify carefully the state interests to be protected by such
regulations.
First, the "nexus" theory articulated by Judge Reynoldson's concur-
rence to Humphrey lacks any empirical support. Thus, Iowa's interest in
protecting the "professionalism" of lawyers by requiring advertisements to
be "dignified" remains unarticulated. Certainly, dignified lawyer advertise-
ments are not necessary to protect the public from false and misleading
information. The Supreme Court has held that protecting the image of the
legal system by itself does not justify regulation of lawyer advertisments. An
alternative interest, protecting the image of the courts from the harsh
imagery of lawyer advertising because lawyers are agents of the justice
system, is not supported by our data. Second, the EMT portion of the
project suggests that the public does not necessarily perceive electronic
media advertising more negatively than other media. In fact, participants in
547. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460- 61 (1978) (holding interest in the
image of the profession is insufficient to justify regulation).
548. See supra notes 462-68 and accompanying text.
549. See supra notes 475, 484, 486, 488 and accompanying text.
550. See supra notes 460-68 and accompanying text.
551. See supra notes 501-18 and accompanying text.
552. See supra notes 498, 519-29 and accompanying text.
553. See supra notes 365-77 and accompanying text.
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the EMT responded more favorably to lawyer advertising after they had
participated in a session evaluating lawyer advertisements. Because elec-
tronic media may be the most effective method of communicating infor-
mation about lawyers to those who otherwise have no information, espe-
cially in areas that are not concentrated and metropolitan, states should
consider the countervailing interest in access to legal services. Third,
members of the public who participated in the EMT study view disclaimer
requirements as patronizing, and many lawyers also believe that they serve
no purpose. Finally, approaches like Iowa's regulatory scheme may have
the effect of chilling lawyer advertising.
We do not suggest that there are no valid state interests to justify the
regulation of attorney advertising. We simply note that in following the
Iowa Bar's articulated concern of "professionalism" in regulating lawyer
advertising, bar associations should be careful not to equivocate "dignity,"
"image," or "reputation" with "professionalism." Professionalism involves
much more than protecting the romantic imagery of lawyers; it also
involves fundamental questions of what justice requires of lawyers.
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FOR THE FIRST TWO QUESTIONS, PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER ON THE SCALE
CORRESPONDING TO YOUR VIEW.
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3. Are you related to a lawyer?
___ YES __ NO (GO TO QUESTION 5)
4. How are you related to that lawyer?
5. Have you ever used or do you use the services of a lawyer?
__ YES NO (GO TO QUESTION 8)
6. How often have you used or do you use the services of a
lawyer?
-- Once Occasionally - Regularly
7. Are you satisfied with the service you received?
__ YES NO UNCERTAIN
APPENDIX A
8. Have you ever seen an advertisement by a lawyer?
__ YES NO (GO TO QUESTION 12)
9. How do you perceive attorneys who advertise? (please circle
the number on the scale corresponding to your view)
Honesty: Extremely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely
Dishonest Honest
Competence: Extremely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely
Incompetent Cozpetent
Helpfulness: Extremely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely
Unhelpful Helpful
Effectiveness: Extremely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely
Ineffective Effective
Reiability: Extremely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely
Unreliable Relisble
10. Have you ever seen an advertisement by a lawyer who
practices in your home state?
__ YES NO (GO TO QUESTION 12)




12. Do you feel secure that you















with the interests of
the Legal profession.
Lawyers are dedicated















1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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14. Would you ever use advertising as the sole basis of choosing
a lawyer?
__ YES NO UNCERTAIN
15. Is the content of ads, in general, truthful or misleading?
Ads, in general, are always truthful
_ Ads, in general, are usually truthful
I am uncertain
Ads, in general, are usually misleading
Ads, in general, are always misleading
16. Is the content of attorney ads truthful or misleading?
Attorney ads are always truthful
Attorney ads are usually truthful
I am uncertain
Attorney ads are usually misleading
Attorney ads are always misleading
17. Sex: Male, Female
18. Age: _ Years
19. Education Level of Head of Household:
Grade school Some college
___ Some high school __ College graduate
High school graduate Graduate school
20. Household Annual Income:
__Under 10,000 __ 30,000 - 40,000
1__ 0,000 - 20,000 __ 40,000 - 50,000
__ 20,000 - 30,000 __ Over 50,000
21. What is the size of your community?
- Under 5,000 (including rural)
__ 5,000 - 20,000
__ Over 20,000
22. Which Wisconsin/Iowa newspaper(s)
do you regularly read?
23. Which Wisconsin/Iowa television station(s)
do you regularly watch?
24. Which Wisconsin/Iowa radio station(s)




All of your answers will remain strictly confidential.
1. Are you currently in private law practice?
__ No (THERE IS NO NEED TO COMPLETE THE




2. What is the name of the firm with which you are
associated?
3. Of the methods below which you use to obtain clients,
please rate, from 1 to 10, their effectiveness (1= least
effective, 10= most effective). If you do not use a
method, please do not rate it.
- Advertising in media (Yellow Pages, newspapers,
television, radio, direct mail, etc.)
-_ Specifically directed goodwill promotion (e.g.,
attending conventions, dinners, etc.)
__ Referrals by past and present clients
__ Referrals by family/ friends
-_ Lawyer referral service (e.g. ABA)
Other
(Please specify:
4. Does your firm list anything other than name(s), address,
and telephone number in the current Yellow Paces of any
telephone book in your area?
_ NO (SKIP TO QUESTION 7) Yes
5. Does your firm specify any of the following services in






___ No specific services
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6. Which of the following information does that listing
contain?
___ Office or telephone answering service hours
_ Names of clients regularly represented







None of the above
7. Does your firm plan to list anything more than name(s),
address, and telephone number in next year's Yellow Pages?
Yes No Uncertain
8. Apart from the Yellow Pages, has your firm done any
advertising during the past six months?
__ No (SKIP TO QUESTION 12) Yes






10. Does your firm specify any of the following services in








11. Which of the following information did your firm advertise
in those media (other than the Yellow Pages)?
___ Office or telephone answering service hours
_ Names of clients regularly represented




___ Fees for specific services
Initial consultation information
_ A disclaimer stating that advertisements should
not be the sole basis for choosing an attorney
Other information
(Please specify: )
None of the above
12. Does your firm plan to do any advertising in the next six
months other than in the Yellow PaQes?
___ No (SKIP TO QUESTION 14)
Yes
_ Uncertain at this time (SKIP TO QUESTION 14)





-- Other (please specify:
NEXT WE WILL SKETCH SOME SITUATIONS OF COMMONLY ADVERTISED TYPES
OF LEGAL SERVICES AND ASK YOU A PEW QUESTIONS ABOUT EACH
SITUATION.
The first situation is a reciprocal "simple", will
Client Situation
-Husband is 35 years old.
-Wife is 33 years old.
-They have 2 children: a 12-year-old and a 14-year-old.
-They have modest estates that are not subject to the
payment of death taxes.
-You have determined that the testamentary objectives will
be properly served by reciprocal wills.
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Provisions of Will:
-All personal effects to spouse if he or she survives
testatrix/testator; otherwise to children in equaf
shares.
-All other property to spouse if he or she survives
testatrix/testator by four (4) months; otherwise equally
to children or issue of deceased children by
representation.
-If distribution is required to a minor -- personal
representative may retain and administer as trustee until
minor reaches majority.
-Representative named to serve without bond.
-Powers of representative set forth.
-Guardian of persons of minor children named.
Assume that you have never served these clients before,
and have no expectation that you or your firm will serve
them (or their personal representatives) in the future.
14. Would you, personally, perform this service?
_ No (SKIP TO QUESTION 17) --- Yes
15. How many hours of your time typically would be required to
perform this service, including any initial client
interview?
_ Hours
16. Would you usually charge an hourly rate OR a flat fee for
this service? What amount?
Hourly rate (Amount: $_)
___ Flat fee (Amount: $_)
The second situation is a variation of the previous will.
All of the facts are the same as in the preceding
situation, except that the testator and testatrix desire
the following disposition of the estate:
-If the spouse fails to survive testatrix/testator by four
(4) months, then all property other than personal effects
shall be placed in trust to provide for the children's
support and education through four years of college
(understanding that the expenses of each child may not be
equal).
-At the end of the trust term, distribution shall be made
equally to the children or issue of deceased children by
representation.
-The amount of the estate justifies such a provision, but
is still not large enough to give rise to estate tax
liability.
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Again, assume that you have never served these clients
before, and you have no expectation that you or your firm
will ever serve them (or their trustees or personal
representative) in the future.
17. Would you, personally, perform this service?
_ No (SKIP TO QUESTION 20) -- Yes
18. How many hours of your time typically would be required to
perform this service, including any initial client
interview?
Hours
19. Would you usually charge an hourly rate OR a flat fee for
for this service? What amount?
____ Hourly rate (Amount: $_ _ )
__Flat fee (Amount: $_ _ )
The third situation is an ",Uncontested", Non-Business Bankruptcy
of Husband and Wife.
Client Situation:
-Client is married and has two children.
-Husband earns $16,000 per year.
-Wife does not work.
-Husband has recently incurred hospital and medical bills
of more than $15,000 as a result of severe illness.
-He also owes about $1,800 to various creditors.
-He owns a four-year-old automobile (fully paid for) and
virtually no other non-exempt assets.
Client Intent:
-He is prepared to repay the $1,800 in incidental
liabilities.
-He feels that $15,000 in medical and hospital bills is an
impossible burden.
-He wishes to go through bankruptcy and wants to engage
you for this purpose.
Legal Services:
-Prepare petitions, schedules, and other appropriate
papers.
-Attend the first meeting of creditors and subsequent
proceedings to the extent customary in such cases.
-Perform any other services routinely provided in
connection with this type of "consumer bankruptcy."
Assume that you have never served either husband or wife
before, and you have no expectation that you or your firm
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will ever serve either of them in the future.
20. Would you, personally, perform this service?
No (SKIP TO QUESTION 25) - Yes
21. How many hours of your time typically would be required to
perform this service, including any initial client
interview?
Hours
22. Would you usually charge an hourly rate OR a flat fee for
for this service? What amount?
Hourly rate (Amount: $. _)
Flat fee (Amount: $_ _
23. Would you usually attend the first meeting of creditors in
cases such as this one?
No Yes
24. How many court appearances would you typically make in
this type of case (not counting the first meeting of
creditors as a court appearance)?
Court appearances
The final situation is an uncontested dissolution of marriage.
Client Situation
-Spouses jointly own their own home ($25,000 equity),
furnishings, and two cars.
-Both work.
-Husband earns $17,000 annually; wife earns $8,500
annually.
-Only the husband has pension rights or life insurance.
-The couple has no children.
-Spouses have agreed that wife will retain counsel to
represent her and that husband will proceed without
counsel. $
Terms of Dissolution (Fact Situation Continued On Next Page)
-Wife is to receive title to and all equity in the family
home.
-Wife is to give up all claims to husband's pension fund
(a death benefit of $5,000) and give up all claims to
proceeds of his life insurance.
-Wife will receive all personal property in the house
except husband's clothes, tools, and guns.
-Each spouse will receive one car.
-They will divide equally an expected tax refund and a
modest savings account.
-Husband will assume all indebtedness (including payment
[1991]
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of the mortgage on the house, which will be fully
amortized in five years).
-The only exception to assuming indebtedness is the
outstanding balance of a car loan on wife's car. Wife
will assume this.
-Wife is to receive no maintenance.
-Husband will pay wife's attorney fees in connection with
the divorce proceedings.
Service to be performed:
-Initial and subsequent consultation with wife.
-Drafting of the appropriate documents.
-Attend all appropriate court proceedings.
-Perform any other services customarily performed in
connection with a routine "uncontested" divorce or
dissolution.
Assume that you have never served either husband or wife
before, and you have no expectation that you or your firm
will ever serve either of them in the future.
25. Would you, personally, perform this service?
__ No (SKIP TO QUESTION 30) __ Yes
26. How many hours of your time typically would be required to
perform this service, including any initial client
interview?
Hours
27. Would you usually charge an hourly rate OR a flat fee for
for this service? What amount?
___ Hourly rate (Amount: $_)
___ Flat fee (Amount: $ _
28. How many court appearances would you typically make in
this type of routine uncontested dissolution or divorce?
Court appearances
29. How much time typically would be spent counseling your
client?
Hours
30. Lawyers often charge an hourly rate where it is not
possible to charge a flat fee for the services they offer.
What is the typical hourly rate you charge for your time?
$_ Typical per hour
31. What is the minimum hourly rate you may charge for your
time?
$ Minimum per hour
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32. What is the maximum hourly rate you may charge for your
time?
$ Maximum per hour
33. Please estimate the number of clients (count husband and
wife as one) you billed in the past three months for:
Number of Clients





34. Are your clients from primarily metropolitan (i.e., an
area with a population greater than 20,000) or primarily
rural areas?
__ Primarily metropolitan - Primarily rural
35. Is your own practice of law a general one, or is most of
the work you do specialized in one or more areas of the
law?
_ General practice (Skip to Question 37)
-_ Specialized practice
36. Which of the following areas of law are areas in which
your practice is specialized?
Bankruptcy
___ Domestic relations / family
Probate / Trust / Estate planning
Other
(Please specify:
37. What is your position within the firm with which you are
associated?
___ In individual practice
Partner
Associate
___ Other (Please specify:
38. Do you work full-time or part-time for this law firm?
__ Full-time _ Part-time
39. How many full-time equivalent attorneys are there in your
law firm (including you)?
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40. How many full-time equivalent personnel does your firm
have doing paralegal work?
41. Does your firm use word processing machines?
No Yes
42. How many different office locations does your firm have
serving clients?
__ One (SKIP TO QUESTION 44)
Two
Three
____ Four or more (Please specify how many:
43. Are all offices located within the same state?
No Yes
The next few questions will ask you certain personal information
so that we can compare answers of attorneys with different
backgrounds.
44. How old are you?
45. What is your sex? __ Female Male
46. In what year was your law degree granted?
47. From which school was it granted?
48. Have you earned any other graduate degrees?
No
___ Yes (Please specify degree:
49. Have you received any other professional certifications?
(e.g., CPA)
No
_ Yes (Please specify:
Finally, we will ask a few questions to obtain your views on
attorney advertising in the legal profession.
50. On a scale of 1 to 10, rate each statement below as to how
well it describes attorneys (1 = does not describe
attorneys, 10 = best describes attorneys).
__ sympathetic to their clients's interests
concerned with their own interests
___ concerned with the interests of the legal profession
___ dedicated to making the justice system work
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51. Do you think that advertising by attorneys benefits the
public, or that it is not in the public's best interest?
-_ Definitely in the public's interest
-_ Generally in the public's interest
_ Not likely to make a difference
-_ Generally not in the public's interest
__ Definitely not in the public's interest
52. Do you think that allowing attorneys to advertise is
in the best interest of the legal profession, or do you
think that it is not in the legal profession's best
interests?
- Definitely in the legal profession's interest
- Generally in the legal profession's interest
__ Not likely to make a difference
-_ Generally not in the legal profession's
interest
-_ Definitely not in the legal profession's
interest
53. Assuming that you were convinced that advertising in any
print or broadcast medium would increase the volume of




_ No, probably not
__ No, definitely not
54. Do you believe that the public obtains useful information
from the following disclosure accompanying attorney
advertisements: "The choice of a lawyer is an extremely
important decision and should not be based solely upon






Thank you for your help.
